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PREFACE   
On 7 March 1991, 27.000 Albanians, escaping from the post-communist chaos in their 
home country, arrived in Brindisi on board of merchant ships. It was the first great 
exodus of migrants towards Italy. The country discovered itself to be a land of 
immigration.  
Eight years later, the Parliament adopted Law n. 40/1998 then merged into the 
Legislative Decree n. 286/1998, the so-called Testo Unico Immigrazione (hereafter 
TUI) representing the first organic regulation on migration. Moving from the idea that 
equal rights represent the very foundation of integration policies, the TUI besides 
establishing the conditions of entry and residence in the country, provided the first ad 
hoc antidiscrimination clause on grounds of race, ethnic origin and nationality, while 
regulating access to employment, social protection, healthcare and education. Only 
two years following the adoption of the TUI, the national legislature, admittedly 
distant from solidarity concerns, would start a process of reconsideration of the steps 
taken by the TUI, opting in favour of more a repressive approach to immigration and 
restricting the scope for equal treatment under the TUI.1  
Yet, protection from discrimination and equality of treatment for migrants is far from 
being the exclusive domain of national authorities. The framework of International 
conventions indeed poses significant constraints to States in view to safeguarding 
human rights or otherwise directly focusing on migrants’ rights. The International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European 
                                                            
1 Art. 80 (19) Law n. 388/2000; Law n. 189/2002; Law n. 94/2009 
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Convention on Human Rights and the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75 
represent only the main examples in this regard.  
In addition, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the 
European Union has intervened in both respects. As to the first, in 2000 the EU 
adopted the Racial Equality Directive (RED) aiming to implement the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. The adoption 
of the Directive proved the EU was resolute in its will to take action against race and 
ethnic discrimination and was praised as an important step forward in the fight, in 
particular in consideration of the attention it pays to the enforcement of the prohibition 
of discrimination. As to the second, the EU has taken steps to narrow the differences 
of treatment between TCNs and EU nationals adopting a number of equality clauses 
granting equality of treatment to TCNs as regards areas such as employment and 
social security, though with different degrees according to the legal status TCNs enjoy 
under EU law.2 
The RED and equal treatment clauses provided under the above EU Directives, despite 
the flaws that have characterized the process of their implementation in the national 
system, have enhanced the opportunities for actors to challenge through courts 
differences of treatment related to nationality.   
Whereas the first years following the adoption of the TUI appear to have been marked 
by particularly low levels of litigation3, national reports on the enforcement of the 
prohibition of discrimination following the implementation of the RED clearly point 
to significant increase in the number of judicial decisions in this regard as well as to 
growing engagement of civil society organizations in litigation. 4  
                                                            
2 EU Directives 2003/109/EC; 2004/83/EC, 2009/50/EC; 2011/98/UE, 2014/36/UE. 
3 D. Gottardi, Le discriminazioni basate sulla razza e sull’origine etnica, in M. Barbera (ed.), Il 
nuovo diritto antidiscriminatorio, Giuffrè, 2007, p. 1; A. Guariso, L’azione civile contro la 
discriminazione, in M. Ferrero and F. Perocco (ed.) Razzismo al lavoro. Il sistema della 
discriminazione sul lavoro, la cornice giuridica e gli strumenti di tutela, Franco Angeli, 2011, 
p. 286. 
4 See in particular in this regard ECRI Reports on racism and discrimination in Italy. As to the 
	 4	
Equal rights litigation assumes particular salience in the national context in the light of 
the legal framework regulating acquisition of citizenship. Indeed, though Italy has 
progressively become home to long-term immigrants, the law on citizenship, as 
adopted in 19925, fails to take into account this changing reality. It reflects the vision 
of a country of emigration providing distinct mechanisms of acquisition of citizenship 
for the descendants of Italian emigrants and the “newcomers”, clearly prioritizing the 
former compared to the latter. In order to be eligible for Italian citizenship, the law 
requires first generation migrants at least ten years of uninterrupted legal residence. 
For those born in Italy the path isn’t any easier. In order to qualify for citizenship 
second generations are required uninterrupted legal residence in Italy up to the age of 
eighteen. In addition excessively long procedures for establishing entitlement and a 
number of procedural constraints further contribute to withholding citizenship rights. 
This study intends to explore how, under what conditions and with what 
consequences, legal actors have relied on the prohibition of discrimination to 
challenge nationality related differences of treatment. 
It will do so, through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the case law, combining 
legal research with the analytical tools of the historical-comparative research in social 
sciences.  
The research will rely on original data gathered from lower courts decisions issued 
from 1998 to 2015 and concerning the enforcement of the prohibition of 
discrimination under the TUI and the national legislation implementing the RED at the 
national level. 
The collection of case law includes 232 lower courts decisions. Relevant case law has 
been selected through multiple sources: national case law databases (in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                              
engagement of civil society organizations see in particular A. Guariso (ed.), Senza distinzioni. 
Quattro anni di contrasto alle discriminazioni istituzionali nel Nord Italia, Quaderni di Apn, 2, 
2012. The publication collects 52 judicial decisions, most of which issued following claims 
filed by civil society organizations. 
5 Law n. 91/1992. 
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Foro Italiano, De Jure, Sistema Leggi D’Italia), institutions (in particular, the National 
Office Against Racial Discrimination and the Emilia Romagna Region), and civil 
society organizations and networks engaged in migrants’ rights advocacy (in 
particular, ASGI and Melting Pot). 
Data have been collected and classified through a research software (Atlas.ti) used by 
social science scholars mostly for qualitative research, though not exclusively. The 
software allows to classify and code parts of the imported documents that are 
considered relevant for the purposes of the research and includes a number of analytic 
tools that help the researcher in the interpretation of data, such as the possibility to 
build queries and display absolute and relative frequencies of codes.  
The research moves from an analysis of the US literature on public interest law, on 
law and social change and law and social movements. Despite adopting different 
approaches, these three different areas of research share a common concern: does law 
and litigation strategies matter for social reform? 
Since the National Association for the Advancement of Colored (NAACP) campaign 
against public segregation in education and the consequent decision of the US 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education 6  that held segregation 
unconstitutional, US scholars have articulated such concern under different forms, 
questioning the ability of courts to bring about “real change”, asking under what 
conditions litigation is more likely to emerge and be successful, and finally exploring 
how litigation affects grassroots, social actors themselves and their interaction with 
political opponents.  
The first chapter will provide an overview of the scientific literature in this regard, in 
the US and European contexts.  
Chapter two will focus in particular on tracing how the implementation of the RED 
and TCNs equal treatment clauses provided by EU law has effected the opportunities 
for effective enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination at the national level.  
                                                            
6 Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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Chapter three will analyse the extent to which such enhanced opportunities have 
provided the incentives for legal actors to turn to courts and shaped their legal 
strategies and chances to succeed in court. In addition it will trace the impact of 
litigation in terms of achieving equal rights in courts. 
Finally, the last chapter will investigate whether litigation has contributed to 
significant social reform by shifting focus from courts to policy response. 
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Chapter I 
LAW AND SOCIAL REFORM  
1. Brown’s legacy. 
On May 17, 1954, the US Supreme Court delivered a unanimous opinion in Brown v. 
Board of Education7 declaring that segregation in public schools entailed a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Refusing to set the clocks back to the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted8, the Court underlined the importance of public education as 
“the very foundation of good citizenship” and stated that segregated public schools 
were not “equal” and could not be made “equal”. 
“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race”, emphasized the Court, “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone”.9  
Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, physical facilities 
and other “tangible” factors being equal, represented in itself, according to the Court, a 
                                                            
7 Ft. 6 
8 Acknowledging the inconclusive nature of the Fourteenth Amendment's history with respect 
to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time, the Court states: “In 
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout”. 
See p. 492 of the decision. 
9 Ibid, p. 494. 
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denial of equal educational opportunities and equal protection of laws.  
The ruling represents the culmination of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) legal campaign 10  targeting the system of racial 
subordination linked to segregation and the legal doctrine of “separate but equal” 
established by the US Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson11. Under this doctrine, 
equality of treatment was “guaranteed” when the “races” were provided substantially 
equal, although separate, facilities.  
When the NAACP legal campaign took shape, segregated schools were anything but 
equal. Disparities varied from one State to another. Whereas in North Carolina, the 
best of Southern States, the ratio of expenditures for white pupils to those for black 
pupils was less than 2 to 1, and teachers’ monthly salaries averaged $98.20 for whites 
and $66.53 for blacks, disparities in South Carolina were extremely alarming. The per 
capita expenditures on whites were $36.10 and on blacks $4.17 and the average annual 
salary for white teachers was $885 and that for blacks $261.12 Disparities concerning 
physical facilities and transportation were even more dramatic. 
It was a time when “alternative forms of protest - political mobilisation, economic 
boycotts, street demonstrations, and physical resistance - were largely unavailable to 
southern blacks, that lived under a ruthlessly repressive regime of racial 
subordination”.13  
                                                            
10 For an extended account of the campaign, see M. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy 
against Segregated Education, 1925-1950, The University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
11 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy involved the constitutionality of Louisiana 
statute requiring railroads to provide separate and equal accommodations for black and white 
passengers. 
12 M. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy, cit., p. 5 and 6. The data appear in NAACP 
reports on disparities in per capita expenditures for white and black students and differences in 
salaries paid to white and black teachers in Georgia, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, and 
Oklahoma. The reports were published from 1926 to 1928. 
13 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights movement, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 230. See also M. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy, cit. p. 12. The author 
gives account of the arguments of Charles Thompson, dean of the School of Education at 
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The litigation campaign was originally intended to support litigation seeking to “make 
the cost of a dual school system prohibitive and therefore speed the abolishment of 
segregated schools”. Nonetheless, since the early stages of its implementation the legal 
staff would also directly act to erode the “separate but equal” system of public 
education, though the choice between desegregation and equalization of expenditure 
would be left to the defendants. As a result, the campaign entailed a double attack on 
segregation, directly in cases in which States chose to equalize spending by integrating 
schools and indirectly by making the cost of segregated schools unaffordable. 14 
The NAACP could count on brilliant lawyers like Charles Houston and Thurgood 
Marshall who were deeply committed to the campaign, able to adapt it to local 
demands and conditions and to actively engage in community meetings contributing to 
raise comprehension on the issues at stake and obtain support to the campaign.15  
Between 1933 and 1950 the NAACP’s legal staff filed cases targeting three distinctive 
objectives: segregation of graduate and professional schools, disparities on salaries 
between black and white teachers, disparities concerning physical facilities at black 
and white elementary and secondary schools.16  
Finding plaintiffs, filing claims and winning them in court was only one part of the 
struggle. Enforcing courts’ decisions was often very difficult. Pressure on plaintiffs 
was not irrelevant. It required a lot of effort to prevent them from accepting settlements 
for less than they could win through litigation, or on the contrary, from rejecting offers 
for more than they could win. Furthermore, non-parties’ elusive practices of legal 
precedents forced litigants to invest on follow-up cases time and resources comparable 
                                                                                                                                                              
Howard University, in support of a litigation campaign. Thompson first considers that no 
alternatives to litigation were reasonable. Migration was inconceivable, revolt suicidal, and 
appeals to the sense of fairness of whites likely to be useless. Thus blacks “must resort to the 
courts. They have no other reasonable litigation legitimate alternative”. 
14 M. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy, cit. p. 14 e 27. 
15 Ibid, p. 44. 
16 Ibid, p. 34. 
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those required by the test cases. “Litigation was draining the NAACP's resources, with 
increasingly small returns for the effort”.17  
After 1950, it became clear that the equalization strategy would not work in pressuring 
Southern States towards desegregation. The NAACP decided to change the plan and 
directly target segregation. They litigated and won the Brown case.18  
But yet, “Brown was two decisions, one on the merits and the other on the remedy”19. 
On May 17, 1954, the US Supreme Court declared segregation unlawful but it 
provided no immediate remedy. Justices ordered reargument on several issues which 
they considered of particular complexity: should desegregation be immediate or 
gradual, how detailed the decree should be, should the Court limit relief to the named 
parties in the lawsuit.20  
Although the NAACP strongly pressed for immediate desegregation, to be 
accomplished before the fall of 1956,21 on May 31, 1955, the Court decided in favour 
of gradual desegregation. Cases were remanded to District Courts that would supervise 
desegregation issuing decrees consistent with “local conditions” and order the 
admission of “parties to these cases” to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory 
basis “with all deliberate speed”. The Supreme Court provided no deadlines or clear 
guidelines for desegregation. “With all deliberate speed” was viewed as “a signal that 
encouraged both noncompliance with, and even resistance to desegregation”.22 
The after Brown era was characterized, on one hand by elusive practices of non 
compliance, such as transfer options, which permitted parents to move their children 
                                                            
17 Ibid, p. 82. 
18 The Board of directors of NAACP resolution in July 1950 declared the Association would 
“seek education on a non-segregated basis and no relief other than that would be acceptable”. 
19 M. Tushnet, Symposium: Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute to Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguties of Brown, in Fordham Law 
Review, 61, 1, 1992, p. 23. 
20 Brown v. Board of education II, 347 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
21 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education, cit. p. 80. 
22 M. Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, in Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy, 16, 2004, p.14. 
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out of desegregated schools, pupil placement schemes, which assigned students to 
schools on the basis of a list of apparently neutral criteria and freedom of choice plans 
living to the student the choice as to the school in which to enrol, and on the other by 
manifest resistance to desegregation and sometimes violence.23  
A few months after Brown was decided, new white supremacist organizations, the 
White Citizens’ Councils, were formed, with the primary objective of opposing 
desegregation of schools.  
Early in 1956, 19 Senators and 82 Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto 
which defined the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown as a “clear abuse of judicial 
power” and showed strong support to Southern States intending to resist the 
implementation of Brown with all “lawful means”. 
School boards, under the pressure of community resistance had strong reasons not to 
desegregate before courts had ordered it, making litigation necessary in almost every 
county. The NAACP was struggling to provide the necessary support to litigants while 
facing severe institutional attacks and violence form white segregationists.24  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court avoided further involvement over school 
desegregation until 1963, denying full review in a number of cases, with the sole 
exception of the Little Rock case.25 
In September 1957, notwithstanding the approval by the District Court of a gradual 
desegregation plan, state militia under the authority of Governor Faubus and white 
mob violence prevented nine black students form entering Little Rock high school.  
After weeks of persistent criticism, President Eisenhower decided to intervene sending 
the army’s 101st Airborne Division to escort black students to and from Little Rock 
Central High School and to provide them with protection while inside the school.  
                                                            
23 M. Tushnet, Symposium: Brown v. Board, cit. p. 24; M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of 
Education, cit. p. 88, M. Minow, Suprising Legacies, cit. p. 12. 
24 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education, cit., p. 126. 
25 Ibid, p. 90.  
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Following the chaos and the inconceivable violence determined by these events the 
Board of Little Rock asked the District Court to suspend the desegregation plan for two 
and a half years in order to allow community resistance to lessen. The District Court 
agreed, but the decision was reversed in appeal.26  
In Cooper v. Aaron27 the Supreme Court confirmed the appellate decision insisting that 
“the constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the 
violence and disorder which have followed”. 
Notwithstanding the criticism of the NAACP, it took the justices almost 10 years to 
return on the issue of school desegregation and the concept of “all deliberate speed”.  
At the time, the civil disobedience movement under the leadership of Martin Luther 
King was mobilising African Americans all across the country.  
In response to the eruption of direct action protest, many lower court judges had 
already begun to reject “gradualist tactics” and national politicians were increasingly 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the pace of desegregation. 28 
Within this transformed context the US Supreme Court decided Watson v. Memphis.29 
The case concerned desegregation of public parks and other publicly owned 
recreational facilities from which African Americans were excluded. The city of 
Memphis defence pointed at the partial segregation already achieved and justified its 
delay by urging the need to proceed gradually towards full desegregation.  
For the first time the Court referred to its decision on the remedies to clarify that it 
“never contemplated that the concept of ‘deliberate speed’ would countenance 
indefinite delay in elimination of racial barriers in public schools, let alone other public 
                                                            
26 District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 163 F.Supp. 13 and Court of Appeal for 
the Eighth Circuit, 257 F.2d 33. 
27 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
28 In February 1963, in a special civil rights message to the Congress, President John F. 
Kennedy declared Brown to be “both legally and morally right” and criticized the process of 
desegregation as “too slow, often painfully so.” M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education, cit., 
p. 101. 
29 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). 
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facilities not involving the same physical problems or comparable conditions.” 
The same year in Goss v. Board of Education30, the Court invalidated a minority-to-
majority transfer scheme that allowed that any student, upon request, would be 
permitted, solely on the basis of his own race and the racial composition of the school 
to which he was assigned to transfer from such school, where he would be in the racial 
minority, back to his former segregated school, where his race would be in the 
majority.  
In Griffin v. School Board31, the Court held that the closure of public schools in order 
to avoid full implementation of Brown was as well not permissible. 
The concept of “all deliberate speed” was definitively set aside only in 1968 in Green 
v. County32  concerning a “freedom of choice” plan for desegregation permitting 
students to choose annually between the two schools of the County.33 
During the plan's three years of operation, “no white student had chosen to attend the 
all-Negro school”, and although 115 African Americans enrolled in the formerly all-
white school, 85% of the African American students in the system still attended a 
segregated school. 
It is for the School Board, stated the Court “to provide a plan that promises realistically 
to work now, and a plan that, at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of 
prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system is intolerable.” 
Lower courts reacted to this change of pace starting to supervise the operation of 
schools more aggressively and the NAACP intensified its efforts in bringing cases 
before courts and demanding more effective policies. Nonetheless, actual 
desegregation in the Deep South came only after Congress enacted the 1964 Civil 
                                                            
30 Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
31 Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
32 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).  
33 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education, cit., p. 90. 
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Rights Act.34 Besides authorizing the Department of Justice to enforce Brown through 
litigation, the act provided the possibility for the latter to withhold federal funds from 
school systems that discriminated against African Americans.35  
The percentage of southern black children in desegregated schools shot up from 1.18% 
in 1964, to 6.1 % in 1966, to 16.9 % in 1967, 32 % in 1969, and roughly 90 % in 
1973.36 
Did Brown matter, then? More than half a century after Brown was decided, the debate 
is still very much alive, although there is significant agreement as to its limited direct 
effects on segregation in public education.37 A more recent picture of public education 
in the US might provide further support to this view. Since the 1980s in many districts 
where court supervised desegregation was ended, it is shown that there has been a 
major increase in segregation.38 But, it might also shed some light on the hardships of 
changing society, inviting us to carefully consider where to set the threshold of 
relevance when assessing the importance of litigation for social reform. Brown did not 
end segregation, neither the Civil Rights Act did. 
This considered, as Klarman puts it, “counting the number of black children attending 
desegregated schools is only one way - and perhaps a rather poor one - for evaluating 
Brown’s importance”.39 
His brilliant analysis of Brown shows that the US Supreme Court decision meant in 
much more complex ways. Building on historical evidence, he claims that although 
Brown did not create the Civil Rights Movement, the ruling had significant indirect 
                                                            
34 Ibid, p. 110. 
35  M. Minow, In Brown's wake: Legacies of America's educational landmark, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 22. 
36 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education cit. p. 124 (These figures do not distinguish 
between blacks attending schools with many whites and with few whites). 
37 D. A. Schultz (ed.), Leveraging the law: Using the courts to achieve social change, Peter 
Lang Pub Incorporated, 1998. 
38 G. Orfield and L. Chungmei, Brown at 50: King’s dream or Plessy’s nightmare, 2004, quoted 
in M. Minow, Surprising Legacies, cit., p.13. 
39 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education cit. p. 125-148. 
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effects.40  
Firstly, the decision clearly inspired blacks: “to have the Court declare segregation to 
be unconstitutional was symbolically important, and it furthered the hope and the 
conviction that fundamental racial change was possible.” 
In Klarman’s account, it mattered also in another more tortuous way. Brown “raised 
the salience of school desegregation” forcing politicians, political parties and social 
organizations to take a position on the issue, which they had previously been able to 
avoid doing”. It forced southern politicians to take a position that given the dominant 
public opinion in the South could not be other than one of support of segregation and 
condemnation of Brown.  
Shifting the focus of southern blacks to school desegregation Brown forced 
confrontation on an issue on which southern whites were much more resistant 
contributing in turn to “the prosperity of extremists”. The backlash was powerful. Yet, 
“the violence ignited by Brown, especially when directed at peaceful protestors and 
broadcast on television, produced a counterbacklash”. By the early 1960s, northerners 
were no longer prepared to tolerate the brutal beatings of peaceful black demonstrators, 
and they responded to such scenes by demanding civil rights legislation that attacked 
segregation at its core.41 
In conclusion, looking at the litigation campaign that brought to Brown, the vision of 
the future radiating from the US Supreme Court decision, its embattled aftermath and 
its relevance for the civil right movement, it is hard no to agree with Minow describing 
Brown as both “the ‘landmark’ emblem of social justice” and “the symbol of the 
                                                            
40 For an opposing view see G. N. Rosenberg, The hollow hope: Can courts bring about social 
change?, University of Chicago Press, 2008. According to the author the decision of the 
Supreme Court was nothing more than a “hollow hope”. It had no impact on ending segregation 
or on the Civil Rights Movement.  
41 M. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education cit. p. 229. 
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limitations of court-led social reform.”42 
2. Public interest law. Looking behind and ahead.  
The Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education supported the view that 
courts can be a powerful ally for protecting the rights of subordinated groups, 
especially when political pressure and direct action are not available strategies. 
Inspired by the promise of social reform embodied in Brown, new organizations, 
modelled on the NAACP and other civil rights groups such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and Legal aid, 43  developed in the 1960s and 1970s, 
generating what became known as the “public interest law movement”.44  
After blacks, other minorities, the poor, environmentalists, consumers, and women 
turned to lawyers and courts to vindicate their rights.45 
Some contextual factors contributed to the growth of public interest law during this 
period. The “rise of the administrative state”, the “civil rights litigation”, and 
“enhanced social protection through the welfare state” legitimized public interest law 
practice. Public interest practice was viewed as a supplement to all of three, making 
sure that all interest were taken into consideration, that rights became reality and 
welfare benefits went to the legitimate recipients.46  
                                                            
42 M. Minow, Suprising Legacies, cit., p.12. 
43 M. Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, in Virginia Law Review, 2004, 
p. 1695. 
44 The classic approach to public interest practice, and the model of firms that embodied this 
idea, emerged in the 60s and 70s. Although there were precursors such as the NAACP, ACLU, 
and Legal Aid, the idea of broad “public interest” practice really crystallized in this period.  See 
L. G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public 
Interest Law, in Wisconsin Law Review, 2005, p. 457 and J.F. Handler, Social Movements and 
the Legal System: Theory of Law Reform and Social Change, Academic, 1976. According to 
Handler “by the end of the 60s the use of litigation as an instrument for social reform became so 
widespread that it can be called a movement”.   
45 J.F. Handler, Social Movements, cit. p. 27. 
46 See L.G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries, cit. p. 458. 
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Centralized agencies subject to reform through impact litigation potentially affecting 
millions of people all across the country, an activist judiciary, and an expanding 
welfare system open to enforcement provided the conditions to effectively deploy legal 
strategies at the federal level.47 
Available resources were relevant as well.48 Federal funding for legal services, fee-
shifting rules and private foundations grants, provided the necessary financial 
resources for litigation. In 1965 the federal government launched the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (EOE) Legal Services Program. The program went beyond 
providing legal services, pursuing in the late 1960s and early 1970s systemic law 
reform on behalf of the poor. Following the dismantlement of EOE, the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC), an independent federally funded entity provided the resources to 
dramatically expand local legal services for poor communities. During the same period 
federal courts relied on their equitable powers to grant attorney fees to successful 
plaintiffs in public interest cases, while the 1964 Civil Rights Act and environmental 
protection laws provided a statute basis for fee shifting.  Finally, substantial financial 
support came from foundation grants49. In 1970 the Ford Foundation launched its 
public interest law initiative becoming one of the main supporters of public interest 
law organizations.50  
Such factors did also influence the features of the movement, consolidating its focus on 
impact litigation, although there was some room for individual representation 
especially in the poverty field, and the pre-eminence of lawyers and their skills over 
                                                            
47 S. Cummings and D. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights From Theory and Practice, 
in Fordham Urban Law Journal, 36, 4, 2009, p. 606. 
48 C. R. Epp, The rights revolution: Lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative 
perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998; C. A. Albiston and L. B. Nielsen, 
Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It 
Matters for Social Change, in Law & Social Inquiry, 39,1, 2014, p. 62  
49 L. B. Nielsen, and C. R. Albiston, Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975-2004, in 
North Carolina Law Review, 84, 2005, p. 1616. 
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the practice of public interest law.51  
In 1976, the use of litigation for social reform was so widespread that reflecting on 
what was happening in federal courts at the time, Chayes noticed the emergence of a 
new model of adjudication, the “public law” adjudication model. 52  Unlike the 
traditional model, commonly viewed as a vehicle for solving disputes between two 
private parties, “public law” litigation aimed at bringing institutional reform involving 
a multiplicity of interests and had widespread effects beyond the parties of the case. As 
such it required complex forms of relief, special non-legal expertise and continuing 
involvement of the judge over the course of implementation.  
As legal scholars started to investigate the complexities inherent to this different 
adjudication model as to the role of the judge53, the forms of relief54 and the fair 
representation of plaintiffs,55 and assessing its relevance in defining the role of courts 
in the American political system,56 the context that favoured its emergence was already 
changing. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, as the right gained power, growing conservatism among 
the judiciary, 57  reform of centralized federal agencies following the trend of 
decentralization and drastic curtailment of welfare benefits at the federal level, 
significantly limited opportunities for litigation strategies.58  
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Additionally, liberal public interest law groups underwent an even more insidious 
attack aiming to undercut their financial resources. They had to face reduced federal 
funding for legal services, rules limiting political advocacy by organizations that were 
supported, even only in part, by such funds and restrictive interpretation of fee shifting 
statutes by the Supreme Court.59 “What the government provides, the government can 
take away,” observes Tushnet in criticising the (over)reliance of public interest 
organizations on governmental funds.60  
While limiting opportunities for liberal groups, these changes cleared the way to 
conservative advocacy groups.61 During this period, conservative groups experienced 
significant success in using liberal’s legal tactics pushing forward competing agendas 
on religious freedom, criminal law, property rights, and affirmative action, starting 
what Southworth defines as “the contest over the meaning of public interest law”.62 
The conservative’s reaction to the success of liberal public interest groups coincided 
with scholarly critique, both from the left and from the right. 
Notwithstanding increasing involvement of conservative groups in impact litigation, 
critics from the right contested reform oriented litigation for circumventing the 
legislative policy making process and thus for being fundamentally undemocratic.63 
Criticism from progressives, on the other hand, openly expressed disenchantment 
towards public interest law along different concerns. 
                                                            
59 C. A. Albiston and L. B. Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical 
Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, in University of California Law 
Review, 54, 2007, p. 1087. 
60 M. Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown, cit. p. 1701. 
61 S. L. Cummings and D. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation, cit. p. 607. 
62 A. Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of “Public Interest 
Law, in University of California Law Review, 52, 2005, p. 1223. See also A. Southworth, 
Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the conservative coalition, University of Chicago Press, 
2009. 
63 C. A. Albiston and L. B. Nielsen, Funding the Cause, cit. p. 68.  
	 20	
The first line of criticism, led by Bell64 and Lopez65 focused on the relation between 
public interest lawyers and affected constituencies and moved from the concern of the 
former disempowering rather than empowering the latter. Focusing on school 
desegregation, Bell offered an account of the NAACP’s legal campaign ignoring the 
preferences of local black communities. Additionally, Lopez highlighted the dangers of 
“lawyer domination” of poor people, urging public interest lawyers to “ground their 
work in the lives of the communities of the subordinated themselves.” 
The second line of critique was more concerned with the consequences of litigation 
strategies. It exposed on one hand the inefficacy of such strategy for achieving 
significant social reform, and on the other the risks it entailed for more promising 
social reform strategies, such as political mobilisation.  
Analysing the impact of litigation strategies across several areas of practice of public 
interest law – environmental, consumer, civil rights and social welfare –Handler 
highlighted its limits vis-à-vis what he considered the most relevant factor predicting 
the success of litigation strategies, the “bureaucratic contingency”. 66  Lack of 
transparency, administrative field-level discretion and technically complex decisions, 
in his account, prevent litigation from achieving significant tangible results, pushing 
reformers towards costly and time consuming activities, likely to drain their resources.  
Scheingold warned against what he termed the “myth of rights” and its underlying 
assumption, the belief that “litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from courts; 
that it can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights; and, finally, that 
realization is tantamount to meaningful change”67. Stressing that the relation between 
rights, remedies and social change is much more complex in the real world and often 
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reflects the same dynamics of power that litigation is expected to transform, he 
considers that “confusion of the symbolic with the real” is likely to divert attention 
from the inertial forces which sustain the status quo” and exhaust movement resources 
for more effective strategies. Additionally, he observes that litigation strategies tend to 
reformulate social conflicts within the framework of the adversary process, 
fractionalizing political action and therefore “dividing rather than uniting those who 
seek change.” 
Notwithstanding their concerns as to the limited direct effects of litigation strategies, 
both Handler and Scheingold provide a more optimistic assessment of litigation in 
discussing its potential “indirect effects”.  
According to Handler, in addition to evaluating success of litigation strategies at 
obtaining tangible benefits, it is also necessary to evaluate their indirect effects. 
Litigation can be used, as part of a larger campaign, to protect members involved in 
direct action, increase the bargaining power of the social reform group, support 
fundraising and provide legitimacy to the claims of the movement.  
“Regardless of the problems of implementation, observes, Scheingold, “rights can be 
useful political tools”. “It is possible to capitalize on the perceptions of entitlement 
associated with rights to initiate and to nurture political mobilisation, a dual process of 
activating a quiescent citizenry and organizing groups into effective political units.”  
In conceptualizing “indirect effects”, they indeed paved the way to contemporary 
approaches. 
In “Rights at work”, McCann analyses the impact of litigation campaigns on pay 
equality in the United States providing empirical support to Handler’s and Scheigold’s 
considerations.68 The author offers a detailed picture of the litigation campaign on pay 
equity in the United States analysing its impact on grassroots mobilisation, its 
transformative legacy, as well as its use as a means for political pressure and policy 
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implementation. McCann concludes that legal practices contributed significantly to pay 
equity reform, especially during the first stages of the emergence of the pay equity 
movement. Litigation helped in mobilising potential beneficiaries and “altering their 
perceptions about what advances might be viable (…).”69 
New understandings of the role of law and lawyers and the limits of litigation as a 
strategy have developed among public interest law leaders, as well.  
Increasing complexity of the problems at issue and growing conservatism, across 
different sites – the judiciary, the congress, the general public – have exacerbated such 
limits. Public interest law organizations seem to be deeply aware of this and share 
concerns about putting too much faith in litigation strategies to the detriment of 
political strategies.  
Away from the “utopian vision” of the founding period, leaders of public interest 
appear to be “less reliant on litigation and more innovative in their use of multiple 
legal, political and educational approaches.” 70 They still sometimes heavily rely on 
litigation to mobilise the necessary support and financial resources for political 
mobilisation and in cases in which other strategies are not available.71 
Most leaders are also well aware of the value of pursuing these initiatives in 
collaboration with other public interest and grassroots organizations and sometimes 
with government or private interest.  
In particular, collaboration with grassroots is expected to provide additional resources, 
perspectives and legitimacy, enhancing the chances to achieve major policy change 
and ensure better accountability.72 
This shift towards more collaborative practices is connected to another shift away from 
the “lawyer as the heroic figure” to the lawyer viewed, according to the circumstances, 
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as a collaborator or facilitator, managing collaborations with other actors in the first 
case, and facilitating the participation of affected constituencies in regulatory processes 
in the second.73  
Analysing a series of campaigns undertaken by a community coalition engaged in the 
struggle for racial and economic justice, Gordon provides further support for these 
findings. She describes the role played by lawyers “as supporting players rather than 
main characters, seeking to help organizations build the power needed to achieve their 
goals”.74 
Her narrative of the relationship between lawyers and affected communities offers the 
opportunity to envisage an alternative model of public interest practice beyond the 
concerns of “lawyer domination”. In her account, lawyers provide the necessary 
expertise needed to translate information about the law and make it intelligible to 
community groups as they make decisions on their strategic choices, legal tactics 
included, as well as translate community needs and organizational claims into legal 
causes of action, use legal tactics to support and protect community organizations and 
pursue legal change as a route to opening up spaces for community voice.  
3. Contemporary theoretical approaches   
Defining Public Interest Law 
The above brief history of the emergence, expansion and embattled era of the public 
interest law movement75 allows illustrating the difficulties related to defining public 
interest law as a discrete category of practice.  
One of the first and most commonly used definitions of the term, referred to public 
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interest law as the “representation of the underrepresented.”76 Public interest law was 
expected to correct underrepresentation through two different, although connected 
activities: individual representation for poor people, or people otherwise not in the 
condition to afford a lawyer and collective representation of specific groups excluded 
from or underrepresented in the policy making process.  
The definition has undergone the same challenges the public interest law movement 
has been subject to. It has been strongly contested, on the one hand in relation to the 
legitimacy of public interest law to represent the underrepresented, and on the other in 
relation to the concept of “underrepresentation” itself. Basically, conservatives have 
claimed that identifying who is underrepresented depends on political attitudes and 
context. As already mentioned, in the mid 1970s, conservatives groups started to 
systematically use liberal public interest lawyers’ legal tactics to advance their own 
agendas emphatically claiming the public interest designation. 
In the light of the difficulties of defining the boundaries of the category of public 
interest law, Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold proposed the alternative concept of 
“cause lawyering.” 77  It referred to the lawyer’s motivation rather than to their 
engagement in the realization of a particular vision of society.  
Yet “cause lawyering” raised other concerns as to how ample the notion of “cause” 
should be or the opportunity of considering under the same category lawyers moved by 
utterly different “causes”, such as those pursuing strategies of deregulation of financial 
markets and those seeking stronger protection for retail consumers of financial 
services.  
Moving away from the idea that “‘the public interest’ in ‘public interest law’ is simply 
in the eye of the beholder”, Cummings, building on the definitions of public interest 
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law provided by Handler et al.,78 suggests to define public interest law as a “category 
of practice (…) used to describe legal activities that advance the interest and causes of 
constituencies that are disadvantaged in the private market and political process 
relative to more powerful social actors.” 79 
In drawing attention to the concept of “relative disadvantage” as referred to the ability 
of a constituency to mobilise resources (money, expertize, social capital) for advancing 
individual and collective group interests, he suggests that it is possible to identify the 
constituencies served by different organizations, in different cases, and then to assess 
the power differential between them as a basis for distinguishing which among 
competing causes might legitimately lay claim to the public interest. 
On this ground, he identifies two different dimensions of public interest law. The first 
is related to basic market inequality (access dimension) and the second to political 
inequality (policy dimension).   
The access dimension consists in providing with no cost and on individual basis legal 
services to individuals deprived of the possibility to ask legal redress because they are 
too poor to afford a lawyer. In this case, the justification of public interest law is 
procedural in nature. The access dimension is limited to achieving effective access to 
justice meant as equal opportunities to bring claims in court. This makes it far less 
controversial compared to the policy dimension as far as it does not choose some 
claims over others and promote a specific vision of society. 
The second dimension of public interest law is aimed to address political inequality. 
The disadvantage in this case consists in the impossibility or limitations some social 
groups face in advancing their interests through political channels.  
Relying on concept of relative disadvantage the definition allows to include “activities 
on both sides of the political spectrum that legitimately advance disadvantaged 
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interests, but excludes those on behalf of the existing structures of power” and “it does 
not in the end suggest that all claims asserted by less powerful groups necessarily 
advance a normative conception of the public interest to which all segments of society 
should subscribe.”80 
Yet most scholars have moved away from the attempt to define public interest law 
adopting a more pragmatic approach. Rather than focusing on the normative 
justification of the practice, contemporary research tends to focus primarily on how 
law and litigation strategies matter for actors interested in social reform.   
Law as politics 
Contemporary approaches consider legal tactics as one of the many tactics available to 
social movements81 and share a basic premise: law has limits and its relevance for 
social change deeply depends on context, accounting for both legal and extra legal 
factors.82 
Borrowing McCann’s words, “how it (the law) matters depends on the complex, often 
changing dynamics of the context in which struggles occur. Legal relations, 
institutions, and norms tend to be double-edged, at once upholding the larger 
infrastructure of the status quo while providing limited opportunities for episodic 
challenges and transformations in that ruling order.” 
Building on social movement scholarship theorizing about collective action based on 
“political process models”, the approach named “legal mobilisation” provides a 
framework for investigating how law matters for social movements during the different 
stages of development of movement activity and for examining the contextual factors 
(be this legal or extra legal) that encourage the use of legal tactics and determine their 
effectiveness. 
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Before going into further detail, it is important to clarify what the concept of “legal 
mobilisation” stands for and how this approach conceptualizes law.  
In relation to the first, scholars adopting the legal mobilisation approach commonly 
refer to the definition of legal mobilisation provided by Zemans.83 Highlighting the 
importance of citizens’ mobilisation of law as a form of political participation, he 
considers that “law is (…) mobilized when a desire or want is translated into a demand 
as an assertion of one’s rights.” The definition is deliberately very broad encompassing 
a wide range of activities through which individuals or collective actors use law as a 
means to advance their claims towards other individuals or society.84  
As to the second, moving away from a narrow conceptualization of law in strictly 
positive terms, the legal mobilisation approach relies on a much more sophisticated 
understanding of law. Whereas not excluding instrumental considerations about the 
direct, tangible effects of litigation, courts and lawyers, this approach focuses also on 
law’s power as a “constitutive convention of social life”85. Law’s constitutive power 
works in a twofold way: legal knowledge contributes to moulding the identities and the 
behaviour of individuals in society structuring their very understanding, expectation 
and interaction with others and represents a resource that can be used to structure 
relations with others, to formulate rightful claims and to negotiate disputes. Law can 
thus matter as both end of and means of action for social struggle.  
The legal mobilisation approach acknowledges that law reflects the distribution of 
power in society supporting the  status quo, and that there are constraints as to what is 
accepted as a legally sound or persuasive interpretation of law, and that some actors, 
like for example governing authorities, enjoy considerable advantages in the contest 
over its meaning. This does not however exclude that at times those interested in 
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challenging the status quo might be able to promote alternative interpretations of the 
law generating a complementary “constitutive” process, in which actors effect to some 
degree the understanding of the law. Such process can take place in the courtrooms, as 
well as outside, with reciprocal influences. Sometimes law’s impact is even more 
powerful outside of the courtrooms: litigation used as a threat might shape interaction 
and influence bargaining far more than actual direct intervention of a judge.86 
This considered, as regards the relationship between law and social movements 
contemporary research shows that probably the most significant contribution of law for 
social movements is during early stages of movement building. According to 
McCann87 law’s impact during this stage can be twofold.  
Firstly, it can contribute to the so-called agenda setting, by which movement actors 
draw on legal discourses to name and challenge existing social wrongs or injustices. 
Legal norms or litigation can become important elements in the process of explaining 
how existing relationships are unjust, in defining movement group goals and 
constructing a common identity among diversely situated citizens.  
Secondly, law and especially impact litigation can contribute to create a sense of 
vulnerability among both states and non-states authorities (exposing systemic 
vulnerability) and impart salience and legitimacy to the social movement claims. 
Apart from strongly influencing movement building, law and litigation are viewed as a 
source of institutional and symbolic leverage against opponents along two different 
stages of movement activity, for obtaining responsive actions to policy demands and 
ensuring implementation and enforcement.  
As to identifying the contextual factors that encourage the adoption of legal strategies 
and determine their effectiveness, scholars tend to focus on three main approaches: 
political opportunity structure (POS), legal opportunity structures (LOS), and resource 
mobilisation (RM). 
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“Political opportunity structure” refers broadly to the “institutional and sociocultural 
factors that shape social movement options - by making some strategies more 
appealing than others.”88 According to Tarrow, the concept includes “consistent - but 
not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that 
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their 
expectations for success or failure.”89 There is broad consensus as to the inclusion in 
POS of access to institutional structure, presence of allies, and configuration of power, 
that is to say the existence of conflicts among power elites on a given issue.  
Early studies on legal mobilisation have relied on the concept of POS to explain the 
choice of some groups to engage in litigation. Researchers focused specifically on the 
NAACP legal strategy have argued that “politically disadvantaged groups” are more 
likely to turn to the courts lacking the strength and means to push their agendas 
through political pressure. However subsequent research has provided examples 
where the contrary, that is to say political strength, is found to provide a persuasive 
explanation of legal mobilisation.90  
Critics of the adoption of POS approach for explaining legal mobilisation have 
identified as one of its major limits the failure to treat law as a separate variable.91 In 
accordance with such critique, Pedriana has revisited the concept of “political 
opportunity structure” to define specific attributes of a legal opportunity structure, 
arguing that legal rules and institutions, although generally not theorized in the 
political process literature, are themselves a type of political opportunity structure that 
enables or constrains social movements.92 
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The relevance of law and institutions in this regard has attracted growing attention 
among scholars leading to the development of a second approach to studying legal 
mobilisation, specifically focusing the legal (elements) of the opportunity structure 
such as rules concerning legal standing and access to resources and legal resources, 
including legal rights and favourable legal doctrine. 
According to the LOS approach such elements are likely to encourage or constrain 
litigation strategies and affect the success of actors in court.  
The third abovementioned approach shifts the focus away from the structuring 
environment to the characteristics of actors. Scholars adopting this approach highlight 
the importance of resources claiming that well-resourced groups are more likely to 
“come out ahead.” The term “resources” commonly includes financial resources to 
sustain litigation and legal expertise. Such approach relies on Galanter’s 1974 seminal 
piece on the potential and limits of the American legal system as a means for social 
change. The author argues that “haves”, which engage in similar litigation over time, 
enjoy a number of advantages in the legal system. Besides developing legal expertise 
and having lower costs for starting a new case, “haves” are in the position to afford 
high risk when key favourable rule development is at stake, skewing as a consequence 
rule development in their favour.93  
Epp further acknowledges the importance of resources in his analysis of the “rights 
revolution” in the United States. He shows that conventional explanations, focusing on 
constitutions, courts, culture and rights consciousness provide in this regard an 
incomplete explanation. As he puts it “cases do not arrive in (supreme) courts as if by 
magic.” Effective enforcement of rights, he argues, becomes possible only when a 
“support structure” including “rights advocacy organizations, rights advocacy lawyers, 
and sources of financing”94 has developed.  
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Resources however do not represent the only characteristic of actors playing a role in 
strategy choice. Vanhala proposes in this regard a fourth approach specifically looking 
at movement characteristics and key to explaining why groups that we would expect 
to adopt legal strategies don’t and others operating in environments hostile to legal 
strategies keep relying on them regardless of the obstacles and related costs95. 
Her approach focuses specifically on framing processes and collective identity.  
Defining a meaning frame as a interpretative scheme “that enables individuals to 
locate, perceive, identify and label aspects of an event in ways that make them 
meaningful”, she analyses the process through which collective frames are generated 
and their influence in shaping strategy choices. Frames guide perceptions and 
expectations of individuals or groups, defining therefore the perimeter of what is 
considered as an appropriate collective action and what is not.  
At the bottom of this approach lies the idea that the process of negotiation of 
collective frames might “dictate courses of actions that are considered more 
appropriate than others”. This implies, as Vahnala exemplifies, that organizations 
defining their membership as rights holders and the courts as an appropriate venue 
within which to pursue social movement agendas will be more likely to pursue legal 
strategies than organizations not considering their constituencies in the same terms 
and having strong preferences for non institutional strategies. 
The above mentioned four approaches, although presented as distinct do not exclude 
each other. In fact most studies combine usually more than one approach.  
Hilson provides an explanation of the strategy choices of the environmental, lesbian 
and gay movement in the UK through a stimulating analysis of the interaction between 
POS and LOS96. 
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McCann analysis of the contextual factors that supported or undermined legal rights 
advocacy for pay equity relies on a model taking into account the changing 
opportunities for litigation and the organizational resources movement activists were 
able to mobilise97. 
Epp for example considers courts and rights (defining although not explicitly a sort of 
legal opportunity structure) to provide only incomplete explanations, therefore arguing 
in this regard on the influence of the support structure.98 
Scholars adopting LOS approaches show how the LOS does not always represent the 
independent variable, adopting a more balanced view of the relevance of the legal 
opportunity structures and explicitly acknowledging the reciprocal influence between 
the structuring environment and actor agency.99  In other words, this means that the 
existence of a favourable LOS will not automatically translate in legal action, on the 
one hand, and that actors might actively engage in litigation in view to changing an 
adverse LOS in view to expanding opportunities for action.  
Highlighting the mutually constitutive relation between legal and cultural frames 
Andersen concludes action will depend on “frame alignment”, that is to say the 
process “where the speaker’s discussion of a subject leads the receiver of the 
discussion to alter the criteria on which she judges the subject”.100 
A favourable legal opportunity structure might therefore change the way social actors 
look at themselves while the way social actors perceive themselves might provide the 
incentives to change the law. 
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4. Legal mobilisation in Europe 
Whereas until recently most studies of legal mobilisation were focused on the US and 
comparative studies were indeed exceptional, 101 legal mobilisation is attracting 
increasing interest among European scholars, now actively engaged in the dialogue on 
legal mobilisation, providing empirical evidence of legal mobilisation in European and 
national contexts and contributing to theory development, as well102.  
But before turning to these growing body of research, it is useful to investigate the 
underlying idea of American exceptionalism lying behind the initial focus on the US. 
According to Kagan, whose work is considered foundational in this regard, the 
exceptional nature of the “American way of law” relies on the prevalence in the United 
States, compared to other Western Europe democracies, of a distinctive “method of 
policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-
dominated litigation”, which he calls “adversarial legalism”.103 
“Adversarial legalism”, in the lights of its findings, manifests itself in “(1) more 
complex bodies of legal rules; (2) more formal, adversarial procedures for resolving 
political and scientific disputes; (3) more costly forms of legal contestation; (4) 
stronger, more punitive legal sanctions; (5) more frequent judicial review of and 
intervention into administrative decisions and processes; (6) more political controversy 
about legal rules and institutions; (7) more politically fragmented, less closely 
coordinated decision-making systems; and (8) more legal uncertainty and 
instability.”104 
While recognizing the negative effects of “adversarial legalism”, its inefficiencies, 
high costs and unpredictability, Kagan highlights its virtues, in particular its openness 
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towards new kind of justice claims, its ability to empower citizens and make powerful 
institutions or corporations accountable.  
Investigating the roots of “adversarial legalism”, he points to the American legal 
culture and its specific view of the law as “the malleable (and fallible) output of an on 
going political battle to make the law responsive to particular interests and values.” 
Ultimately adversarial legalism has been shaped by a fundamental tension in American 
broader political culture between demands for justice and protection from the 
government and mistrust towards concentration of power translating in fragmented 
governmental structure and accountability mechanisms through judicial review. 
More specifically, he finds that the collision between claims for major social 
transformations growing out of the strong political movements of the 1960s – civil 
rights, feminist, environmentalist, anti-poverty - with the limited powers of the federal 
government vis-à-vis state and local governments intensified reliance on adversarial 
legalism. Since most of the areas of policy interested by these claims were under the 
competences of state and local governments, the constitutional limits of federalism 
prevented the federal government from proving adequate responses and provided 
strong incentives to bypass such limits through litigation. Social justice claims were 
therefore formulated in terms of constitutional grounded legal rights, and social 
policies were articulated and implemented under court supervision.   
Fragmented governmental power has been indeed acknowledged by scholars 
contesting the exceptional nature of the US legal system, as the main factor 
contributing to the spreading in the European Union of a distinct variant of 
“adversarial legalism”. Daniel Kelemen calls this variant “eurolegalism” and links its 
emergence to the process of European integration. 105 
He claims that vertical (EU – Member States) and horizontal (EU institutions) 
fragmentation of power in the European Union has encouraged in some policy areas 
the adoption of detailed legislation whose implementation is supported through 
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transparency requirements and judicial enforcement. Furthermore, EU extremely 
limited implementation and enforcement capacity has generated, in his account, strong 
incentives towards the framing of policy objectives in terms of individual rights that 
Member States are obliged to respect, empowering private parties to serve as the 
enforcers of EU law.  
Such incentives operate in conjunction with other factors. In the case of competition 
policy, Kelemen finds the process of deregulation and reregulation linked to the 
creation of the common market has undermined traditionally cooperative, informal and 
less judicialised regulatory approaches to regulation in favour of more formal and 
transparent approaches with increased room for enforcement by private parties. 
In other policy areas, such as disability rights, he notes the need to provide legitimacy 
to European institutions in the eyes of EU citizens has mattered as well.  
The growing catalogue of EU rights and spread of policies supporting effective access 
to justice are both considered to reflect and likely to provide fertile ground for the 
spread of Eurolegalism. 
He concludes that although Eurolegalism shares the same defining characteristics as 
US adversarial legalism, we can hardly expect it to resemble the American model. 
Existing national institutions and legal culture are likely to have a moderating 
influence, constraining this variant of adversarial legalism compared to its US 
counterpart. 
European scholars have entered the frame providing detailed accounts of the 
emergence of legal mobilisation in the EU and its impact on the process of European 
integration, EU policies, political mobilisation and democratic participation of EU 
citizens, as well as offering sophisticated analysis of the interaction between the 
opportunities for litigation created at the EU level and domestic opportunities, 
identifying therefore the conditions under which national actors are more likely to 
engage in litigation strategies.  
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Focusing on gender equality and environmental protection, Cichowski provides a 
particularly insightful analysis of the dynamic relation between litigation, mobilisation 
and governance in the EU.  Relying on preliminary references to the ECJ, she 
documents how individuals and groups have exploited the opportunities for litigation 
provided by the EU law and the ECJ to highlight the impact of litigation in shaping EU 
governance, creating new opportunities for future social action and enhancing 
opportunities for public participation in the EU. 106 She also contributes to a better 
understanding of cross-national national variations in the use of litigation stressing the 
impact of legal resources - governmental agency legal support, legal expertise and 
legal standing rules - on preliminary reference rates.  
Investigating the impact of EU law on gender equality policies in the UK, Alter and 
Vargas show how EU regulation has contributed to shift the balance of power in favour 
of actors fighting for gender equality, such as the British Equal Opportunities 
Commission, enhancing their capacity to target through litigation national legislation 
in contrast with the EU Directives on gender equality. The success of a EU litigation 
strategy depends, on their account, on the existence of EU law with direct effect, 
mobilisation of domestic groups, judicial support and sustained implementation of 
favourable decisions.107 
Looking at the process of enforcement of EU environmental law in domestic courts, 
Borzel108 provides a less optimistic prospective on the effects of opportunities for 
litigation created by EU legislation. Her research highlights that, despite expectations, 
whether such opportunities will lead to greater participation of citizens through law 
enforcement and rights claiming will ultimately depend on domestic opportunity 
structures and specifically on the degree of access to national courts and the amount of 
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resources available to support legal action. Comparing the processes of enforcement of 
EU environmental law in Germany and Spain she notes: the EU enforcement system is 
most likely to empower actors actively engaged in domestic and EU politics, in other 
words “the already powerful”.109 
In addition, scholars have studied increasing levels of legal mobilisation around the 
European Convention on Humans Rights (ECHR) highlighting the relevance of the 
ECHR as an arena for public participation of EU citizens110, its impact on the 
development of social rights in the EU111and national policies.112 
Lastly, legal mobilisation in the European multilevel system has been the focus of a 
recently published book exploring the dynamics of legal mobilisation at the national as 
well as European level, identifying the European Court of Justice and European Court 
of Human rights as the main arenas in this regard.113  
“Over the past few decades”, can be red in the first lines of the introduction, “Europe 
has witnessed the emergence of a notable and far-reaching “rights revolution”. (…) 
(Law and Rights) have become increasingly relevant and salient for the demands 
advanced by different social groups, but also the political strategies they craft. 
Individuals from and at times on behalf of various social marginalised groups invoke 
legal norms in front of courts - domestic, European and international – or quasi judicial 
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bodies to assert their rights and claim protection vis-à-vis state action or private 
parties.” 
The book explores the extent and the ways in which legal rights have been mobilised 
in national and European courts by less privileged social actors, placing litigation 
strategies within the broader context of social and political struggles they are 
incorporated in. It does so considering the multi-level structure of protection of rights 
in Europe including the national constitutional level, the EU law, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.  
The book moves from the idea that interaction between the different levels of 
protection will ultimately shape litigation both at the national and at supranational and 
international levels: in assessing the conditions under which citizens in Europe are 
more likely to pursue their interest and seek to influence policy making through the 
courts, it specifically invites to consider the mitigating effect of domestic opportunity 
structures, both political and legal, and the differences between the different national 
systems as to available resources and support structures for litigation. 
Acknowledging the existence of a gap in social science and legal scholarship in this 
regard, the book investigates whether, why and with what consequences individual or 
collective actors “turn to courts”.  
Although the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have 
recently attracted scholarly attention on legal mobilisation, it is important to 
acknowledge that practices of using law as a tool for social reform long pre-existed 
such developments. 
Contrary to studies focusing on the impact of EU law and EU institutions on the 
emergence of legal mobilisation in Europe, Israël analyses the case of legal 
mobilisation for migrant’s rights in France, arguing it represents the result of the 
processes of interaction between lawyers and social movements during the late 1960s 
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and 1970s and the practices of “cause lawyering” that were generated at the time.114 
As far as Italy is concerned, there are at least two major reasons suggesting that the 
idea of law as a means for social reform has it roots in the claims for social justice 
growing out of the political movements of the 1960s. 
The first one is related to the so-called experience of the “alternative use of law”.  It 
refers to a two days conference aiming to encourage a view of the legal system as an 
arena for social struggle, deliberately rejecting formalist conceptions of the law as a 
compact and consistent set of rules in favour of an instrumentalist conception of the 
latter as a structure potentially able, if properly used, to safeguard the interest of 
dominated classes and contribute to the renewal of the social structure.115  
The second is an empirical study coordinated by Treu focusing on the enforcement of 
the “Workers’ Statute”116, the role of trade unions, judges and lawyers and the impact 
of the Statute in institutionalizing the Italian industrial relations system.  
The first part of the research focuses on trade unions and aims to explore their role in 
the process of enforcement of the Statute, on the one hand in organizing/supporting the 
claims of individual workers and on the other in influencing from a qualitative point of 
view the aggregate product of such claims and the way they were framed. 
Acknowledging the political connotations of both activities, the research provides an 
empirically grounded analysis of the extent to which trade unions have exploited the 
legal opportunities provided by the Statute to pursue broader political objectives.  
Additionally, it shows how the “political use of the Statuto” is mediated by the 
organizational identity and the characteristics of the context in which such trade unions 
operate. The findings are particularly interesting as far as they show that the use of the 
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Statute is more aggressive in those areas where trade unions are organizationally 
weaker and therefore risks related to demanding the collective conflict to a third party 
are lower.  
Finally the research highlights the general approach of trade unions towards the law 
and courts. Legal strategies are used to support political action rather than in 
substitution of the latter. In doing so, it stands as a precursor of the contemporary 
scholarly approaches placing legal mobilisation within the broader political context 
and investigating the role social actors and their strategy choices. 
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Chapter II 
SHIFTING OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Legal opportunity structure (LOS). 
The previous chapter provided a general overview of the different approaches to 
explaining the emergence and success of legal mobilisation in contemporary literature. 
The present paragraph will instead focus specifically on the “legal opportunity 
structure” (LOS) approach. It will briefly review the literature on the concept and 
define the dimensions of the legal opportunity structure that will be included in the 
following analysis.  
As previously underlined, the concepts of “political opportunity structure” (POS) and 
“legal opportunity structure” (LOS) are strongly connected; the latter concept indeed 
has developed in the wake of the former. Whereas both have been used to highlight 
under what conditions legal mobilisation is more likely to emerge and to be successful, 
LOS approaches specifically focus on law and legal institutions as relevant variables. 
In doing so, the LOS approach allows to define the degree of “openness or 
accessibility of the legal system to the social and political goals and tactics of 
individuals and/or collective actors”. 117 
The concept of LOS has been extensively used to study legal mobilisation in different 
areas of social struggle, although with some differences as to the elements the concept 
should include. Whereas there is broad consensus as to the inclusion of rules 
concerning legal standing, available resources and rights and favourable legal doctrine, 
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more recent work has considered as part of the structure also elements such as élite 
alignment, cultural frames and presence of allies.   
Pedriana was the first to explore the “legal dimensions of the political opportunity 
structure,” arguing that legal rules and legal institutions just like their political 
counterparts enable and constrain social movements.118  
His analysis of the initial legal battles of women’s movement over sex specific jobs 
advertisements shows that the narrow interpretation of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting sex 
discrimination (Title VII was interpreted as allowing sex specific job advertisement) 
“challenged, angered, and eventually inspired women’s groups in ways that sent the 
women’s movement in aggressive new directions”.119  
In his account the creation of the National organization of Women (NOW) - the most 
important feminist organization in the US – relied in part on the opportunities created 
by the inclusion of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex and the 
expectations it created among women’s advocates. The narrow interpretation of the 
EEOC ultimately allowing segregated job advertisement created the conditions for the 
NOW to change the course of the movement, breaking free from governmental ties and 
adopting litigation as a strategy to pressure the EEOC to take sex as seriously as “race” 
and enforce the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex with the same strength 
they reserved to “race”. In doing so, the movement contributed to expanding the legal 
opportunities that influenced its very emergence and created the conditions to extend 
its fight for equal treatment beyond sex specific advertisement. 
For the purposes of explaining the strategy choices of the environmental, lesbian and 
gay, animal welfare and women’s movements in the UK, Hilson was among the first to 
refer to a distinct concept he terms “legal opportunity”, that encompasses relatively 
stable or structural features concerning access to justice, such as laws on legal standing 
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and the availability of state funding and more contingent features such as judicial 
receptivity. 120 
His analysis provides a very insightful account of the interplay between political and 
legal opportunities and their influence on social movements’ strategy choices, relating 
the adoption of a litigation strategy to a poor POS and the emergence of protest activity 
to poor LOS and POS. 
In the case of women’s movement, for example, he maintains one of the key reasons 
for the women’s movement adopting a national court litigation strategy was the lack of 
PO at both national and EC levels. In comparison, EC-based national LO was much 
more favourable. Relying on such opportunities and the propensity of industrial 
tribunals to make references to the European Court of Justice, the British Equal 
Opportunity Commission (EOC) successfully used litigation to overcome national 
policies not consistent with EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice121.  
By contrast, in the case of the lesbian and gay movement, poor political opportunities 
at national level and poor legal opportunities following the closure of the ECJ towards 
the extension of the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace to homosexuals 
influenced, the emergence of protest activity.122  
Wilson and Cordero provide another example that illustrates how the LOS matters for 
social reform.123 They focus on the impact of reform of the Costa Rican Constitutional 
Court providing free and general access to the Court. Analysing litigation efforts on 
lesbian and gay rights, AIDS patient’s rights and labour rights, they conclude that the 
broadened access to the Court and substantial reduction of costs “enabled marginalized 
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groups to push for their rights and effectively circumvent the traditional policy-making 
process”. 
Case and Givens use the concept of LOS in their analysis of the policy-making process 
and potential impact of the adoption of the Race Equality Directive (RED) at the 
European level. To this end, they specifically consider available legal resources, rules 
on access to courts, and access to legal advocacy. Classifying legal opportunity 
structures in a liberal-conservative continuum, where liberal structures facilitate 
litigation strategies and conservative structures by contrast impede them, they argue 
that RED significantly liberalises opportunities for litigation, both at the European and 
national level and highlight the influence of civil society in the process of adoption of 
the rules implying such liberalisation.124 
Andersen’s study of legal mobilisation for gay rights in the United States represents 
the most systematic application of the concept of LOS to investigate the relevance of 
law for social struggle. Andersen’s book “Out of the closet and into the courts: Legal 
opportunity structure and gay rights litigation” relies on the LOS approach to explain 
the varying ability of Lambda and other US social movement organizations to 
successfully use the law for advancing the interests of the LGBT community.125  
Her analysis considers four different dimensions of the legal opportunity structure: 
access to courts; presence of allies; cultural and legal frames and élite alignment. 
Firstly, she emphasizes the importance of the “access” dimension. Building on the 
parallelism with its counterpart in POS she stresses, “as much as access to political 
institutions shapes the emergence, progress, and outcomes of collective action, access 
to courts shapes the emergence, progress, and outcomes of legal action”.  
In relation to the “presence of allies and/or opponents” Andersen argues that allies 
matter as far as they can support devising legal strategies or intervene in court through 
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amicus curiae briefs whereas the presence of opponents can undermine legal strategy 
through the same means. 
As to legal resources, she considers their relevance in terms of shaping the kind of 
claims that can be made, the persuasiveness of those claims and the facts that are to be 
considered relevant. She further adds that legal frames cannot be considered in 
isolation from cultural frames and highlights their mutually constitutive relationship: 
“cultural symbols and discourses shape legal understandings just as legal discourses 
and symbols shape cultural understandings.”  
Finally, “élite alignment” matters in her account since the alignment of judges on a 
specific claim, whether they uniformly reject or accept the claim or whether they are 
divided among themselves, impacts the decision to engage in litigation: legal claims 
that are uniformly rejected exit the litigation process; claims that are uniformly 
accepted also exit the litigation process, because they get settled out of court; where 
judges are divided further litigation of the claim is stimulated. 
Whereas the relevance of “access to court” and “legal resources” appears undisputable, 
the other dimensions of LOS have raised some criticism.  
On the one hand, as far as “presence of allies and/or opponents” is concerned, it has 
been observed that although in the case of the gay rights movement in the US, the 
configuration of allies was relatively established, other movements might face 
configurations of allies and adversaries that are much more contingent on the specific 
issue at stake126. The consideration of cultural frames as an element of the LOS, on the 
other hand, as Vanhala puts it, bears the risk “of scholars picking and choosing which 
elements of culture make their case in explaining any particular social movement’s 
emergence and choice of strategy and incorporating that under the rubric of 
structure.”127 
Ultimately, with regard to “élite alignment”, whereas it is undisputable that the way 
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courts are oriented on a specific claim defines the chances of winning in court, the 
consideration of such chances is not the only aspect that matters in a conflict over the 
interpretation of a specific regulation. Parties might consider going to court more 
convenient in terms of financial costs or count on the length of the legal proceedings in 
terms of delaying the implementation of an obligation. To illustrate such critique it 
appears sufficient to consider the case of an employer litigating over the discriminatory 
exclusion of some employees from a certain welfare benefit. Although judges could be 
aligned in considering the provision discriminatory, it might be much more convenient 
for the employer to go to court rather than to settle the dispute. Accepting a settlement 
could be likely to encourage other employees to advance the same claim making the 
overall operation more expensive, whereas the burden of covering the costs of legal 
proceedings might play the other way around. Therefore it would be more appropriate 
to limit the consideration of “élite alignment” in terms of favourable or non-favourable 
judicial interpretation of the relevant regulation defining the chances of winning in 
court, and as such a legal resource, rather than as an element impacting the decision to 
engage in litigation. 
Building on these considerations, the following research will take into account three 
different dimensions of the LOS: legal resources, access to courts and resources 
available for litigation. In assessing their relevance, it will rely in particular on Evans 
and Case classification of legal opportunity structures in a liberal-conservative 
continuum.128  
Firstly, as to the “access to courts” dimension, the research will focus on rules on legal 
standing. The openness of the legal systems to legal actors other than individuals, such 
as civil society organizations enhances the chances of effective and strategic 
enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination. Depending on how legal standing is 
regulated, civil society organizations might be able to participate in the proceedings in 
support of the victim of discrimination or in their own name. Whereas in the first case 
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the organization might be still compelled by the fact that victims of discriminations are 
often reluctant to go to court due to the high emotional and material costs legal 
proceedings are associated with or constrained by considerations related to achieving 
the best possible outcome for the individual concerned and by his or her decisions in 
this regard, in the second case we can reasonably expect social movement 
organizations to be less constrained in planning and pursuing legal strategies on their 
own.  
As far as “legal resources” are concerned, antidiscrimination law provisions, judicial 
interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination will be taken into account. The LOS 
will be considered more liberal (therefore providing better incentives for the adoption 
of legal strategies) to the extent that it includes an enforceable right not to be 
discriminated, includes a definition of discrimination that is characterized by an 
objective approach to discrimination and therefore does not require proof of intent 
rather focuses on the effects, addresses through the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination also cases in which the criterion, provision, or practice being 
challenged, although neutral in nature, determines a particular disadvantage for 
protected groups, and includes rules allowing a shift of the burden of proof once the 
complainant has established a prima facie case. 
Finally, in relation to “rules on available resources", the research will focus in 
particular on two elements. As the US research on public interest litigation shows, 
funding is crucial. Victims of discrimination typically lack the resources to access legal 
expertise and sustain the cost of litigation and organizations pursuing equality on 
behalf of the latter are very much likely to struggle for funding, therefore rules 
concerning court fees and attorney fees are expected to have a particularly strong 
impact on legal mobilisation. The existence of other public forms of support to legal 
claims, such as the possibility to access legal aid or the existence of public bodies 
providing financial support or other forms of support for individuals or other legal 
actors interested in enforcing the prohibition of discrimination might be important as 
well.   
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Having defined the different dimension of the legal opportunity structure, the 
following two preliminary premises are necessary. 
First, the analysis will take into consideration the multilevel nature of protection 
against discrimination involving national, EU and international law. It will offer an 
overview of the interaction of the different levels of protection in shaping opportunities 
for litigation from a domestic perspective. Although there is a growing body of 
research on legal mobilisation in the EU, most of this research has its focus on the EU 
level and in particular on the preliminary ruling mechanism and the interaction 
between national judges and the European Court of Justice. There are indeed only a 
few studies of legal mobilisation around EU law adopting a domestic point of view.129 
Second, the research will take into account the reciprocal influence between the 
structuring environment and legal actors and highlight how legal actors instead of 
responding passively to legal opportunities actively engage in changing the structure 
and creating their own opportunities. As Andersen notes the LOS shape strategy 
choices and are shaped by these choices in turn.130  
Actors interested in litigation can act both outside and within the LOS. They can lobby 
government or elected representatives, in the first case, or promote through the courts 
an understanding of the law such as to make the LOS more open to their strategies, in 
the second case. 
  
                                                            
129 See L. Conant, Individuals, courts, cit.; R. D. Kelemen, Eurolegalism. cit.; T. A. Börzel, 
Participation Through, cit.; R. Slepcevic, The judicial enforcement of EU law through national 
courts: possibilities and limits, in Journal of European Public Policy 16, 3, 2009, p. 378; C. 
Kilpatrick, Gender Equality: A Fundamental Dialogue, in S Sciarra (ed.), Labour Law in the 
Courts. National Judges and the European Court of Justice, Hart Publishing, 2001, p. 31; T. 
Tesoka, Judicial Politics in the European Union: Its Impact on National Opportunity Structures 
for Gender Equality, MPIfG Discussion Paper, 1999. 
130 E. A. Andersen, Out of the Closet, cit. p. 9. 
	 49	
 
2. The International and Constitutional framework.  
The international framework  
Following the classic mechanism of international law, international conventions oblige 
Parties to act in conformity with their provisions and respect the rights and freedoms 
they establish and subject them to the authority of the organism to which the 
interpretation and enforcement of the Convention is demanded. The European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for example obliges the members of the 
Convention to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by the latter and subjects 
them to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
Looking at international conventions from a domestic point of view, there is also a 
second mechanism through which the ECHR explicates its effects. Art. 117(1) of the 
Constitution requires the legislature to abide by EU law obligations and international 
conventions. This has implied, at least with reference to the ECHR, two main 
consequences. Firstly, the ECHR provisions as interpreted by the ECtHR represent 
parameters for constitutional review, meaning that a national provision can be declared 
constitutionally unlawful for violating the provisions of the Convention131. Secondly, 
the same provisions represent criteria for interpreting national law, meaning that 
between different interpretations of the law, the interpretation better conforming to the 
Convention should be preferred132.  
Art. 14 ECHR establishes that the rights and freedoms of the Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.  
The ECHR equality and non-discrimination clause does not provide a freestanding 
right to be protected from discrimination. As known it applies only to cases that 
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involve the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.  
In order to ensure protection form discrimination beyond the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the Council of Europe adopted Prot. 12, 
which was open for signature in 2000. Regrettably only 19 out of 47 Members of the 
Council of Europe have ratified the Protocol133 . Italy, although among the first 
signatories, has not ratified the Protocol to the present day.   
This considered, art. 14 covers discrimination based on an extensive number of 
grounds. Moreover as the use of terms “any ground such as” and “or other status” 
leads to conclude the list of grounds is not exhaustive134.  
According to the Court's established case law, a difference of treatment is 
discriminatory, within the meaning of art. 14, if it “has no objective and reasonable 
justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a 
“reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realized”. Nevertheless, in some cases, to some extent depending on the 
“suspect” character of the ground concerned, the Court applies a significantly stricter 
test requiring differential treatment to be justified by “very weighty reasons” and the 
means used to be both appropriate and necessary135.  
Since the 90’ the Court has increasingly considered nationality as a “suspect” ground 
concluding in a number of cases concerning access to welfare that very “weighty 
reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of 
treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the 
Convention”. 
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The Court did so for the first time in Gaygusuz v. Austria136. The case concerned a 
Turkish national who was denied access to unemployment benefits due to his foreign 
nationality. The Court considered the applicant had worked in Austria for a long time 
and contributed to the unemployment insurance fund “on the same capacity and on the 
same basis as Austrian nationals” before finding that the refusal of the Austrian 
authorities to grant the applicant the unemployment benefit was discriminatory for the 
purposes of art. 14.  
The Court has followed the same approach with regard to differences of nationality 
concerning access to a disability allowance (non contributory)137, admission to a 
professional social security scheme138, criteria applying for the purposes of pension 
calculation,139and the granting of an allowance for large families (non contributory).140  
The Court has also issued a number of judgments in which only certain categories of 
foreigners were subject to differential treatment. In Niedzwiecki v. Germany and 
Okpisz v. Germany the Court concluded, although without referring to the “very 
weighty reasons” test, that there were no sufficient reasons justifying the difference of 
treatment with regard to child benefits between non nationals holders of a long term 
permit of stay and others that were not.141  Yet, in Ponomaryouvi v. Bulgaria the Court 
has applied strict scrutiny though the difference of treatment affected only migrants not 
qualifying for a long-term residence permit of stay. The claimants were two Russian 
nationals excluded from school since they were able neither to pay enrolment fees nor 
to benefit from the exemption provided by the legislation for long-term residents or EU 
                                                            
136 ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, Appl. n. 17371/90.  
137 ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France, 30 September 2003, Appl. n. 40892/98. 
138 ECtHR, Luczak v. Poland, 27 November 2007, Appl. n. 77782/01. 
139 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia (Grand Chamber), 18 February 2009, Appl. n. 55707/00. 
140 ECtHR, Fawsie v. Greece, 28 October 2010, Appl. n. 40080/07; ECtHR, Saidoun v. Greece, 
28 October 2010, Appl. n. 40083/07; ECtHR, Dhabhi v. Italy, 8 April 2014, Appl. n. 17120/09. 
See L. Slingenberg, Social security in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
in F. Pennings and G. Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 53. 
141 ECtHR, Niedzwiecki v. Germany, 25 October 2005, Appl. n. 58453/00 and ECtHR, Okpisz v. 
Germany, 25 October 2005, Appl. n. 59140/00. 
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citizens.142  
By contrast in Moustaquim and C. v. Belgium the Court has concluded that the Belgian 
immigration rules providing that TCNs could be deported for public order reasons 
although Belgian or EU nationals could not have been deported on the same grounds 
did not violate art. 14.143 Whereas the position of TCNs is considered not to be 
comparable to that of nationals, the Court agrees that TCNs and EU national are in a 
comparable situation concluding that the difference of treatment between the two 
categories is nonetheless justified in the light of the special character of the EU legal 
order.  
The different approach adopted by the Court appears to follow Gerard’s’ distinction 
between the “external” dimension of nationality relating to entry and residence and its 
“internal” dimension related to areas such as employment and access to welfare.144 
Whereas in the first case differences between national and non nationals are widely 
accepted, in the second case such differences are more difficult to justify, leading the 
Court to treat nationality as a suspect ground only with regard to the “internal 
dimension” of nationality. 
This difference appears to explain to a certain extent the tensions underlying the 
Court’s decision in Bah v. United Kingdom.145 The case concerned a Sierra Leonean 
national and her son, who was admitted in the UK under conditional leave, the 
condition being that he must not have recourse to public funds. Shortly after her sons 
arrival they became homeless and applied for assistance. Whereas under the national 
law a homeless person with a minor would qualify as being in priority, in the case of 
the applicant, her son was not taken into consideration for establishing whether she 
                                                            
142 ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 21 June 2011, Appl. n. 5335/05.  
143 ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium, 18 February, 1991, Appl. n. 5335/05; ECtHR, C v. 
Belgium, 7 August 1996, Appl. n. 21794/93. 
144 J. H. Gerards, The Grounds of Discrimination in D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell 
(eds.) in Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-
Discrimination Law, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 66. 
145 Cfr. ECtHR, Bah v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 2011, Appl.n. 56328/07. 
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was in priority for social housing. Though the applicant had claimed that she was 
treated differently based on the nationality of her son (which the Court considers to 
equate to “national origin” for the purposes of Article 14), the Court concludes that in 
the case under review the differential treatment was based on her son immigration 
status and in particular on the fact that he was granted entry to the United Kingdom on 
the express condition that he would not have recourse to public funds. The Court goes 
on holding that the element of choice involved in immigration status implies that 
although differential treatment based on such status should still be reasonably and 
objectively justifiable, the justification is not required to be as weighty as in the case of 
a distinction based on nationality. 
The case law shows the Court applies a particularly strict scrutiny with regard to 
differential treatment based on nationality, in areas such as access to social security or 
social benefits, though in cases involving differential treatment targeting only some 
categories of migrants, the Court appears more willing to take into consideration the 
possibility of justification.  
By contrast, as the Bah case shows, with regard to areas covered by immigration law, 
the assessment of the Court allows States a particularly high margin for distinguishing 
between nationals and non-nationals. 
Whereas the ECHR is undoubtedly the most important international convention to be 
considered under art. 117 of the Constitution there are at least two other international 
conventions worth considering in this regard: the ILO Migrant Workers Convention n. 
143/75 and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  
The first, which was ratified by Italy in 1981, requires under art. 10 each Member of 
the Convention to pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee, by 
methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and 
treatment in respect to employment and occupation, social security, trade union and 
cultural rights and individual and collective freedoms for migrant workers with regular 
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residency status and members of their families.  
As to access to employment, art. 14 allows Members to restrict access to limited 
categories of employment or functions where this is necessary in the interests of the 
State.  
The second prohibits racial discrimination considering as such “any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”. 
Whereas originally the Convention excluded from its scope of application 
“distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens”, in its General Policy Recommendation 
n. 30, the Committee on the elimination of Racial discrimination holds that under the 
Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of 
the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate 
aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of such aim.  
The Constitutional framework. 
An accurate description of the domestic legal opportunity structure necessarily needs 
to consider the constitutional provisions on the scope of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination and the legal status of foreigners.146 
Art. 3 of the Constitution represents a key provision in this regard. The first paragraph 
of the article states “all citizens are invested with equal social status and are equal 
before the law, without distinction as to sex, race, language, religion, political 
                                                            
146 The Constitution does not include a definition of “foreigner”. The defining characteristic of 
the category of foreigners is the absence of Italian citizenship. Such category includes TCNs, 
European citizens, asylum seekers, and stateless persons. See E. Grosso, Straniero (statuto 
costituzionale dello), in Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche, Utet, 1999, p. 158. 
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opinions, and personal or social conditions”. It establishes therefore a general principle 
of equality while providing an open-ended list of discriminatory grounds. The second 
paragraph is instead informed by an aspiration towards substantial equality. It 
establishes that “it is responsibility of the Republic to remove all economic and social 
obstacles which, by limiting the freedom and equality of citizens, prevent the full 
development of the individual and the participation of all workers in the political, 
economic, and social organization of the country”.   
Notwithstanding the wording of the provision the Constitutional Court has 
acknowledged since 1967147 that the principle of equality before the law under art. 3 
applies also to foreigners, at least as far as the exercise of fundamental rights is 
concerned.  
The textual reference to citizens according to the Court does not exclude foreigners 
from the scope of application of the principle of equality. Art. 3 of the Constitution 
should be interpreted, has stated the Court, in connection with art. 2 and art. 10 (2) of 
the Constitution. 
The former guarantees the inviolable rights of every human being. Whereas drawing 
the dividing line between “inviolable” rights and rights that can be lawfully reserved to 
citizens has given rise to opposing views with regard to the relevance of the textual 
reference to “citizens” in the Constitution148, the wording of art. 2 (rights of every 
human being), as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in different occasions, clearly 
indicates that it is intended to protect the rights of every human being as such, 
irrespective of his/her citizenship.149   
The latter states that the legal status of foreigners is defined by law, in accordance with 
international conventions. The provision strongly enhances the level of protection of 
                                                            
147 Constitutional Court n. 120/1967, n. 104/1969, n. 144/1970, n. 54/1979  
148 See in this regard, F. Biondi Dal Monte, Dai diritti sociali alla cittadinanza: la condizione 
giuridica dello straniero tra ordinamento italiano e prospettive sovranazionali, Giappichelli 
Editore, 2014, p. 23-26. 
149 Constitutional Court n. 105/2001.  
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foreigners constraining the legislature to abide by international law, here included 
provisions concerning fundamental rights and protection of migrants.150 The provision 
is complemented by the above-mentioned art. 117(1) stating that legislative authority is 
subject to the constraints arising from EU law and international obligations.  
However, such a broad interpretation of art. 3 has not prevented the Court from 
considering constitutionally conform differences of treatment affecting the level of 
protection of fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court has admitted that the 
principle of equality does not preclude differences of treatment between citizens and 
foreigners, provided that such differences are reasonably justified in consideration of 
the “factual differences” underlying each status151 and ultimately pertaining to the 
specificities of the relationship between the state and its citizens. In particular the 
Court observes that citizens have their permanent residence in the territory of the 
Republic and have the right to reside anywhere with no time limit and cannot be 
deported for any reason, whereas foreigners usually reside in the country for a limited 
period of time and are subject to deportation.  
Therefore, according to art. 3 of the Constitution, the legislature is allowed to introduce 
differences of treatment between citizens and non-citizens provided that such 
differences are consistent with the principle of reasonableness and do not compromise 
the enjoyment of fundamental rights152. 
Yet more recently the Court has opted for a more rigorous approach to equality153 
                                                            
150 The International Conventions the article refers to can be classified into two categories: 
conventions concerning the protection of fundamental rights (for example the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the European Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) and conventions specifically dealing with migrants’ rights (ILO Migrant Workers 
Convention n. 143/75 or the Geneva Convention on Refugees). 
151 See in particular Constitutional Court  n. 104/1969 and n. 244/1974  
152 In addition, art. 3 of the Constitution has been interpreted as applying also to differential 
treatment between non citizens, unless such differences are provided by the Constitution itself, 
such as in the case of asylum seekers, or are due to international obligations, such as the in the 
case of EU citizens.  
153 W. Chiaromonte, Lavoro e diritti sociali degli stranieri, Giappichelli Editore, 2013. 
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declaring constitutionally unlawful or adopting constitutionally conform interpretations 
of legislation affecting the right to healthcare, the right of defence and the right to 
family unity without a prior assessment based on reasonableness154, on the one hand, 
and extending its scrutiny under art. 3 to situations clearly falling outside of the scope 
of fundamental rights, on the other hand.155  
The Constitutional Court case law concerning access to welfare is particularly 
significant for delineating the scope of protection provided under art. 3 of the 
Constitution, offering essential indications as to the differences of treatment between 
nationals and foreigners the Court has considered in contrast with art. 3, on the one 
hand, and the differences of treatment the Court has been willing to accept as 
conforming with the latter, on the other156.  
 The path traced by the Constitutional Court begins with the decision n. 432/2005. The 
Court was called to examine the constitutionality of a regional law (Lombardia) 
providing Italian citizenship as a requirement for accessing a “free transport card” 
reserved to totally disabled persons.  
Extending the scope of the principle of equality beyond the area of fundamental rights 
(there was no dispute as to the fact that the considered benefit did not impact the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights), the Court states that the legislature is not allowed to 
differentiate between Italian citizens and non citizens or stateless persons without 
establishing a “reasonable correlation” between the requirement of nationality and the 
rationale of the benefit considered.  
The Court agrees that limited resources might impose choices aimed at narrowing 
down the number of potential beneficiaries. Nevertheless such choices cannot 
introduce arbitrary distinctions and should conform, under any circumstances, to the 
                                                            
154 See in this regard Constitutional Court  n. 245/2011.  
155 Constitutional Court  n. 432/2005.  
156 The case law of the Constitutional Court and the implications of art. 3 of the Constitution for 
migrants have been thoroughly analysed in W. Chiaromonte, Lavoro e diritti sociali, cit.; F. 
Biondi Dal Monte, Dai diritti sociali, cit. 
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principle of reasonableness under art. 3.  
The Court had the occasion to confirm the same principle a few years later, in a case 
concerning once again a regional law (Friuli Venezia Giulia) establishing a “system of 
interventions and services for the promotion and protection of the rights of social 
citizenship” which limited access to Italian and EU nationals with at least thirty-six 
months of residence in the Region.  
Reminding that under art. 3 of the Constitution the legislature is subject to the principle 
of reasonableness, the Court highlights the arbitrariness of the nationality clause and 
protracted residence for thirty-six months in the light of the other eligibility criteria 
provided by the regional law. Such criteria, underlines the Court, refer to personal 
conditions of social or psycho-physical hardship defining the eminently social nature 
of the regional benefits under review, holding on this account the lack of a reasonable 
correlation between the criteria being challenged before the Court and the rationale of 
the benefit. 
In the same line, the Court has considered constitutionally unlawful a number of other 
regional laws for limiting access to social security to TCNs with at least five years of 
residence in the region157, or requiring three years of residence in the region and the 
possession of the EU long-term residency status for accessing a monetary benefit 
aimed at supporting people with disabilities.158  
In a more recent decision, the Court clarifies that the legislature can lawfully reserve 
certain benefits to nationals or people that are comparable to them, whose status proves 
in itself the existence of an adequate link between their participation in the political, 
economic and social life of the Republic, and the granting of the benefit. This, 
however, does not exclude that a link worthy of protection might emerge with regard 
to the position of those who, while lacking the same status, have a stable prospective 
of work and family life within the community and should be considered as a matter of 
                                                            
157 Constitutional Court  n. 2/2013; Constitutional Court  n. 133/2013.  
158 Constitutional Court  n. 172/2013;  Constitutional Court n. 4/2013. 
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fact part of latter. The Court therefore confirmed the exclusion of TCNs lacking five 
years of residence form social protection measures established at the regional level 
violates art. 3. 
On the contrary, the Court considers generally admissible for the same purposes a 
“twenty-four months residence in the region” criterion applying to everyone 
irrespective of nationality, but for cases in which the benefit under review is aimed to 
respond to the population basic needs. 159As a consequence, the Court holds the 
requirement is unlawful with regard to benefits aiming to support the right to education 
and fighting poverty and social disadvantage, while dismissing the unconstitutionality 
claims with regard to a benefit aiming to support families with new born babies, 
housing subsidies, and social housing. 
Finally, another judgment of the Court completes the picture as to the protracted 
residency requirements applying to everyone irrespective of their citizenship.160 The 
Court was asked to assess the conformity to the Constitution of the Law of the Valle 
d’Aosta limiting access to social housing to nationals or foreigners with at least eight 
years of residence in region. Reminding that the legislature can lawfully refer to the 
criterion of residence for the purposes of regulating access to social housing, the Court 
clarifies that the criterion should be contained and consistent with the aims of social 
housing, excluding that “eight years of residence” could be considered reasonable in 
this regard. In addition the Court considers the requirement to entail also an “indirect 
disadvantage” for EU citizens and other categories of TCNs that enjoy equal treatment 
under EU law.  
                                                            
159 Constitutional Court  n. 222/2013. The Court highlights in this regard the regional dimension 
of the requirement and argues that the Region, within the limits provided by the principle of 
reasonableness, may well favour its residents, also in relation to their contribution to the 
community. See also as to the 24-month residency requirement as a condition for benefiting 
from a “baby bonus” for families with at least two dependant children, the Constitutional Court  
n. 141/2014. In this case the Court considered the requirement lawful since the benefit was 
granted on the basis of the duration of residence in the Region irrespective of other conditions.  
160 Constitutional Court  n.168/2014. 
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Finally the Constitutional Court has repeatedly intervened in relation to Law n. 
388/2000 limiting access to monetary social assistance benefits granted by national law 
to TCNs with long-term residence. 
The Court was first called to assess the constitutional conformity of the requirement in 
2008 and 2009, with regard to disability benefits, specifically incapacity allowance 
(indennità di accompagnamento)161 and inability pension (pensione di inabilità)162. In 
both cases the requirement was considered unlawful following the scrutiny of 
reasonableness, which focused mainly on the fact that for the purposes of issuing the 
long-term residence permit of stay the applicant was required to provide proof of a 
certain income. 
As to the first case, the Court notes that by limiting access to TCNs with a long term 
permit of stay the legislature had indirectly introduced a minimum income requirement 
with regard to a benefit that was granted regardless of the income of the disabled. The 
unreasonable nature of the provision was even more evident in the second case 
considered that the legislation on the inability pension provides the benefit is granted 
to disabled people whose income is lower than the one required for obtaining the long 
term permit of stay. It followed in both cases a declaration of unconstitutionality 
limited to the income requirement.  
The approach of the Court changed significantly with decision n. 187/10. The Court 
investigates in the first place the rationale of the benefit considered concluding it 
pertains to the area of fundamental rights since it aims to satisfy the basic needs of the 
recipients. Framing the difference of treatment as a difference on grounds of 
nationality163, the Court maintains the lawfulness of the requirement of long-term 
residence should be examined in the light of the ECtHR case law on access to social 
security  (art. 14 of the Convention and art. 1 Prot. 1). Going beyond the scrutiny of 
                                                            
161 Constitutional Court n. 306/2008. 
162 Constitutional Court n.11/2009. 
163 Indeed in the present case TCNs were subject to a number of additional requirements 
(minimum income, 5 years of residence etc.)  
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reasonableness the Court reminds that according to the ECtHR case law, as far as 
access to social security in concerned, only very “weighty reasons” can justify a 
difference in treatment based on nationality, concluding the requirement of the long 
term residence permit of stay violated Article. 14 ECHR and as a consequence art. 
117(1) of the Constitution.164 
The same principle was confirmed in relation to a number of other benefits165, here 
included the incapacity allowance and the inability pension with regard to which the 
Court initially had limited the declaratory of unlawfulness to the criterion of income.166 
On the one hand, the case law of the Constitutional Court is very clear in considering 
differences of treatment based on nationality (including provisions limiting access to 
holders of a long term permit of stay or imposing for the same purposes a length of 
residence requirement only on TCNs) in contrast with the principle of equality under 
art. 3 and art. 117 (1).  
On the other, the Court appears open to uphold the constitutional conformity of the 
criterion of residence, provided that it is referred to measures that are not aimed at 
satisfying the basic needs of the beneficiaries and the number of years required is 
contained and consistent with the nature of the benefit considered, and does not entail 
an indirect disadvantage for EU citizens and TCNs that enjoy equality of treatment 
under EU law. 
 
  
                                                            
164 Constitutional Court  n. 187/2010. 
165 Constitutional Court  n. 329/2011 concerning to a “school attendance” allowance for minors 
with disabilities; Constitutional Court n. 22/2015 and Constitutional Court  n. 230/2015 
concerning respectively an “incapacity allowance” granted to visually impaired individuals and 
an inability pension granted to those affected by deafness.  
166 Constitutional Court  n. 40/2013. 
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3. The TUI 
The antidiscrimination clause and equality of treatment in the TUI. 
The first general antidiscrimination clause under Italian law dates back 1970167. It was 
introduced by Law n. 300/1970 entitled the “Workers’ Statute”. The original provision 
concerned discriminatory behaviour on grounds of trade union affiliation, political 
opinions, and religious belief. It sanctioned as null any act or pact aimed at affecting 
access to employment, firing or disadvantaging an employee based on the protected 
grounds. The article, according to Barbera “provides a snapshot of the 70s” conveying 
the image of a society in which the great divisions seem to run along the lines of class 
and ideology.168 Furthermore, as she observes, we can reasonably assume that the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion under art. 15 of the Statute, while 
paying tribute to non discrimination clauses provided in international law (see for 
example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), all of them 
including religion as a protected ground, was based on the underlying idea that 
religious discrimination was symptomatic of other forms of discrimination belonging 
to the political and ideological sphere. Whereas the absence of race, colour, and 
national origin can be explained through the fact that at the time Italy was more a 
country of emigration rather than of immigration, the failure to include sex among the 
protected grounds appears to reflect the lack attention towards sex discrimination, both 
by the legislature and the labour movement itself, still significantly anchored to 
claiming “special protection” measures for women in the workplace.169  
This considered, the effectiveness of the provision has been strongly undermined by 
two factors: the embracing by courts of a theoretical elaboration of the concept of 
discrimination as an intentional act and the inadequacy of the sanction of nullity, as the 
                                                            
167 Prior to the adoption of art. 15, national legislation prohibited discriminatory dismissal on 
grounds of political opinion, religion and trade union affiliation (art. 4 Law n. 604/1966) and 
marriage (art. 1 Law n. 7/1963). 
168 M. Barbera, La tutela antidiscriminatoria al tempo dello Statuto e ai tempi nostri, in Diritti 
lavori mercati, 3, 2010, p. 724. 
169 Ibid, p. 727.  
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only available remedy, to discrimination.170  
Law n. 903/1977 entitled “Equal treatment between men and women at work” 
extended protection under art. 15 Law n. 300/1970 to gender, race and language.  
The law was adopted under the impetus of EU legislation on equal treatment between 
women and men, implementing into national law EU Directives 75/117/EC on equal 
pay and 76/207/EC on equal treatment as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions. The law included no definition of 
discrimination and, except for art. 15 that introduced the possibility for trade union 
organizations to act on behalf of the victim of discrimination and the power for the 
judge to order the offender to terminate unlawful conduct and remove its effects, was 
reticent on enforcement. 
The following years were characterized by the establishment of a number of 
institutional actors with the scope of promoting gender equality and fighting 
discrimination. In 1983, the government created the National Equality Committee 
attached to the Labour and Welfare Ministry and in 1984 the Commission for Equal 
Opportunities attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. In the same year Law n. 
863/1984 created the institutional figure of the Equality Advisors. The latter would be 
appointed by the Labour and Welfare Ministry with the task of ensuring the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment between men and women in 
employment.      
It is the adoption of Law n. 125/1991 “Positive actions for the realization of gender 
equality at work” that allows tracing the emergence of the contemporary model of 
protection against discrimination. 171  
                                                            
170 M. Barbera, Discriminazioni ed eguaglianza nel rapporto di lavoro, Giuffre, 1991, p. 218-
223. 
171 See L. Gaeta and C. Zoppoli (eds.) Il diritto diseguale. La legge sulle azioni positive, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 1992; M.V. Ballestrero, La legge sulle azioni positive, in Spazio Impresa, 
18, 1991, p. 3; M. Barbera, Una legge per le azioni positive, in Diritto e pratica del lavoro, 20, 
1991, p. 1240; T. Treu, La legge sulle azioni positive: prime riflessioni, in Rivista italiana di 
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The law moved from the explicit aspiration to realize substantive equality between 
men and women in the workplace through the adoption of “positive actions” measures 
aiming to overcome inequality in educational and vocational training, access to 
employment, career advancement; to promote the diversification of career choices for 
women; to overcome organizational practices with a disparate impact on women; to 
promote the inclusion of women in professional activities where they are 
underrepresented, and encourage a better distribution of family responsibilities. To 
these ends, it introduced a public funding mechanism for positive action measures in 
the private sector as well as an obligation to adopt positive action measures in the 
public sector. 
Although apparently not its major focus, the law brought a second critical 
improvement: new definitions of discriminatory behaviour. Its innovative capacity in 
this regard has been accurately analysed and acknowledged.172 On the one hand, by 
defining as discriminatory any act or behaviour determining, directly or indirectly, a 
prejudicial effect on grounds of sex, and therefore explicitly pointing to the effects of 
the behaviour considered, it marks a breaking point with reference to the enforcement 
practices of art. 15 of the Statute as far as intent is concerned. On the other hand, it 
introduces the concept of indirect discrimination prohibiting any prejudicial treatment 
following the adoption of criteria that disproportionately disadvantage workers on 
grounds of sex and do not relate to an essential occupational requirement.  
The law also provides new rules on the distribution of the burden of proof ensuring 
that once the claimant provides facts, here included statistical data, from which it can 
be presumed the existence discrimination, it will be for the respondent to prove that 
there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                              
diritto del lavoro, I, 1991, p.109. 
172 T. Treu, La leggi sulle azioni cit.; M.V. Ballestrero, La nozione di discriminazione nella 
legge n. 125/1991, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 1992, p. 773; M. Barbera, La nozione 
di discriminazione, in Le nuove leggi civili commentate, XVII, 1, 1994, p. 46, S. Scarponi, Le 
nozioni di discriminazione, in C. Zoppoli and L. Gaeta (eds.) Diritto diseguale. La legge sulle 
azioni positive, Giappichelli, Torino, 1992, p. 43. 
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In doing so the Law n. 125/1991 clearly builds on the Court of Justice case law on 
discrimination on grounds of sex. In particular the definition of indirect discrimination 
noticeably recalls the Court of Justice decisions in Bilka173 and subsequent case law on 
indirect discrimination, whereas the part on the burden of proof the related ECJ 
doctrine elaborated starting from Danfoss.174  
Unlike art. 15 of Statute, the law provided the power for the judge to impose to the 
employer the adoption of “a plan of removal of discrimination” to be defined in 
collaboration with trade union organizations and equality advisors and strengthened the 
power of equality advisors granting them legal standing to act on behalf or support of 
the victim of discrimination and in their own name in instances of collective 
discrimination175. 
Such developments according to Kilpatrick are to be understood as taking place 
“within a labour law context where there is a huge degree of cross-over between the 
academic and left-centre governmental spheres”. 176 
The draft of the new equality law, she explains, was entrusted to the National Equality 
Committee and practically to its two technical members prof. Treu and prof. 
Ballestrero, both distinguished scholars of labour and equality law. “Although the draft 
they created was subject to substantial modification by successive governments and 
parliaments, the law which finally emerged remains strongly marked by the authors’ 
awareness of EU law developments and their perception of the deficiencies of the 1977 
law’s vision of equality and discrimination”. She further acknowledges the role of 
academics giving account of their input during the parliamentary process in terms of 
the meaning of equality, the existing institutional apparatus and the experiences of and 
lessons to be learned from other jurisdictions.  
                                                            
173 Judgment of 13 May 1986, Bilka C-170/84, EU:C:1986:204. 
174 Judgment of 17 October 1989, Danfoss C- 109/88, EU:C:1989:383. 
175 G. De Simone, Gli organismi collettivi per le pari opportunità, in Le nuove leggi civili 
commentate, XVII, 1, 1994, p. 101. 
176 C. Kilpatrick, Gender Equality, cit. p. 107. 
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Compared to gender discrimination, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
race, ethnic origin and nationality has a more recent history. The first ad hoc 
antidiscrimination clause in this regard was introduced with the adoption of the first 
organic regulation on migration, Law n. 40/1998 later on merged into the Legislative 
Decree n. 286/1998, the TUI. 
It was 1998 and Italy was turning into a country of immigration. According to the data 
included in the “Dossier immigrazione 2005”, whereas in 1970 the number of migrants 
in Italy was 144.000, it exceeded half a million in 1987, and one million in 1997177. 
Data denoted a general increasing trend that would be confirmed in the years to come.  
The process for the adoption of a new law on migration moved from the idea that 
“emergency legislation” could not provide adequate answers to the issues raised by a 
sustained and structural process of immigration, as to regulation of entry and residence 
of TCNs on the one hand, and their integration in the host society on the other. 
Unlike previous legislative interventions the first organic law on migration established 
equal rights for foreign workers, regulated under title V access to education, 
healthcare, welfare and housing and introduced the first prohibition of direct and 
indirect discrimination on grounds of racial, ethnic origin and nationality. 
Nevertheless, only a few years after its adoption, the legislature will intervene with 
several reforms restricting the guaranties established by the TUI, admittedly distant 
from solidarity considerations178. 
Before turning to examining its contents, the process that brought to the draft proposal 
approved by the parliament might once again provide some explanations as to why it 
was adopted the way it was. In extending the prohibition of discrimination to direct as 
well as to indirect discrimination, the TUI preceded by a few years the implementation 
                                                            
177 Caritas/Migrantes, XV Rapporto sull’immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2005, Anterem, 2005. 
178 Law n. 388/2000 and Law. n. 189/2002; L. Calafà, Migrazione economica e contratto di 
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of the RED in national legislation.  
As in the case of gender discrimination, academic’s role in the elaboration of the draft 
proposal of the TUI has been particularly significant. In addition, the analysis of the 
process that brought to the adoption of the prohibition of discrimination shows the 
contribution of civil society has been important as well, while allowing to identify 
another link worth exploring between civil society and the academics involved in the 
process. 
In 1993 a Ministerial Decree created the National Study Commission on the Legal 
Status of Foreigners in Italy with the scope of overcoming previous regulatory 
interventions in favour of a more comprehensive approach to migration, taking into 
account obligations as well as rights of migrants. The Commission entrusted the 
drafting of the new law proposal to a restricted committee whose members were 
distinguished academics and experts of Migration Law: prof. Adinolfi; prof. 
Nascimbene and prof. Bonetti. The first two were also founding members of the newly 
established “Associazione Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione” (ASGI), a civil society 
organization aiming to promote research on Migration Law and exchange of 
information and good practices within the community of migrant lawyers. 
The committee’s proposal was submitted in 1994 to the Prime Minister’s Office. The 
draft included an article entitled “Repression of xenophobic and racist acts”. It 
addressed four different hypothesis of prejudicial treatment concerning relations with 
public authorities, access to goods and services, employment and self-employment, 
access to social welfare and sanctioned perpetrators with an administrative fee. Despite 
the title, the article referred without any exception to objective situations of prejudicial 
treatment based on the protected grounds. Indeed the four situations referred to in the 
article were later incorporated in the final draft under the title “lawsuit against 
discrimination”. The final proposal represented the end result of the collaboration 
between prof. Bonetti and a group of religious organizations lobbying for migrants’ 
rights coordinated by Caritas Italiana.  
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Pressure from civil society together with strong expertise proved crucial to the 
adoption of the antidiscrimination clause. In particular the awareness of the authors of 
the draft proposal submitted to the Parliament of the recent developments on fighting 
discrimination, at the international and national level, appears to have strongly 
influenced the specific features of the clause.  
Indeed the first part of art. 43 TUI corresponds to the definition of discrimination on 
grounds of race provided under the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, while the second part literally recalls, with regard to 
discrimination concerning employment, the definition of indirect discrimination 
provided by Law n. 125/1991. In addition the enforcement clause (now art. 44 TUI) 
incorporated the rule on the distribution of the burden of proof provided under the 
latter, and more specifically the part shifting the burden of proof on the defendant once 
the claimant has provided facts, including statistical data, from which discrimination 
can be presumed. 
Except for the latter part, which was subject to substantial revisions during the 
parliamentary debate, the prohibition of discrimination was approved and included in 
the TUI with no substantial modifications.  
Art. 43 TUI qualifies as discriminatory any behaviour, that “directly or indirectly, 
involves a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent or national or ethnic origin, beliefs and religious practices, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social and cultural life and in every other field of public life.”179 
The second part of the article includes a number of specifications of discriminatory 
                                                            
179 In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life. 
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behaviour concerning relations with public authorities, access to goods and services, 
employment and self-employment, housing, education, training, social services and 
social protection. It also defines indirect discrimination in employment as every 
prejudicial treatment resulting from the adoption of criteria that disproportionately 
disadvantage workers belonging to a particular “race”, to a particular ethnic or 
linguistic group, to a particular religious denomination or nationality180. 
As anticipated, the part of the draft concerning the distribution of the burden of proof 
was amended during the parliamentary process. It was in particular strongly contested 
by centre-right and right representatives as being against the rule of law, abusive and 
legally absurd.181  
The final version of art. 44 TUI established that the complainant could prove the 
existence of discrimination by providing facts, here included statistical data concerning 
recruitment, contributory schemes, qualifications, career advancements and 
dismissals182. Such facts however had to be considered under the general rule of the on 
“simple presumptions”. This implied on the one hand that their consideration was left 
to the discretionary appreciation of the judge, and on the other that the presumption of 
discrimination would be admissible only when grounded on facts providing “weighty, 
accurate and consistent” elements of proof. Any reference to the shift of the burden of 
proof was eliminated.  
As to remedies, the enforcement clause introduced a “urgent” procedure for 
discrimination claims aiming to guarantee the adoption of a final judgment in a very 
short time and provided the power for the judge to order the offender to terminate 
discriminatory conduct and adopt any other measure, necessary under the 
circumstances to remove its effects besides imposing the adoption of a “plan of 
                                                            
180 P. Bonetti et al., La tutela contro le discriminazioni razziali, etniche e religiose, in B. 
Nascimbene, Diritto degli stranieri, Cedam, 2004, p.1082-1134. 
181  See the statements of the member of the Parliament Raffaele Marotta 
http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed273/s250.htm#Titolo33 82  
182 L. Curcio, Le azioni in giudizio e l’onere della prova, in M. Barbera (ed.), Il nuovo diritto 
antidiscriminatorio. Il quadro comunitario e nazionale, Giuffre, 2007, p. 529. 
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removal” of the concerned conduct.  
Besides prohibiting discrimination the TUI includes a number of “equal treatment 
clauses” concerning employment, education, healthcare, social protection and social 
housing, identifying for each case the categories of migrants that benefit from equal 
treatment183.  
Article 2 (3) TUI establishes a general principle of equal treatment in favour of migrant 
workers legally residing in Italy. The Italian Republic, states the provision, in 
accordance with ILO Convention 143 of 24 June 1975 guarantees to all foreign 
workers regularly residing in its territory, and their families, equal treatment and full 
equality of rights compared to national workers184.   
Art. 34 establishes the right to equal treatment in access to healthcare and regulates 
registration procedures for different categories of TCNs, whereas art. 35 identifies the 
categories of healthcare services guaranteed to TCNs irrespective of their irregular 
residency status.  
Art. 38 extends compulsory school attendance to TCNs minors and guarantees equal 
treatment in access to education and participation to the school community life. Art. 39 
addresses access to higher education establishing the right to equal treatment in access 
to higher education for all TCNs with regular residence status.  
Art. 40 and art. 41 are dedicated to access to social housing and social assistance. The 
original formulation of art. 40 extended equality of treatment in access to social 
housing to TCNs with regular residence who were registered as unemployed or 
regularly employed or self-employment. The article was revised in 2002185 limiting 
equality of treatment to TCNs that are granted at least a two-year working permit and 
                                                            
183 P. Bonetti et al., Sanità, istruzione, alloggio e integrazione, in B. Nascimbene, Diritto degli 
stranieri, Cedam, 2004, p. 973-1081. 
184 On the scope of the principle of equality under art. 2 TUI and the ILO Conventio see 
Constitutional Court n. 454/1998.  
185 Law n. 189/2002. The implications of the reform has been thoroughly analysed in T. Vettor, 
I diritti sociali degli stranieri: le innovazioni della legge n. 189/2002, in T. Tursi (ed.), Lavoro 
e immigrazione, Giappichelli, 2005, p. 291. 
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are regularly employed or self-employed.  Art. 41 TUI ensures, with regard to social 
assistance, equality of treatment to TCNs with at least one-year residence permit. A 
couple of years later the legislature would seriously limit its scope of application 
through art. 80 (19) Law n. 388/2000 granting access to monetary social assistance 
benefits only to TCNs holders of a long-term residence permit of stay. 
Early enforcement efforts of the antidiscrimination clause. 
Although during the parliamentary debate those opposing the adoption of the 
prohibition of discrimination “warned” against the risks inherent to the prohibition of 
discrimination and its enforcement clause, “such as to induce nationals to avoid any 
interaction with migrants only to avoid lawsuits”186, the number of judicial decisions 
during the first years following the adoption of the TUI is exiguous.  
The Court of Florence decided the very first case on the prohibition of discrimination, 
in 1999.187  The claimant, a Peruvian national, claimed to have been subject to 
discriminatory behaviour during a ticket inspection on a public bus. In particular she 
maintained that the decision to forcedly accompany her for identification at a police 
station following the inspection was based on racial grounds. Furthermore, while she 
was taken to the police station, she maintained the ticket inspector had intimidated her 
prospecting the possibility of a forced return in her country of origin.  
The decision provides the opportunity to introduce two key aspects discussed in the 
case law during the first years of the enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination.  
The first one concerns the distribution of the burden of proof. As discussed earlier, the 
rule on burden of proof approved by the Parliament was limited to expressively state 
                                                            
186See the statements of the member of the Parliament Rolando Fontan, available at the 
following link 
http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed273/s250.htm#Titolo33 82   
187 Court of Firenze, 30 December 1999, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 1, 2000, p. 
111; L. Mughini, Prime riflessioni a margine dell’ordinanza del Court of Firenze in materia di 
azione civile contro la discriminazione razziale, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2000, 
1, p. 82. 
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the application of the general rules on “simple presumptions” and was deliberately 
silent as far as the shift of the burden of proof is concerned. Based on such rule, the 
judge dismissed the claim due to the absence of univocal evidence on alleged 
behaviour, irrespective of the existence of testimonial evidence supporting the 
description of events presented by the claimant. 
The rule was applied in similar terms, although with different outcomes in a 2000 
decision of the Court of Milano188 and a 2001 decision of the Court of Bologna.189 
Both cases concerned the refusal of a real estate agency to negotiate with TCNs due to 
the reluctance of their clients to rent to the former. In the Court of Milano case, the 
claimant made contact with the agency through an organization engaged in assisting 
migrants. As soon as the employee of the agency came to know that the person 
interested in the apartment was from the Ivory Cost, he refused to continue the 
negotiation due to the fact that “the owners had no intention to rent the apartment to 
foreigners”. In the second case, those interested in renting could view available 
apartments using a website which included among “personal conditions of the tenants” 
the category of TCNs. Once flagged the option TCNs in the input form, the research 
provided no apartments at any available price. 
The second aspect before mentioned concerns the concept of discrimination itself. 
Despite the definition of discrimination in the TUI clearly refers alternatively to the 
“purpose or effect” of the behaviour considered, the decision of the Court of Firenze 
seems to fall into the trap of “intention” requiring the claimant to prove that what was 
deemed as “arbitrary behaviour” of the ticket inspector was exclusively due to her 
“race”.  
A subsequent decision of the Court of Bologna in 2000190 would maintain ambiguity in 
this regard. It concerned the publication in a local newspaper of an article concerning 
                                                            
188 Court of Milano, 30 March 2000, in Foro It, I, 2000, p. 2041. 
189 Court of Bologna, 22 February 2001, in Diritto immigrazione cittadinanza, 1, 2001, p. 101 
190 Court of Bologna, 17 October 2001; M. Pipponzi, L’onere della prova nell’azione civile 
contro la discriminazione, in Diritto immigrazione e cittadinanza, 4, 2000, p. 86. 
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“marriages of convenience” together with a picture of the claimant, an Italian black 
man, with his Italian white wife, in which only her face was screened in order to 
protect her identity. The Court admits that the publication of the picture without 
screening the face of the claimant was discriminatory irrespective of the absence of 
intention to discriminate. By contrast, in considering for the same purposes the fact 
that the picture of the claimant was associated to an article potentially able to create an 
environment hostile to immigrants, the Court surprisingly states that its consequences 
are due to the existence of such blameful practices among immigrants, as 
acknowledged in the press, rather than to the intention of the journalist.  
Uncertainties concerning the relevance of intention would be overcome by a decision 
of the Court of Milano in 2002. It concerned a regulation of the Municipality of Milano 
on social housing, which assigned Italian nationals five additional points for the 
purposes of their ranking in the list of beneficiaries. Reminding that under art. 43 TUI 
there is no room for investigating intention, the Court assessed the discriminatory 
nature of the regulation based on its prejudicial effect on foreign citizens.191  
In addition the decision of the Court is absolutely worth mentioning for rejecting the 
defence of the public administration according to which the prohibition of 
discrimination should not apply to the public administration when exercising 
discretionary powers. Acknowledging the prohibition of discrimination entails a 
fundamental right, the Court dismisses the idea that its scope can be limited based on 
the characteristics of the defendant or the bounded rather than discretionary exercise of 
powers by the latter.192  
                                                            
191 A year later, following the same approach, the Court of Monza would declare discriminatory 
the statute of a housing association requiring Italian nationality for the purposes of membership. 
See Court of Monza, 27 March 2003, in Foro It, I, 2003, p. 3179. 
192 Court of Milano, 21 March 2002, in Foro It, I, 2003, p. 3175. There are two other decisions 
dealing with access to social housing: TAR Lombardia (Sezione di Brescia) n. 264/2005 in 
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2, 2005, p. 130 and TAR Piemonte n. 323/2002, in 
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2, 2002, p. 117. Both cases involved local regulations 
subordinating access to social housing for TCNs to criteria different from those provided by the 
TUI. Although the claims are not based on the prohibition of discrimination they have 
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The approach of the Court of Milano would be followed by the Court of Firenze in 
2002, the first decision enforcing the prohibition of discrimination with regard to 
access to employment in the public sector.193   
It should be noted before going into further detail that regulation concerning access to 
employment is particularly complex given that it involves different levels of regulation 
(national, European and international) and the overall framework is to some extent 
inconsistent.  
While DPR n. 3/57 entitled “Code on the status of civil servants” included Italian 
citizenship among the necessary requirements to access employment in public sector, 
EU law and international law, in particular the ILO Convention on Migrant workers 
(implemented in Italy through Law 158/1982), would significantly narrow the scope of 
its application.   
As known, art. 45 of the TFUE in establishing freedom of movement for workers in 
the EU excludes from its scope of application employment in the public sector. The 
provision has been interpreted restrictively by the European Court of Justice that has 
admitted such limitation to the freedom of movement of workers only in relation to 
“posts involving the exercise of public authority and the safeguard of general 
interests”194.  
                                                                                                                                                              
important implications for its enforcement. In the first one, the Municipality of Chiari had 
adopted a narrow interpretation of the regional law concerning access to social housing 
requiring the claimant to provide proof of “reciprocity”. The Court maintained that the local 
regulation was in violation of national law therefore suspended its effects. In the second, the 
Municipality of Torino admitted TCNs applications under the condition that they had worked 
for at least three years in accordance with the regional law on social housing. The Court 
rejected the claim dismissing the request of the applicants to refer the issue to the Constitutional 
Court provided that in its account the regional law was consistent with the principle of 
reasonableness under art. 3.   
193 Court of Appeal of Firenze n. 281/2002 in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, 2003, II, 272 
G. Mammone, L’accesso al lavoro pubblico dei cittadini stranieri fra divieto di discriminazione 
e restrizioni all’accesso degli extracomunitari, in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, II, 2003, 
p. 272.  
194 Judgment of the Court of 26 May 1982, Commission, C- 149/79, ECLI:EU:C:1982:195. 
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Italian law would implement the principle established by the Court of Justice extending 
to European citizens access to employment in the public sector, with the only 
exception of posts implying direct or indirect exercise of “public authority” or 
pertaining to the national interest and delegate the identification of such posts to a 
subsequent decree195. Indeed DPCM n. 174/1994 identifies the posts in public sector 
for which the requirement of Italian citizenship is not dispensable.  
The rule establishing the right of EU citizens to access employment in the public 
services was later merged into Legislative Decree n. 165/2001. The Legislative Decree 
is silent as to access to employment in the public sector for TCNs. With regard to 
situations not covered by the decree it defers to previous legislation on access to 
employment in the public sector, here included the requirement of citizenship. 
However before concluding that the law excludes TCNs from access to employment in 
the public sector, it is necessary to turn to the provisions of the ILO Convention on 
migrant workers. While establishing the obligation upon Members of the Convention 
“to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee (…) 
equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation”, art. 
14 of the ILO Convention admits only restrictions that are justified in the interests of 
the State and concern limited categories of employment or functions. 
Italy has implemented the ILO Convention with Law 158/1982. In addition, as above 
mentioned the TUI refers to the ILO Convention when establishing the right of migrant 
workers to equal treatment. Art. 2 of the TUI, “in accordance with the ILO Convention 
143 of 24 June 1975 guarantees to all foreign workers regularly residing in Italy and 
their families equal treatment and full equality of rights compared to national 
workers”.   
Art. 2 TUI allows to reasonably conclude that access to employment in the public 
service for TCNs is informed by the same principle regulating access for European 
citizens: equality of treatment represents the general rule, whereas Italian citizenship 
                                                            
195 Legislative Decree n. 29/1993 and Presidential Decree n. 487/1994 
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can be required only under particular circumstances, that is to say when it is necessary 
in the interest of the State.  
It is important to notice that the Constitutional Court has clearly acknowledged, though 
not specifically in relation to access to employment in the public sector, that art. 2 TUI, 
in accordance with the ILO Convention, provides a general principle of equal 
treatment of migrant workers that have been authorized to employment, as regards 
working conditions and access to employment. The case concerned the constitutional 
conformity of the lack of a legislative provision allowing migrant workers to benefit 
from disability hiring quotas. Provided that art. 2 TUI grants foreign workers equal 
rights with nationals, observes the Court, there is no need to for a provision specifically 
extending migrant workers the possibility to access employment though hiring 
quotas196.  
Still, the complexity of the legal framework regulating access to employment in the 
public sector will give rise to different interpretations and conflict between different 
judicial doctrines197.  
The first discrimination case dealing with the issue concerned an Albanian national 
applying for a post as a nurse’s assistant. His application was initially accepted under 
condition and subsequently rejected due to the absence of Italian citizenship. He 
claimed the refusal of the Public Administration was discriminatory on grounds of 
nationality. The Court of Pisa198 initially dismissed the claim based on the fact that the 
decision of the respondent was adopted in accordance with regulations concerning 
access to employment in the public service, but the Court of Appeal of Firenze 
reversed the decision199. It is not under dispute, states the Court, building on a 2001 
                                                            
196 Constitutional Court n. 454/1998  
197 See Court of Cassation n. 18523/2014, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro 2, II 2015, p, 
467; Court of Cassation n. 24170/2006, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2, II, 2007, p. 
302 
198 Court of Pisa, 26 October 2001, not published. 
199 Court of Appeal of  Firenze n. 281/2002, in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, II, 2003, p. 
272. 
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decision of the TAR Liguria200, that art. 2 of the TUI has implicitly amended such 
regulations. This considered, the Court analyses the behaviour of the Public 
Administration in the light of the prohibition of discrimination under art. 43 TUI and 
the specific hypothesis of discriminatory behaviour under the same article, and in 
particular the clause concerning discrimination in access to employment. The Court 
concludes the refusal of the respondent to hire the claimant due to the lack of Italian 
citizenship should be considered unlawful since the law prohibits any behaviour 
consisting in imposing disadvantageous conditions or refusing to employ a foreigner 
with regular residency status on grounds of her/his nationality. 
Another line of decisions enforcing the prohibition of discrimination is related to the 
exclusion of foreigners from membership in national sports federations (volleyball, 
basketball, football, and swimming). The first case in this regard was decided by the 
Court of Reggio Emilia in 2000.201 The Court agreed with the applicant that the federal 
regulation limiting the enrolment of TCNs football players was discriminatory. Since 
the applicant was already employed by a football club the Court points to the 
prejudicial effect of the contested regulation in terms of constraining the right to work 
and free choice of employment.  A year later the Court di Pescara202 would confirm the 
same principle with regard to non-professional sporting activity, though the decision 
would be reversed by the second instance decision.203 According to the latter art. 43 
TUI applies only in connection with fundamental rights and freedoms. Provided that 
the prejudice lamented by the applicant consisted in the impossibility to participate in 
the national championship of water polo, no violation of such rights and freedoms was 
envisaged.  
                                                            
200 TAR Liguria n. 399/2001, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2, 2001, p.161. The Court 
considers that art. 2 TUI has implicitly abrogated art. 2 of the DPR 487 del 1994. As a 
consequence, according to its reading the only limitation applying to TCNs access to 
employment in the public sector is represented by the posts implying direct or indirect exercise 
of “public authority” or pertaining to the national interest. For an opposing interpretation see 
TAR Toscana n. 38/2003, not published. 
201 Court of Reggio Emilia, 2 Novemebr 2000 in Foro It, I, 2002, p. 909. See also Court of 
Teramo, 30 March 2001, in Foro It, I, 2002, p. 907. 
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Legal standing  
Legal standing, as already observed represents one key element of the legal 
opportunity structure.  
As far as Italy is concerned, the first provision to go beyond individual enforcement is 
represented by art. 28 of the Workers’ Statute.204 The provision grants trade unions 
legal standing before the courts for challenging anti-trade union behaviour. On the 
contrary of art. 15 of the Statute, previously mentioned as the first general 
antidiscrimination clause under national legislation, art. 28 has been widely used in 
courts.205 
Relying on the model of enforcement provided under art. 28 of the Workers’ Statute, 
art. 15 Law n. 903/1977 provided the possibility for trade union organizations to act on 
behalf of the victim of discrimination and Law n.125/1991 extended legal standing to 
equality advisors. The latter could act on behalf of the victim or in their own name in 
instances of collective discrimination.  
The TUI provisions concerning legal standing significantly build on the latter 
provision. The first draft of the law included the creation of an ombudsman for the 
rights of migrants, at the national and regional level. As to protection against 
discrimination, the draft provided that, in cases of collective forms of discrimination 
concerning employment, the claim could be filed by the ombudsman operating at the 
regional level or trade union organizations. After the proposal on the creation of the 
ombudsman was set aside, the provision was modified accordingly, limiting legal 
standing to trade union organizations.  
In absence of an explicit provision in this respect, civil society organizations might still 
claim legal standing relying on the doctrine elaborated with regard to environmental 
                                                                                                                                                              
202 Court of Pescara, 18 October 2001, in Foro It, I, 2002, p. 905. 
203 Court of Pescara, 14 November 2001 in Foro It, I, 2002, p. 898. 
204 T. Treu, Condotta antisindacale e atti discriminatori, Milano, 1974. 
205 T. Treu (ed.), Sindacato e magistratura, cit.; M. Barbera, Vecchi e nuovi attori sulla scena 
dello Statuto, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale, n. 1, 1995, p. 11. 
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advocacy organizations. 
Although the Civil Procedure Code excludes, except for cases in which it is provided 
by law, the possibility to take legal action for enforcing somebody else’s rights, as far 
as environmental advocacy organizations are concerned courts have since the ’70, 
though not unanimously, admitted the possibility for such organizations to enjoy legal 
standing based on their statutory objectives, the continuity of their engagement and the 
existence of a link with the territory affected by the contested measures.206 
Whereas this doctrine is strictly related to environmental organizations, there are also 
examples in which the above criteria have been applied for the purposes of legal 
standing in discrimination cases. In the already mentioned 2002 case of the Court of 
Milano, the Court agreed the applicant organizations enjoyed legal standing provided 
that their statute included the objective of promoting the fundamental rights of Italian 
and foreign workers with particular regard as far as the latter are concerned to aspects 
concerning their integration and access to housing. In addition, it was considered the 
continuity of their activities and the link with the territory affected by the contested 
regulation of the Municipality of Milano.207   
In alternative to claiming legal standing in their own name civil society organizations 
might claim the right to intervene in the proceedings to support one of the parties.  
The Civil Procedure Code allows a supporting third party intervention provided that 
the third party has “an autonomous interest” in this regard. 
Although the case law provides no definitive answers on what qualifies “an 
autonomous interest” as such,208 the inclusion of fighting discrimination among the 
                                                            
206  S. Gobbato, Legal Standing of Environmental Associations: The New “Democratic 
Approach” of the Italian Supreme Administrative Court, in Journal of environmental law, 19, 
2, 2007, p. 259. 
207 Court of Milano, 21 March 2002, in Foro It, I, 2003, p. 3175. Cfr. Court of Bologna, 17 
October 2001, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2002, 1, p. 101. 
208 According to a narrow interpretation, the intervention is admissible upon the existence of “a 
qualified legal interest” to prevent any negative consequences even only indirectly related to the 
final judgment. Cfr. Court of Cassation n. 3323/2016.  
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statutory objectives and performance of activities aimed to this end on a continuous 
basis might legitimize the intervention of associations engaged in protection migrants’ 
rights. 
The dependent supporting intervention is however subject to a series limitations: the 
intervention is valid only if submitted within the terms provided by the Civil Procedure 
Code, it is not possible to present new claims, and finally the third party has no 
autonomous power to appellate the judgment.  
In conclusion, claiming legal standing irrespective of a legal provision in this regard, 
though not inconceivable from a legal point of view, appears at the very least a risky 
strategy.  
4. Shifting opportunities 
The adoption of the Race Equality Directive 
By June 2000, The European Council adopted the Racial Equality Directive (RED). 
The Directive implements the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. It was adopted on the basis of art. 13 TCE (now 
art. 19 TFUE) that enables the European Council to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.  
The adoption of the Directive made “a clear and unequivocal statement to the Union's 
own citizens and other persons within the territory, to its Member States and future 
Member States, and to the wider world, that the European Union is committed to the 
elimination of racism and racial or ethnic discrimination”.209  
                                                            
209 E. Howard, The EU Race Directive: Its Symbolic Value - Its Only Value?, in International 
Journal of Discrimination and the Law, 6, 2, 2004,  p. 141.  
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Apart from its symbolic value, the Directive was acknowledged as an important step in 
moving forward the European agenda on fighting discrimination. 210 
The Directive has a significantly broad scope of application. It applies to all persons, as 
regards both the public and private sectors, in relation to access to employment and 
working conditions, vocational training, social protection, including social security and 
healthcare, social advantages, education, access to goods and services, including 
housing. 
Art. 2 defines the concept of discrimination. The RED applies with regard to four 
different forms of discrimination: direct, indirect, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate. In particular under the Directive, direct discrimination “shall be taken to 
occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be 
treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin” and indirect 
discrimination “shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion 
or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary”.  
In view to ensuring the effective enforcement of the prohibition to discriminate, the 
Directive provides a number of obligations upon Member States concerning burden of 
proof, access to judicial and administrative procedures, assistance from civil society 
organizations, effective remedies and equality bodies. 
                                                            
210 E. Guild, The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and Limitations, 
in Industrial Law Journal, 2000, 29, p. 416; S. Fredman, Equality: A New Generation?, in 
Industrial Law Journal 30, n. 2, 2001, p. 145; E. Howard, Anti Race Discrimination Measures 
in Europe: An Attack on Two Fronts, 2005, 11, 4 p. 468; D. Schiek, A New Framework on 
Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law in European Law Journal?, 2002, 8, p. 290. L. 
Waddington and M. Bell, More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality 
Directives in Common Market Law Review 38, 3 2001, p. 587. M. Bell, Antidiscrimination law 
in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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Art. 8 requires Member States, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to 
ensure that the burden of proof is shared between the claimant and the respondent in 
cases of discrimination. In other words, when the claimant is able to bring before the 
Court facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination, it should be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of 
the principle of equal treatment. 
Finally, art. 15 specifies that Member States should adopt adequate remedies and 
sanctions in case of violation of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the 
Directive. The sanctions, which may comprise the payment of compensation to the 
victim, should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. To be effective, remedies and 
sanctions must achieve the desired outcome; to be proportionate, they must adequately 
reflect the gravity, nature and extent of the loss and/or harm; and to be dissuasive, 
sanctions must deter future acts of discrimination. 211 
As to access to justice, art. 7 of the Directive provides an obligation upon Member 
States to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures are available to victims 
to enforce their right not to be discriminated against.  
In addition, under the same article, Member States are obliged to allow that 
associations, organizations or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with the 
criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
provisions of the RED are complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of 
the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative 
procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under the Directive. The CJEU 
has clarified in the Feryn case that Member States may also adopt more generous rules 
of legal standing, allowing claims to be brought without the permission of the victim, 
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or even where no identifiable victim exists212. 
Finally, art. 13 requires the establishment of a body or bodies responsible for the 
promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin. Such bodies, which may form part of national human rights 
agencies, should offer assistance to victims in pursuing their complaints, conduct 
independent surveys and publish independent reports and make recommendations on 
any issue relating to discrimination.213  
Analysing the policy making process of the RED, Evans Case and Givens argue that 
the adoption of some of the provisions of the latter were part of a deliberate strategy to 
promote strategic litigation at the EU and domestic level214.   
Whereas acknowledging that the adoption of Directive was promoted by politicians 
and that the timing of the adoption is clearly related to contemporaneous events, such 
as Haider’s extreme right-wing becoming part of the governing coalition in Austria and 
the domination of centre left political parties in Europe, they conclude that national 
politicians were not the proponents of key measures in RED that would open 
opportunities for litigation at the EU and domestic level. On the contrary, according to 
their findings, national representatives sought to weaken several provisions of the draft 
directive on legal standing and national enforcement bodies.  
They argue that the “Starting Line Group” (SLG), a network of nearly 400 
organizations with special expertise in antidiscrimination law, working with the 
support of the European Parliament and later of the European Commission, was the 
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key actor in this regard215 . Whereas is well known that part of the innovative 
provisions in the RED clearly capitalizes on the evolution of the ECJ jurisprudence and 
the sex discrimination Directives, the introduction of key provisions like those on legal 
standing and national enforcement bodies are found to have their roots in the SLG’s 
1993 and 1998 draft directives. 
Overall, the RED clearly contributes to opening opportunities for litigation, at the EU 
and domestic level. This appears with definite evidence if we look at the provisions of 
the Directive through the lenses of the LOS approach. 
In particular as far as availability of legal resources or legal stock is concerned, the 
RED introduces three key provisions: art. 3 significantly expands the scope of the 
prohibition of discrimination; art. 8 shifts the burden of proof once sufficient evidence 
has been presented to establish a presumption of discriminatory behaviour; art. 2 
provides an objective definition of discrimination clearly excluding any relevance of 
the intent to discriminate and broadens, as far as direct discrimination is concerned the 
“area” of available comparators. In addition it introduces a new notion of indirect 
discrimination that “is designed to be wider and less dependent on the production of 
statistical evidence”216.   
As to “access to courts”, the provision requiring Member States to ensure that 
associations, organizations or other legal entities may engage, either on behalf of or in 
support of the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or 
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under the 
Directive together with the broad interpretation of the clause in Feryn clearly opens 
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opportunities for organizations fighting discrimination to enforce and mobilise around 
the newly adopted provision of discrimination.  
Finally, art. 13 requiring the establishment of national enforcement institutions aiming, 
besides conducting research on discrimination, to providing assistance to victims of 
discrimination in pursuing their complaints might potentially contribute to the creation 
of public bodies supporting the enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination with 
financial resources or legal expertise and therefore contributing to liberalise the legal 
opportunity structure as far as access to resources for litigation is concerned.  
As Case and Givens note, quoting Epp, the provision on legal standing and the one on 
public enforcement bodies “potentially lay the groundwork for the development of a 
‘support structure’ for legal mobilization”.217 
Whereas the material scope of the RED, as defined in art. 3 (1), is quite far-reaching 
and satisfactory in terms of protection against discriminatory behaviour. It should be 
noted however that art. 3(2) establishes a relevant as well as controversial limitation. 
The Directive, as is well known, specifies that it “does not cover differences of 
treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions 
relating to the entry and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on 
the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status 
of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned”.  
The Directive itself has been subject to severe criticism as a result of such limitation.218 
It has been suggested that the limitation clause should be interpreted restrictively as 
allowing only differences of treatment concerning the entry, residence and legal status 
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of TCNs rather than any difference of treatment based on nationality.219 Furthermore 
differences on grounds of nationality could fall under the prohibition of discrimination 
based on racial and ethnic origin in cases in which nationality is used as a proxy for 
racial and ethnic origin or where they result in a particular disadvantage for people 
belonging to a particular ethnic group or affect them disproportionately.220  
In its first decision on the RED, the European Court of Justice appeared willing to 
adopt a narrow interpretation of art. 3(2). As is well known the Feryn221  case 
concerned a number public statements made by one of the directors of the company 
announcing that the firm intended to recruit fitters but that was not willing to employ 
“Moroccans” because its customers were reluctant to give immigrants access to their 
residences. Though the statement referred to nationality, the Court considered it 
amounted to direct racial and ethnic discrimination, though it did argue on the relation 
between the prohibitions of discrimination under art. 2 and art. 3(2).  
Other EU equality clauses.  
In the Tampere Conclusions in 1999, Member States highlighted for the first time the 
importance of fair and equal treatment of TCNs legally residing in the EU 222 . 
According to such conclusions, TCNs legally residing in Europe should be granted 
rights as near as possible to those to EU citizens in view to their integration in the EU. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis, the aftermath of the Tampere Summit proved 
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consensus among Member States was illusory, at least with regard to the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for employment reasons.223 
While is it acknowledged that the Tampere objectives have gradually become “shared 
nostalgia” and the goal of giving TCNs legally residing in EU equal rights compared to 
EU citizens has been set aside224, in the last years the engagement of the EU legislature 
on equality and legal status of TCNs has become increasingly tangible. 
Such activism has translated in a number of equality clauses referring to specific 
categories of TCNs. This has resulted in highly fragmented framework, which on the 
one hand poses serious challenges as to its interpretation, and on the other raises strong 
criticism as to the merits of the approach followed by the legislature.225 
Furthermore, the equality clauses leave Member States a wide margin of discretionary 
power to limit the scope of equality226. This is particularly clear as far as social security 
and social benefits are concerned.   
Finally, it should be noted that unlike the prohibition of discrimination such clauses are 
devoid of enforcement mechanisms.  
The first European Directives to introduce equality clauses were: Directive 
2003/109/EC227 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
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residents; Directive 2004/83/EC 228  on refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection and Directive 2004/38/EC 229 establishing the conditions governing the 
exercise of the right to free movement and residence within the territory of the Member 
States by EU citizens and their family members. 
Art. 11 of the Directive 2003/109/EC establishes that long-term residents shall enjoy 
equal treatment among the areas identified by the article: (a) access to employment and 
self-employed activity, provided that such activities do not entail even occasional 
involvement in the exercise of public authority, and conditions of employment and 
working conditions, including conditions regarding dismissal and remuneration; (b) 
education and vocational training, including study grants in accordance with national 
law; (d) social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national 
law; (f) access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made 
available to the public and to procedures for obtaining housing. 
The same article then specifies that Member States may limit equal treatment in 
respect of social assistance and social protection to core benefits.  
In this regard, the European Court of Justice, besides clarifying that the equal treatment 
clause has immediate and direct affect in national law and therefore requires the 
disapplication of conflicting provisions, has emphasizes that, any exception to the right 
to equal treatment should be interpreted strictly.230 
Art. 28 Directive 2004/83/EC provides the obligation for Member States to ensure that 
beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status receive, in the Member States 
that has granted international protection, the necessary social assistance and access to 
healthcare under the same conditions as nationals. By exception, Member States may 
limit social assistance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (only to them; it 
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does not apply to refugees) to core benefits, which will then be provided at the same 
levels and under the same eligibility conditions applying to nationals. In addition the 
Directive requires Member States to authorize beneficiaries of refugee status or 
subsidiary protection status to engage in employed or self-employed activities subject 
to rules generally applicable to the profession and to the public service.  
Art. 24 Directive 2004/38/EC reminds that all European Union citizens residing on the 
basis of the Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal 
treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The 
Directive then specifies that equality shall be extended to family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent 
residence. The Directive species that this right is subject to limitations only with 
reference to the first three months of residence as regards access to social assistance.  
In 2009 the EU has adopted the Blue Card Directive231 which ensures equal treatment 
as regards working conditions, including payment and dismissal, access to goods and 
services and the supply of goods and services made available to the public, including 
procedures for obtaining housing, education and vocational training. However, the 
right to equal treatment can be limited with regard to study and maintenance grants and 
loans or other grants and loans regarding secondary and higher education and 
vocational training, and procedures for obtaining housing. In addition the right to equal 
treatment may be restricted if the cardholder moves to a second Member State.   
More recently Directive 2011/98/UE232 has been approved. The Directive regulates a 
single application procedure for a permit of stay for third-country nationals residing 
and working in the territory of a Member State while aiming to guarantee the latter a 
common set of rights.233  
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Art. 12 establishes that third-country nationals residing in a Member State enjoy the 
right to equal treatment with regard to working conditions, including pay and dismissal 
as well as health and safety at the workplace; branches of social security, as defined in 
Regulation (EC) n. 883/2004; access to goods and services and the supply of goods 
and services made available to the public including procedures for obtaining housing 
as provided by national law. 
The article itself provides the possibility for Member States to limit access to social 
security although such option cannot be used to limit equality of treatment for third-
country workers who are in employment or who have been employed for a minimum 
period of six months and who are registered as unemployed.  
Finally in 2014, the EU legislature approved Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions 
of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal 
workers. Art. 23 grants seasonal workers a lower standard of equality by allowing 
Member States to restrict equality as far as access to social security is concerned to 
exclude seasonal workers form family benefits and unemployment benefits and failing 
to include housing among the areas covered by equality.  
In addition the EU has concluded a number of cooperation or association agreements 
with third countries. Such agreements are particularly important since they commonly 
include equality clauses granting to the national of the third country equality of 
treatment with nationals in areas such as employment, employment conditions and 
social security. The agreement establishing an Association between the EU and Turkey 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Morocco and Tunisia all prohibit differential treatment on grounds of nationality with 
reference to the above-mentioned areas.234 As to the legal effect of such clauses, it 
should be considered that the European Court of Justice case law is well established as 
to the fact that these provisions are of immediate and direct effect in national law, 
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therefore requiring the disapplication of incompatible national provisions235. The point 
is crucial since the beneficiaries of such clauses are entitled as a consequence to rely 
on the clause before the national courts in order to invoke the disapplication of national 
provisions violating the equality clause. 
The implementation of the RED.   
The RED was implemented at the domestic level through the adoption of Legislative 
Decree n. 215/03.236 Its implementation liberalised legal opportunity structures at the 
domestic level fulfilling and, to some extent, going beyond the expectations of its 
promoters. 
Art. 2 of the Legislative Decree introduces new definitions of discriminatory behaviour 
literally reproducing the definitions provided by the Directive. It also, albeit timidly, 
attempts to coordinate the new prohibition of discrimination with the already existing 
prohibition of discrimination under art. 43 TUI, which as specified above, explicitly 
includes nationality among the prohibited factors. Art. 2 of the implementing decree 
refers to art. 43 TUI clarifying that “the present definition is without prejudice to art. 
43 (1) and (2) of TUI, concerning immigration and the status of foreigners.” 
With regard to the scope of application, art. 3 defines the material and personal scope 
of the implementing decree in the same terms as the Directive. Therefore the 
prohibition of discrimination applies to access to employment and working conditions, 
vocational training, social protection, including social security and healthcare, social 
advantages, education, access to goods and services, including housing. It excludes 
from its scope differences of treatment based on nationality though it specifically 
refers, in addition to conditions relating entry, residence and any other treatment 
arising from the legal status of TCNs, also to access to occupation and social welfare.  
As far as enforcement is concerned, the implementing decree referred to art. 44 TUI, 
extending the application of the special proceeding under the TUI to the new 
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prohibition of discrimination.  
Furthermore, it replicated the rule concerning the burden of proof under art. 44 TUI, 
stating “the complainant can prove the existence of discrimination by providing 
weighty, accurate and consistent facts”, here included statistical data that will be 
considered by the judge under the civil procedure rules on simple presumptions.  
It was only after the activation by the European Commission of an infringement 
procedure against Italy237 that the provision of the burden of proof changed. Law n. 
101/2008 subsequently specified that once the plaintiff provides facts, here included 
statistical data, such as to establish, in precise and consistent terms, the presumption of 
acts, agreements or discriminatory behaviour, it is for the respondent to prove there is 
no discrimination. 
The decree confirmed the provisions of the TUI on remedies. It provided the power for 
the judge to condemn the perpetrator to pay damages, here included moral damages, 
and order the latter to end discriminatory behaviour and remove its effects, and in view 
to preventing discrimination from occurring in the future to impose the adoption of a 
plan of removal.  
Since 2011, as part of an overall reform to simplify the rules of civil procedure, the 
legislature has created a new proceeding on discrimination, applying to both the TUI 
and the implementing decree. Art. 28 Legislative Decree n. 150/2011 reorganizes the 
previous regulations with one substantial innovation: it extends the rules on burden of 
proof under Legislative Decree n. 215/03 to the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality under the TUI.  
Art. 5 of the implementing decree besides establishing that civil society organizations 
having an interest in enforcing the prohibition of discrimination can act on behalf and 
in support of the complainant, with his or her approval, provides the possibility for 
such organizations to act in their own name in cases of collective discrimination where 
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the victims of discriminatory behaviour are not subject to immediate and ready 
identification therefore providing legal standing to organizations other than trade union 
organizations. 
Legal standing is granted upon the condition that civil society organizations are 
included in a special register approved by Decree of the Minister of Labour and Social 
Policy and the Minister for Equal Opportunities. Although the implementing decree 
was adopted in 2003, the Department of Equal Opportunities established the register 
only in December 2005, almost three years later.238 Following its adoption the register 
was updated for the first time only in April 2010.   
Art. 5 limits the possibility of registration for the purposes of legal standing to civil 
society organizations included in the register of organizations carrying activities aimed 
at promoting social integration for TCNs, which was established under the TUI239 and 
civil society organizations engaged in fighting discrimination that are included in the 
register established under art. 6 of the implementing decree. The latter subjects the 
inclusion in the register to a number of requirements relating to the statute of the 
organization, financial transparency and continuity of its activities, criminal record of 
the legal representatives and potential conflict of interest. 
The implementing decree establishes UNAR, the National Office against racial 
discrimination240. UNAR, which is attached to the Prime Minister Office, is under the 
institutional obligation to monitor and promote compliance with the principle of 
equality. The implementing decree specifies the Office should provide assistance to 
victims of discrimination along judicial and/or administrative procedures also through 
the submission to the Court of relevant information or observations on the merits of the 
case; investigate cases of discrimination; promote the adoption, by public and private 
entities, of specific measures, including positive action, aiming to prevent or 
compensate disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin; promote knowledge and 
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research on discrimination and finally race awareness among the public. The obligation 
to assist victims of discrimination has been intended by UNAR, until very recently, as 
limited to submitting a “pre-litigation opinion” on the merit of the discriminatory 
conduct allegations rather than providing the victim with the necessary legal expertise 
to file the claim. In November 2014, UNAR established a solidarity fund aiming to 
financially support legal claims concerning discrimination by individual victims, civil 
society organizations that are granted legal standing under art. 5 Legislative Decree 
215/03 and trade union organizations. As far as this aspect concerns specifically access 
to resources it will be considered in the following paragraph. 
 
5. Resources for litigation 
Art. 44 TUI and later art. 28 Legislative Decree 150/2011 provide the possibility for 
the victim of discrimination to personally stand before the court. Although the 
provision might appear revolutionary and indeed there have been cases in which 
allowing the claimant to personally stand before the court has opened the door of the 
justice system to the most vulnerable groups in society241, it should be noted that the 
highly technical nature of antidiscrimination law and civil procedure law together with 
the reasons that often dissuade victims of discrimination even in cases in which access 
to legal expertise is provided, are very much likely to seriously limit the application of 
the provision. So far there is no knowledge of cases in which the claimant stood before 
the court without being represented by a lawyer. 
Scholars of legal mobilisation have repeatedly highlighted the importance of access to 
resources to legal expertise as one of the main factors explaining the emergence of 
litigation strategies.  
From a LOS perspective fee shifting rules are considered crucial in this regard. 
According to art. 92 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code, the basic rule concerning cost 
and fee allocation is that the losing party has to reimburse all his or her opponent’s 
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expenses including court fees and lawyer’s fees.  
Fee shifting undoubtedly represents a key resource for legal actors and this is 
especially true if we consider the unequal distribution of resources that often 
characterizes parties in proceedings on discriminatory behaviour. There is however a 
flip side of the rule that scholars tend to ignore and it is related to the risk of being 
condemned to pay the defender’s lawyer’s fees and the impact such risk can have on 
the decision to engage in litigation. With the aim of covering situations in which such a 
consequence appears not to respond to justice, art. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code 
provides the possibility to derogate to the general rule allowing the judge to decide that 
each party should bear its own costs. According to the original version of the 
provision, the judge was allowed to decide in the aforesaid terms in two different 
cases: a split outcome or the presence of a “good cause”. The wording of the clause 
allowed the judge enough discretion to decide that each party would have to pay its 
own attorney based on considerations concerning the behaviour of the parties and their 
impact on the duration and the course of the proceedings, but also in relation to equity 
reasons242. 
In Labour Courts, for example, judges commonly referred to the “nature of the 
dispute”, “the different characteristics of the parties” or in general to their different 
personal and financial conditions, and finally to their position in the proceedings in 
order not to impose on the worker who had not succeeded in court the payment of the 
expenses of the winning party where such a consequence appeared unfair.243 
The provision was amended in 2005 requiring the judge to explicitly state in the 
decision the “good cause” and subsequently in 2009 allowing the judge to derogate to 
the general rule only for “serious and exceptional reasons” clearly limiting the 
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possibility to derogate the general rule for equity reasons. In 2014, the legislature 
replaced “serious and exceptional reasons” with reasons related to the “absolute 
novelty of the issues considered or overruling of precedents on the issues at stake”.  
Whereas the above mentioned reforms consider the obligation to reimburse the 
opponent’s expenses mostly as a mechanism to sanction frivolous litigation and abuse 
of procedural rights, labour scholars are highlighting the risks it bears as to the 
enforcement of worker’s rights, arguing the reform is likely to discourage, besides 
frivolous litigation, also genuine cases.244  
Indeed the prospective to win the case and benefit from fee shifting rule might promote 
access to justice, however on the other hand the risk of loosing and being obliged to 
pay the others party’s lawyer might operate the other way around. The deterrent effect 
is particularly clear as far as employment or welfare or discrimination cases are 
concerned. The lower the resource available to the claimant, the higher is the risk of an 
unfavourable outcome.   
As previously stated, art. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code was last reformed in 2014, 
therefore assessing its impact at the time being would be premature.245 However, it is 
clear that in this regard preventing the judge from deciding each party should pay 
his/her own lawyer based on equity reasons can be viewed as contributing to making 
the LOS more conservative.  
The same trend can be observed in relation to regulations concerning courts fees, 
which represent the major cost of litigation after lawyer’s fees. Whereas in comparison 
with other EU countries court fees in Italy are considered to be modest, and therefore 
as having a lower impact in terms of access to justice, it appears that in case the current 
trend of increasing fees is confirmed in the year to come, there will be enough room to 
question such assessment.  
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In 2002, Presidential Decree n.115/2002 (Justice Costs Consolidated Act) introduced 
the payment of the so called “contributo unificato”, a standard court fee due at the 
beginning of the proceedings.246 The amount of the fee is determined based on the 
value of the claim and the type of proceedings (in 2002, for example, the claimant was 
required to pay a fee of € 310 in civil proceedings with a value that from € 25.823 to € 
51.646 or with indeterminable value). 
The decree was without prejudice to the full exemption from court fees applying to 
“employment and welfare” proceedings, since the ‘70. 247  The exemption for 
employment and welfare proceedings applied also to discrimination cases concerning 
access to employment or access to welfare. When this is the case, the claim is assigned 
to “employment and welfare” judges and is subject to the same obligations in terms of 
court fees.  
The Justice Costs Consolidated Act was revised in 2011. The most significant changes 
concerned the exemption applying to employment and welfare proceedings. D.L. n. 
98/2011 introduced a threshold income requiring the claimant, in case their family 
income exceeded the threshold (€31.884,48), to pay the minimum fee in welfare 
proceedings and half of the standard fee in employment proceedings (that is to say €37 
and €225)248. With reference to appellate proceedings the “contributo unificato” is 
increased by half and is doubled in the proceedings before the Court of Cassation.249  
Yet the exemption applies only with reference to individual claimants therefore civil 
society or trade unions organizations filing a discrimination claim concerning 
employment or welfare will be required, under any circumstances, to pay half of the 
                                                            
246 The previous regime was based on the payment of a stamp (of € 14.62) every four pages of 
the initial procedural act. See. D.P.R. 6/10/1972, n. 642. 
247 Law n. 533/1973. 
248 In 2015 the updated costs are: €259 (Court of First Instance), €388,50 (Court of Appeal) and 
€518 (Court of Cassation). 
249 In addition, as provided by Law n. 183/2011, when the appeal is totally dismissed, the 
appealing party should pay an additional sum, equal to the “contributo unificato” due for the 
appeal.  
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standard fee.250  
Likewise rules concerning fee shifting and court fees, regulations concerning legal aid 
potentially represent another key resource for legal mobilisation. Nevertheless, in the 
Italian case there are two main barriers to the impact of legal aid in this regard. The 
first concerns the limited scope of the benefit. Indeed it is granted only to those with 
annual income lower than  € 11.528,41. The second one is related to lawyer’s fees, 
which under the consolidated act are reduced by half as far as civil proceedings are 
concerned. 
The above mentioned solidarity fund established by UNAR in November 2014 
complements legal aid providing financial support to victims of discriminations that 
are unable to satisfy the threshold income requirement under the Justice Cost 
Consolidated Act. For civil society organizations that are granted legal standing under 
art. 5 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 and trade union organizations such condition does 
not apply. Whereas the Fund regulation does not provide a maximum income 
threshold, it establishes beneficiaries are entitled to receive a fixed amount of €600 
euros for each level of the judicial proceedings. As in the case of the rules concerning 
derogation to fee shifting, the recent nature of the fund does not allow any assessment 
of its impact. Although it would be reasonable to expect that its effectiveness might be 
constrained by the provision limiting the benefit to €600, the establishment of the fund, 
may provide an additional resource for mobilisation around equality. 
  
                                                            
250 The applicant will be required to pay the same amount (half of the standard fee) in cases of 
discrimination not concerning employment or access to welfare, since there is a 50 % reduction 
for the “processo di cognizione sommaria”  
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Chapter III 
INTO THE COURTS 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Forging opportunities.  
Nationality under art. 3(2) the RED. 
Recital 3 of the Directive reminds that the right to equality before the law and 
protection against discrimination for all persons constitutes a universal right as 
recognized inter alia by the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination and by the European Convention on Human Rights, to which 
all Member States are signatories. 
Notwithstanding the emphatic proclamation of the right to equality as a universal right, 
the Directive suffers serious shortcomings in terms of ensuring protection against 
discrimination for all persons in Europe.  
As previously noted art. 3(2) of the RED specifies that the Directive “does not cover 
differences of treatment based on nationality” and “is without prejudice to provisions 
and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals and 
stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises 
from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned”. 
The exclusion is reiterated in recital 13 of the Directive, which on the one hand 
clarifies that the prohibition of discrimination “should also apply to nationals of third 
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countries” and on the other confirms “differences of treatment based on nationality” 
and provisions “governing the entry and residence of third-country nationals and their 
access to employment and to occupation” are not included within the scope of the 
Directive.  
It follows that the Directive does protect TCNs from discrimination on grounds of race 
and ethnic origin but differences of treatment based on nationality 251 such as those 
between TCNs and nationals of one Member State and in particular those concerning 
entry and residence and “any other treatment” arising from their legal status as TCNs 
are not covered for the purposes of the RED.  
The exclusion of nationality from the scope of the RED has been considered, together 
with the absence of positive social, economic and cultural obligations, as one of the 
main factors limiting its effectiveness in promoting a “pluralistic culture of human 
rights in Europe. 252  The effects of the exclusion, according to Hepple, are felt 
disproportionately by ethnic minorities who make up the majority of TCNs. Their 
inferior legal status has serious repercussion on the perception of ethnic minorities 
generally, and on their integration”. “Inhumane restrictions on welfare benefits, harsh 
policies against family reunification, and marginalization in the labour market” he 
observes “prevent the realization of the principle of equality which must be the 
foundation of all integration policies”253.   
To this day, whereas the EU has taken important steps to overcome the exclusion of 
TCNs and align their legal status to that of nationals of Member States, these 
developments do not ensure full equality of treatment254 and are not backed by the 
                                                            
251 According to De Schutter, differences of treatment on grounds of nationality fall under three 
categories: such differences may be created (a) between the nationals of one Member State and 
foreigners; (b) between nationals of one Member State and nationals of other EU Member 
States on the one hand and nationals of third countries on the other; and (c) between nationals 
of different third countries. O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 9. 
252 B. Hepple, Race and law in, cit., p. 3. 
253 Ibid. p. 7. 
254 O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 8 
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enforcement mechanisms the RED provides. 
Fighting discrimination based on race and ethnic origin, while excluding nationality 
from its scope of application, has been compellingly compared to “(like) carrying 
water with a sieve”, given the existence of an obvious link between racial and ethnic 
discrimination and migrant communities.255 
According to another critic, despite the formal inclusion of TCNs within the personal 
scope of the Directive, art. 3(2) fails to recognize “the specific nature of the racist 
constructs surrounding T.C.N”, explicitly excluding the “distinctions most relevant to 
the plight of T.C.N. as members of racial or ethnic minorities”. The mere possibility 
that T.C.N. will be protected under the Directive, warns McInerney “is insufficient 
legal protection against the specific and multiple forms of race discrimination to which 
they remain susceptible.”256 
Yet, the exact implications of article 3 (2) are still far form being clear. The language 
used in the article is rather loose and ambiguous. Art. 3(2) consists of two parts. The 
first one refers to any difference of treatment based on nationality whereas the second 
to differences of treatment which are based on nationality and concern provisions and 
conditions relating to the entry, residence and any treatment which arises from the 
legal status of the TCNs and stateless persons concerned.  
On a literal reading, the first part of the article appears to “screen” any difference of 
treatment based on nationality from being considered under the RED.  If this were the 
case, the second part of the article would have no purpose other then that of reiterating 
the irrelevance under the RED of differences of treatment targeting TCNs, and are 
therefore based on their nationality, with regard to the concerned areas. 
Since such an interpretation would ultimately result in making the second part of art. 
3(2) completely superfluous, the latter should be rather understood as specifying the 
areas in which differences of treatment based on nationality are indeed “screened” 
                                                            
255 L. Roseberry, Like Carrying Water, cit. p. 247 
256 S. McInerney, Legal Protection against, cit. p. 14. 
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form the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin.  
It follows that art. 3(2) does not exclude from the scope of the Directive any difference 
of treatment based on nationality but only those concerning the entry into and 
residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member 
States, and any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country 
nationals and stateless persons concerned.  
This is not to say that nationality should be included on its own as a protected ground 
under the Directive, but that outside of the areas specifically mentioned, art. 3(2) does 
not preclude from considering whether a difference of treatment based on nationality 
results in a violation of the prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination based on 
race and ethnic origin. As Hepple notes “nationality discrimination may simply be the 
cloak for direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.”257 
In addition, a different interpretation of the provision would conflict with the objective 
of effectively fighting discrimination based on ethnic origin, let alone with the 
universal nature of the right not to be discriminated and the legal principle according to 
which derogations to such right should be interpreted restrictively.  
This potential conflict appears with evidence if we investigate the meaning of race and 
ethnic origin under the RED. As Gerards notes the definition of the prohibited grounds 
is key to defining the scope of application of the prohibition of discrimination258. The 
scope of the RED, therefore, will be more or less inclusive based on the definition of 
race and ethnic origin.  
As known the Directive is of little help in this regard since it does not provide any 
definition of the two concepts, apart from making explicit in recital 7 that “the 
European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate 
human races and the use of the term "racial origin" in this Directive does not imply an 
acceptance of such theories.” 
                                                            
257 B. Hepple, Race and law in, cit., p. 6. 
258 J. H. Gerards, The Grounds of Discrimination, 2007, p. 33 
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Distinguishing between race and ethnic origin and nationality is anything but an easy 
task. Perpetrators do not usually name the ground and it is quite common that TCNs 
belong to different overlapping groups, making it difficult to draw a straight line 
between discrimination based on nationality (not protected) and racial and ethnic 
discrimination (protected).259 
In this regard, it has been noticed that such distinction may be even more challenging 
in some countries compared to others. In countries with relatively recent experiences 
of mass migration and naturalization policies, which are designed to withhold 
citizenship, such as the case of Italy, is much more likely that nationality, race and 
ethnic origin will overlap.260 
Defining race and ethnic origin isn’t an easy task either. Whereas nationality is 
commonly understood as referring to the link existing between the state and individual, 
the meaning of race and ethnic origin tends to be blurred. It could not be otherwise. 
Race and ethnic origin are social constructs, which vary across time and space. “Race 
and ethnic groups, like nations, are imagined communities. People are socially defined 
as belonging to particular ethnic or racial groups, either in terms of definitions 
employed by others, or definitions which members of particular ethnic groups develop 
for themselves”.261 
Before the eighteenth century, the term race was used to denote “nothing more than a 
group of people with a common line of descent, a common ancestry”.262 It was only 
later on that race assumed a biological connotation and was linked to a hierarchy 
between the races and therefore “used to justify exclusion, subordination and even 
                                                            
259 S. B Lahuerta, Race equality and TCNs, cit., p. 739. 
260 C. Favilli, La non discriminazione, cit., p. 52; In this regard, see the data provided in M. 
Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 18. 
261 O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 19 quoting M. Bulmer and J. Solomos, 
Introduction: Re-thinking Ethnic and Racial Studies, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21, 5, 1998 
p. 822 
262 E. Howard, Race and Racism: Why Does European Law Have Difficulties with Definitions? 
in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 24, 1, 2008, 
p. 10. 
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extermination of certain groups that were considered to be inferior”263.  
Although theories about the biological existence of races have been largely disproved 
since the ‘30, race is still very much present in the public discourse and everyday life. 
It is commonly used to refer to visible physical differences, and irrespective of whether 
it is believed to exist or not in a biological sense, it is still almost inextricably linked to 
the same idea of hierarchy.264 
Ethnicity on the other hand, although often used together with the term race and indeed 
in many aspects overlapping with the former, appears to refer more to cultural rather 
than physical differences. Therefore it is related to membership of a group that shares 
certain cultural traits.265 
Whereas it has been suggested that we should be careful in drawing clear-cut 
distinctions between race and ethnic origin since it would ultimately have the effect of 
validating a biological understanding of race in contrast to the cultural understanding 
of ethnic origin, the fact that the RED mentions ethnic origin along race prevents from 
considering the two terms as synonyms266. On this account, the use of race together 
with ethnic origin should be interpreted as covering under the prohibition of 
discrimination differences of treatment based on physical traits as well as differences 
of treatment based on cultural traits.  
The difference between race and ethnic origin is confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice in the first decision ever addressing the meaning of ethnic origin for the 
purposes of the RED. In the Chez judgement267 the Court, in considering whether 
                                                            
263 Ibidem 
264 E. Howard, Race and Racism, cit., p. 10. 
265 As Bell notes “pinning down the limits to ethnicity has troubled courts and law-makers in 
various Member States”. In the UK, for example Sikhs and Jews have been accepted as ethnic 
groups, whereas Rastafarians have not. In the Netherlands, case law from the Equal Treatment 
Commission has recognized that discrimination related to ethnic origin can cover Jews and, in 
certain circumstances, Rastafarians and Muslims. M. Bell, Racism and Equality, cit. p. 10. 
266 O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 20. 
267  Judgment of 16 July 2015, CHEZ C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480 
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Roma are an ethnic group for the purposes of the RED notably states that the concept 
of ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked in particular by 
common nationality, religious faith, language, cultural and traditional origins and 
backgrounds. In doing so the ECJ explicitly refers to the ECtHR case law on art. 14 
ECHR. In a well-established line of case law, the latter has repeatedly observed that 
“ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts” and that “whereas the notion 
of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human beings into subspecies 
according to morphological features such as skin colour or facial characteristics, 
ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked by common nationality, 
tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional origins and 
backgrounds”.268  
In providing a “geographically sensible” definition of ethnicity the two courts strongly 
point to cultural markers such as nationality, language and religion.269 On this account, 
it can be argued that both cases in which nationality is used as a proxy for ethnic origin 
and cases of differential treatment genuinely based on nationality which put persons of 
a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage or affect them disproportionately 
should be considered under the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ethnic 
origin. Whereas the first calls into question the prohibition of direct discrimination, the 
second should be considered under the prohibition of indirect discrimination270. 
Several scholars have called for a consistent interpretation of the RED, in line with this 
argument. Guild points out that equality law must not accept as being beyond its reach 
discrimination that has as an essential element differential treatment on grounds of race 
or religion only because it has been formally categorized as nationality 
                                                            
268  ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, 13 December 2011, Appl. nn 55762/00 and 55974/00, 
paragraph 55. 
269 M. Bell, Racism and Equality, cit.p. 25. 
270 For De Schutter these are both forms of indirect discrimination. See O. De Schutter, Links 
between migration cit., p. 8. For a discussion on the issue see M. Ambrus, M. J. Busstra, and K. 
Henrard, The Racial Equality Directive and Effective Protection Against Discrimination: 
Mismatches Between the Substantive Law and its Application, in Erasmus Law Review, 3, 3, 
2010, p. 165. 
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discrimination”271. Likewise Lahuerta insists that a broad interpretation of the concept 
of racial discrimination would allow to consider that racial discrimination ‘which is 
presented as’ religion or nationality discrimination falls within the scope of the 
RED.272 
De Schutter considers that art. 3(2) does not necessarily imply that indirect 
discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin is not prohibited for the simple 
reason that it results from a difference of treatment based on nationality,273 while 
adding that a reading of the Directives adopted on the basis of art. 13 in accordance 
with the developments in international human rights law would certainly favour an 
interpretation of the clause according to which it does not exclude challenging 
nationality based differences of treatment when they amount to indirect discrimination 
on grounds of race and ethnic origin or religion.274 For Bell, an interpretation of art. 
3(2) such as to exclude from the scope of the directive any treatment based on 
nationality, where such treatment is also indirect racial discrimination, raises a 
potential conflict between art. 3(2) and art. 2(2)(b).275  
This is, on the other hand, also the position of the European Commission which 
explicitly considers in its Report on the application of the RED, that “Directive 
2000/43/EC does not cover discrimination on the basis of nationality as such (unless 
differentiation on the basis of nationality or language turns out to be indirect 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin)”.276 
                                                            
271 E. Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity. EU Citizenship and Migration Law, 
Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 250. 
272 S. B Lahuerta, Race equality and TCNs, cit., p. 739. 
273 O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 28. 
274 Ibid, p.78 see also C. Favilli, La non discriminazione, cit., p. 52; G. N. Toggenburg, The 
Race Directive, p. 236. 
275 M. Bell, Meeting the Challenge, cit., p. 31. 
276 European Commision, Joint Report on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 
29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin (‘Racial Equality Directive’) and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
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Any treatment? 
These considerations set the ground for reflecting on a second interpretative issue. If 
art. 3(2) has to be interpreted as not “safeguarding” any difference of treatment based 
on nationality but only those regarding the entry, residence and “any treatment” arising 
from the legal status of TCNs, what does “any treatment” stand for?  
The vague reference to “any treatment” appears to imply that also TCNs that are 
already admitted in the EU do not enjoy protection against differential treatment 
arising from their legal status in any of the areas covered by the Directive even when it 
indirectly determines race and ethnic origin discrimination.  
The adoption of art. 3(2) is commonly explained in the light of the concern of many 
Member States that the Directive would interfere with national regulations on border 
control and immigration policies.277 Interestingly, neither art. 3(2) nor recital 13 were 
included in the original proposal278. They were introduced during the negotiations, 
confirming that the regulation of migration was at the time of the adoption of the RED, 
and still is, a highly sensitive issue on which Members States are willing to preserve 
their control.  
As Bell notes, based on information, which is available on the Council’s deliberations, 
it appears that pressure from Member States in this regard was specifically related to 
the fear that restrictions on access employment imposed by work permits could be 
challenged under the prohibition of indirect discrimination. On this account, he 
considers that the main aim of the provision is to protect Member States’ immigration 
law instruments, which regulate access to employment by TCNs.279   
                                                                                                                                                              
occupation (‘Employment Equality Directive’), 2014. 
277 B. Hepple, Race and law in, cit., p. 6. 
278  E. Howard, The EU Race Directive: Time for Change?, in International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 8, 4, 2000, p. 244. She reports Member States insisted in the 
adoption of the clause not feeling reassured by the European Commission statement that 
immigration laws and border control were not included under the scope of the RED. 
279 M. Bell, Meeting the Challenge, cit., p. 31. 
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Interestingly the aforementioned recital 13, unlike art. 3(2), refers only to “access to 
employment or occupation” rather than to “any treatment” arising from their legal 
status.  
A reading of the exclusion clause as limited to access to employment and occupation 
might find further support also in the light of the strict interaction between admission 
policies and the right of permanence of third country nationals on the one hand and 
being employed on the other hand. Apart from cases of family reunification and other 
more marginal hypothesis, having a job offer or being employed represents the main 
condition required for the purposes of being admitted in the EU and granted the right 
to stay. 
Regardless of whether it is concluded that art 3(2) refers only to access to employment 
or that it refers to any treatment, including as such also access to welfare, the provision 
should at the most be intended as covering only differences of treatment that satisfy the 
following two conditions: are established by law and are strictly related to the legal 
status of TCNs.280 
Bell best illustrates this point through a couple of examples concerning access to 
employment. “An employer who paid third country nationals workers less than EU 
citizens for the same occupation should not be entitled to claim this was due to a 
difference in their ‘legal status’”. Provided that all workers enjoy the right to engage in 
employment under the same conditions, he moves to consider that “then there is no 
relevant difference in their legal status, which could apply to the employer’s unequal 
treatment”. Similarly, he observes, whilst recruitment by employers of EU nationals in 
preference to third country nationals (seeking to enter the EU maybe required by 
national or EU law), recruitment practices entailing a total exclusion of third-country 
through statements such as “EU nationals only need apply”, should not be protected by 
reference to Article 3(2).”281 
                                                            
280 Ibid.; G. N. Toggenburg, The Race Directive, p. 236.  
281 M. Bell, Meeting the Challenge, cit., p. 31 
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A different reading of art. 3(2) would find no justification in light of the context and 
the motivations that animated its proponents nor in the wording of the provision, 
besides undermining the aim of the Directive to effectively fight discrimination on 
ground of race and ethnic origin and conflict with the duty to interpret restrictively 
derogations to the universal right not to be discriminated against.  
A restrictive interpretation of the clause finds further support in the interpretation of 
the Court of Strasbourg of art. 14 ECHR considering nationality as a suspect ground 
and a number of international conventions mentioned by recital 3 of the RED and to 
which all member states are signatory.  
It is of particular relevance for the same purposes the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The Convention as 
highlighted in the previous chapter defines “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”.  
According to art. 2, the Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, 
restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to the Convention between citizens 
and non-citizens. This has not prevented the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination from acknowledging a strong interaction between racial, ethnic or 
national origin discrimination and discrimination on the basis of nationality, noting that 
in some cases nationality may actually be used as a proxy for race.282 
Most importantly, following the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban in 2001, which 
acknowledged that “xenophobia against non-nationals particularly migrants, refugees 
and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism and 
                                                            
282 Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, CERD Views of 17 March 1999, Communication 
010/1997. 
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that human rights violations against members of such groups occur widely in the 
context of discriminatory, xenophobic and racist practices”, the Committee adopted its 
Recommendation n. 30 stating that under the Convention, “differential treatment based 
on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for 
such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to 
the achievement of this aim.” 
Finally, a restrictive interpretation of art. 3(2) would find further support in the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Recommendation n. 7, 
which defines ‘racism’ as “the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, 
religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a 
group of persons, or the notion of superiority of a person or a group of persons.”283 
This considered, an understanding of art. 3(2) as safeguarding from the prohibition of 
discrimination only differences of treatment that are established by law and arise from 
the status of TCNs appears to explain the different outcomes of the Court of Justice in 
the cases Feryn284 and Kamberaj285. 
Interestingly in Feryn, the controversial declarations referred to the nationality of the 
applicants. Thus, it would have been possible to argue that it was a case of non-EU 
nationality discrimination, excluded from the scope of the RED286. Neither the AG, nor 
the Court entered into this discussion qualifying the concerned statements as direct 
racial discrimination under article 2(2)(a) of the RED. 
  
                                                            
283 ECRI is a monitoring body established by the Council of Europe with the objective to 
combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance at the level of greater Europe and 
from the perspective of the protection of human rights. For an analysis of the ECRI 
reccomandation and the differences between the RED and the Reccomandation see E. Howard, 
Anti Race Discrimination cit., p. 468. 
284 Ft. 212. 
285 Ft. 230.  
286 S. B Lahuerta, Race equality and TCNs, cit., p. 754. 
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By contrast in Kamberaj the Court appeared as not willing to adopt a restrictive 
interpretation of art. 3(2).287 The case concerned an Albanian long-term resident that 
was denied access to a benefit aimed at supporting low-income families pay for rent. 
The denial was due to the creation of two separated funds depending on whether the 
applicants were EU or third-country nationals. The fund dedicated to the latter group 
had a comparatively lower budget and the claimant application was rejected due to the 
exhaustion of monetary resources. 
Asked by the Court of Bolzano if the Directive applied to the case, the Court affirmed 
without further specifications that the RED does not cover differential treatment based 
on third-country national status.  
The Court of Justice does not explain the different outcomes. The decision simply 
affirms that “under articles 1 and 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/43, the Directive 
applies only to direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin” and 
literally quotes art. 3(2). It is nevertheless tempting to argue that such different 
outcomes could be reconnected to the fact that in Feryn differential treatment was 
related to statements coming from a private employer, whereas in Kamberaj 
differential treatment was established by law and related to the legal status of TCNs 
and as such attracted within the scope of art. 3(2).  
The opinion of the AG is likewise of little help. After recalling art. 3(2), it is limited to 
stating: “It is apparent from the order for reference that Mr. Kamberaj has not suffered 
any direct or indirect discrimination based on his racial or ethnic origin. The difference 
in treatment allegedly suffered compared with citizens of the Union, under the 
provincial law, is based on his status as a third-country national, and therefore on his 
nationality”. 
Yet the referring judge had made explicit that the applicant was of Albanian ethnic 
origin and of Muslim faith pointing to the indirectly discriminatory effects of the 
                                                            
287 S. Morano Foadi and K. de Vries, The equality clauses, cit., p. 19. 
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national provision. Interestingly, not too long after Kamberaj, in Chez288 the Court 
would explicitly acknowledge the interaction between ethnic origin, nationality and 
religion in considering that ethnicity as stated by the ECtHR “has its origin in the idea 
of societal groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, 
language, cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds”.  
Nonetheless, the Court found that the differential treatment violated the equality clause 
established by art. 11 Directive 2003/109/EC in favour of long-term residents. 
Art. 11(1)(d) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, according to the Court, “must be interpreted as 
precluding a national or regional law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
which provides, with regard to the grant of housing benefit, for different treatment for 
third-country nationals enjoying the status of long-term resident conferred pursuant to 
the provisions of that Directive compared to that accorded to nationals residing in the 
same province or region when the funds for the benefit are allocated, in so far as such a 
benefit falls within one of the three categories referred to in that provision and 
art. 11(4) of that Directive does not apply”. 
Whatever the legal reasoning lying behind the decision of the Court, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that, although since the adoption of the RED the European Union has 
made important progress in closing the gap between the rights granted to TCNs and 
EU nationals, the concerns and pressures that pushed the adoption of art. 3(2) still 
seem to be very much in place. 
Getting back to art. 3(2), the Court omits to consider that the differential treatment 
based on the legal status of TCNs provided by national law was, according to its own 
assessment, in clear contrast with EU law, that allows no differences of treatment as to 
access to housing. The consequences are to some are puzzling. Provided that EU law in 
regulating long-term residents legal status grants to this category of TCNs equality of 
treatment, it appears that there should be no room for any differential treatment arising 
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from their legal status, such as to justify the application of the “legal status” defence 
under art. 3(2). 
Finally, there is nothing to prevent Member States from granting more extensive 
protection against discrimination. Indeed in at least 11 Member States, domestic 
legislation implementing the RED explicitly mentions nationality as a protected 
ground. In other 11 Member States, domestic legislation already included a prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality289. As the previous chapter showed, Italy is 
included in the latter group. 
This considered, as De Schutter notes “a distinct question is whether domestic 
legislation prohibiting discrimination on grounds other than nationality particularly on 
grounds of race or ethnic origin, (…) – extends, or can be interpreted to extend, to 
differences of treatment on grounds of nationality where this may amount to indirect 
discrimination on these other grounds.”290  
Domestic solutions  
The implementing decree n. 215/2003 does not appear to have made any significant 
attempt of clarity, with regard neither to the implications of art. 3(2), as far as 
nationality is concerned, nor to the coordination of the new prohibition of 
discriminatory behaviour with the pre-existing one, which as known includes 
nationality among the protected grounds.  
As to the former art. 3(2) of the implementing decree replicates art. 3(2) of the RED 
but for the explicit reference to “access to occupation and access to social welfare”.  
As to the latter, art. 2 of the implementing decree is limited to specifying that the new 
definition of discrimination in the implementing decree is not intended to affect (is 
without prejudice to) art. 43 TUI. The limits of the approach of the legislature seem to 
have been overcome by courts and civil society organizations granted legal standing 
                                                            
289 O. De Schutter, Links between migration cit., p. 73-74 
290 Ibid, p. 73.  
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under Legislative Decree n. 215/03. 
The analysis of the case law allows to clearly trace the influence of the latter in 
promoting and contributing to consolidate through sustained litigation an interpretation 
of the prohibition of discrimination based on race and ethnic origin such as to cover 
also nationality related differential treatment.  
The persistence of civil society organizations, in this regard, is not a coincidence, 
provided that they enjoy legal standing, in support or on behalf of the victim of 
discrimination, or on their own in instances of collective discrimination only under 
Legislative Decree n. 215/03. 
As already highlighted, although the RED was implemented in 2003, the register of 
associations granted legal standing under art. 5 was established only by December 
2005. 
Actually civil society organizations, in particular ASGI and SOS Razzismo had 
claimed that they were granted legal standing under art. 7 of the RED, even before the 
establishment of the register under art. 5 Legislative Decree n. 215/03, complaining 
about the inactivity of the national authorities in this regard. The claim was nonetheless 
dismissed on the account that art. 7 of the RED could not be considered to have direct 
effect.291  
From a quantitative prospective, the analysis of the case law allows establishing that 
from 2004 to 2015, out of 219 filed claims on discrimination, 57 were filed under art. 
43 TUI, 1 under art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/2003 and 161 filed under art. 43 TUI 
together with Legislative Decree n. 215/03 (Table n.1). 
Focusing on the second group of claims, reference to the TUI and the implementing 
decree can be considered as a marker of the fact they concern nationality based 
                                                            
291 Court of Padova, 19 May 2005, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 5, 2006, p. 949, confirmed in 
second instance by Court of Padova, 5 October 2005, not published. The case concerned a bar 
tender applying higher prices to foreigners, in the attempt to drive away  “black immigrants and 
Albanians” that “were deemed as inappropriate clients” 
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differential treatment. Indeed, further analysis allows confirming that most of such 
cases (145 out of 161) have dealt with nationality related differential treatment.  
Looking at how courts have dealt with the issue in point, it should be acknowledged 
that in most of the cases (96), whereas the ruling refers to both regulations to qualify 
the concerned conduct as discriminatory, it does not specifically argue on the 
coordination between the TUI and the implementing decree, since and the applicability 
of latter appears not to have been contested by the defender. In 43 cases courts have 
specifically argued on the issue or indirectly concluded so, by arguing on whether civil 
society organizations could claim legal standing in the case under consideration. By 
contrast, the applicability of Legislative Decree n. 215/03 has been excluded only in 5 
cases (Table n. 2) 
It should be noted that civil society organizations have acted in their own name in 36 
out of 44 cases in which the court have concluded on the applicability of Legislative 
Decree n. 215/03. As far as contested behaviour is concerned, this group of cases 
concerns mostly provisions requiring Italian citizenship or European citizenship for the 
purposes of access to employment or social protection. Cases not concerning 
nationality clauses deal with selective criteria referring to the “length of residence” or 
a specific type of permit of stay. Finally in one case, applicants have complained about 
the discriminatory nature of a number of public statements made by a city counsellor, 
inviting the city not to rent or sell their properties to foreigners. 
Table 1 
  
Legal basis n. of cases filed  
TUI  57 
RED 1 
TUI & RED 161 
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Table n. 2 
Moving to analysing the case law from a qualitative point of view, it is clear that the 
interpretation of the implementing decree as covering also nationality based 
differential treatment relies on two distinct arguments. 
The first one is based on art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 that defines discriminatory 
behaviour for the purposes of the implementing decree. Following the definition of 
direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, art. 2 refers to 
art. 43 TUI specifying that such definitions are without prejudice to the definition of 
discrimination provided by the latter.  
The above reference has been considered to manifest the intention of the legislature not 
to limit the prohibition of discrimination under the implementing decree only to race 
and ethnic origin. On this account, courts have argued that the notion of discrimination 
under art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 includes also discrimination on grounds of 
nationality as defined by art. 43 TUI. 
A decision of the Court of Brescia clearly illustrates this point. The case was filed by 
ASGI and Fondazione Guido Piccini and concerned the establishment of “pre-school 
fee subsidy” and the process of allocation of a number of city-owned apartments aimed 
at over 65s. As to the first the City limited the benefit to TCN children whose parents 
were both holders of a long-term residence permit. As to the second, Italian citizenship 
Outcome  n. of cases decided 
Applies to nationality  44 
Does not apply to nationality  6 
Not contested  95 
Other  16 
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and ten years of residence in the city were required in order to qualify for the 
allocation.  The court considers: 
“The notion of discrimination provided in art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 includes 
different types of discriminatory conduct. It certainly includes the type of 
discriminatory conduct described by art. 43 TUI, which is explicitly recalled by art. 2 
Legislative Decree n. 215/03. Indeed, the following paragraph begins by stating that 
are also considered discriminatory for the purposes of the first paragraph (…), that is 
to say that also the type of behaviour mentioned by the second paragraph shall be 
considered discriminatory for the purpose of implementing the principle of equality 
under the Legislative Decree”.292 
Other decisions rely instead on the notion of indirect discrimination. In line with 
suggestions from antidiscrimination scholars, courts argue the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination covers nationality related differential treatment where it results in 
indirect discrimination based on grounds of race and ethnic origin.  
Following the claim of Avvocati per Niente (APN) and Associazione Volontaria di 
Assistenza Socio Sanitaria e per i Diritti degli Stranieri e Nomadi Onlus (NAGA), the 
Court of Milano has decided that the requirement of Italian citizenship for the 
allocation of student housing by the Province of Sondrio was discriminatory under 
Legislative Decree n. 215/03 and the TUI. The court specifically argues on the 
relevance of the implementing decree in the case in point: 
“It should be observed that Legislative Decree n. 215/03 does certainly prohibit any 
discrimination formally based on ethnic origin, but not exclusively. It does also apply 
to indirect discriminations, which are realized through apparently neutral criteria; it 
should be noticed that the criterion of citizenship, applied in the absence of the 
conditions legitimizing its use, as specified by the Constitutional Court, determines a 
                                                            
292 Court of Brescia, 17 October 2011, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p.105. See also 
Court of Bergamo, 3 November 2011, not published; Court of Bergamo, 15 March 2011, in A. 
Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 255; Court of  Milano, 13 July 2011, Guariso (ed.) Senza 
distinzioni, cit., p. 344 
	 118	
discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, given that notoriously most 
foreigners belong to ethnic groups other than the native groups”.293  
In another case filed by ASGI, CGIL, CISL and UIL together with and individual 
applicant and concerning the requirement of “ten years of residence in Italy and five 
years of residence in region” as a precondition for benefiting from a “baby bonus” 
measure implemented at the regional level, the Court of Udine in addressing the 
objection of the defender as to the applicability of Legislative Decree n. 215/03 to 
nationality, argues as follows: 
“The discrimination under review is indirect discrimination, mainly based on 
nationality, though at a closer look it goes further resulting in discrimination based on 
race and ethnic origin covered by Directive 2000/43/EC, which was implemented by 
Legislative Decree n. 215/03. Indeed, the choice of the concerned criterion is intended 
to facilitate and favour individuals that have stronger ties to the territory and belong 
for the most to native communities characterized by cultural and ethnic cohesion.  (…) 
In addition it should be considered that in a country like Italy where the law on 
citizenship is based for the most on the principle jus sanguinis foreign nationals, 
whether or not belonging to the European Union, are overwhelmingly part of ethnic 
groups other than the natives groups.”294 
 
 
                                                            
293 Court of Milano, 9 February 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 115. The 
reference to the conditions legitimizing its use, as specified by the Constitutional Court, is 
intended to safeguard those differences of treatment that are provided by law and are consistent 
with the constitutional principle of equality. On the same argument, see also Court of Verona, 
28 October 2014, not published. Interestingly in affirming the relevance of the implementing 
decree, the Court quotes the French Agence des Droit 2010 Report considering that differential 
treatment based on nationality often “hides” indirect forms of discrimination based on ethnic 
origin. See also Court of Brescia, 13 June 2012, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 
101.The court considers: “there is no doubt that the requirement of citizenship determines as a 
matter of fact a discrimination based in ethnic origin against all those that despite holding a 
permit of stay in Italy, are not Italian citizens”. 
294 Court of Udine, 17 November 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 109. 
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In fact, racial and ethnic prejudice in cases involving nationality related differences is 
often less hidden than it might appear.  In the decision quoted above, for example, the 
court identifies a clear intention to prioritize native communities pointing to a later 
amendment to the regional law providing a general exemption as to the requirement of 
residency for the “people of the region and their descendants that decide to re-
establish their residence in the Region.” In another case introduced by ASGI and 
ANOLF against the Municipality of Palazzago, the defendant appears to have justified 
the granting of a “baby bonus” only to children with at least an Italian parent in view to 
ensure a “minimum safeguard to the historical and social characteristics of our 
community.”295  
Specifically addressing the scope of art. 3(2), in assessing whether the granting of a 
baby bonus only to children born in families where both parents hold Italian 
citizenship filed by ASGI, APN e FARSI PROSSIMO, the Court of Milano 
maintains:296  
“(…) art. 3 is mainly meant to safeguard certain national provisions concerning 
specific matters in relation to which the legal status of third-country nationals may be 
relevant.”297 
                                                            
295 Court of Bergamo, 17 May 2010, in Responsabilità civile e previdenza, 12, 2010, 12, p. 
2541 
296 Court of Milano, 30 July 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 147. The 
decision was confirmed in second instance by Court of  Milano, 29 September 2010, in  Rivista 
critica di diritto del lavoro, 3, 2010, p. 875. 
297 Contra, Court of Rimini, 27 September 2011, in Foro It, I, 2012, p. 934, Assessing the 
discriminatory nature of the requirement Italian citizenship for a nurse post the Court considers: 
“Equally irrelevant is the reference to art. 3 Legislative decree n. 215/03 (implementation of 
Directive 2000/43 / EC), according to which the principle of equal treatment regardless of race 
or ethnic origin applies to all persons in both the public and private sectors and is susceptible 
to judicial protection with reference, among other areas to to self-employment and to 
occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions. In the case under review, in 
fact, it is not being discussed about a possible discrimination based on grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin, but about a different based of citizenship, that outside the scope of the directive, 
whose thirteenth recital explicitly states that "the prohibition of discrimination should also 
apply to citizens of third countries, but it does not cover differences of treatment based on 
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Most recently the Court of Appeal of Milano has addressed the issue in particularly 
clear terms298. The case concerned the discriminatory nature of art. 65 L. 448/98 to the 
extent that it required Italian or EU citizenship to access the “large family allowance” 
established by the same article. The City of Milan had specifically contested that ASGI 
and APN could claim legal standing since the differential treatment being contested 
was based on nationality. 
The court first of all highlights the interaction between nationality, race and ethnic 
origin: 
 “As far as the legal standing of the applicant associations is concerned, the objection 
of the appellant moves from the assumption that the discrimination in the case in point 
is based solely on nationality, whereas in fact such discrimination is subtended after 
all by indirect discrimination based on race and ethnic origin, as observed by the 
defence of N.(applicant) making reference to the Recommendation 1.10.2004 n. 30 of 
the UN Committee (on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) concerning the UN 
Convention (on the elimination of Racial Discrimination) to which has Italy is a 
party.” 
As to the exclusion clause provided in the implementing decree the Court considers: 
“The exclusion provided by art. 3(2) of the aforementioned Legislative Decree n. 
215/03 refers in particular to the possibility for the state to regulate immigration with 
regard to entry and conditions of access to occupation, social security, and social 
assistance by foreigners, within the limits of the principle of reasonableness and 
compatibility with EU law as articulated in the EU Directives, to which national law 
should conform.”  
                                                                                                                                                              
nationality. Likewise, the second paragraph of the aforementioned Article. 3 states: "this 
legislative decree does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without 
prejudice to national provisions and conditions relating to entry, residence, access to 
employment and welfare by TCNs and stateless persons, and to any treatment, adopted by law 
that arises from the legal status of the aforementioned parties”. 
298 Court of Appeal of Milano, 22 May 2015, not published. 
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In essence, on the one hand the Court agrees that the exclusion clause does not concern 
any difference of treatment based on nationality but only those established by law as 
specified above, on the other hand the Court adds that not any difference of treatment 
provided by national law should be covered by art. 3(2) but only those differences that 
comply with the constitutional principle of reasonableness and those that conform to 
EU law.  
The decision of the Court of Appeal of Milano provides an interesting prospective on 
how these different levels of protection interact. bringing together national law, 
constitutional principles and EU law. As far as constitutional principles are concerned, 
national law should be interpreted in conformity with the principle of reasonableness. 
In cases in which conform interpretation is not possible then lower courts need to ask 
the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutional compatibility of the concerned 
provision. Courts are left with the same options in case of conflict between a national 
law and the ECHR or the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75.  
As far as EU law is concerned, the principle of direct effect, if applicable, requires 
courts to “set aside” national law in contrast with EU law. In the case in point the 
Court finds the national law provision to be in contrast with EU Directive 
2003/109/EC and in particular with the equality clause it provides which as known has 
been considered by the Court of Justice in Kamberaj to have direct effects. The same 
conclusions should apply with regard to equality clauses provided by the Association 
and Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. 
Whereas it is acknowledged that art. 3(2) protects differential treatment related to the 
legal status of TCNs that is established by law, the Court of Milano shifts the focus to 
tracing within a multilevel system of law, such as the one resulting from the integration 
of EU and domestic legal orders, the provisions that regulate such status. If EU law 
grants long-term residents equality of treatment and any provision conflicting with 
such principle should be disapplied then there is no room for protecting differential 
treatment based on nationality only because it is formally embodied in national law. A 
different reading would be difficult to reconcile with the ECJ doctrine on supremacy 
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and direct effects and the related obligation upon national authorities and courts to 
disregard such domestic provisions in favour of EU law.299  
The above analysis provides a clear picture of the ways in which courts have provided 
a consistent interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race and 
ethnic origin such as to ensure the effectiveness of the right not be discriminated vis-à-
vis nationality based differences of treatment, overcoming the limits related to a broad 
interpretation of art. 3(2) of the RED.  
Yet such a consideration does not tell the whole story. As Epp puts it cases do not 
arrive in courts by magic.300 Lawyers, rights advocacy organizations and financial 
resources are crucial. In the light of the above analyses, it appears that civil society 
organizations have strongly contributed in this regard, through a forward-looking legal 
strategy and sustained litigation on the issue. It could be argued that claiming that the 
implementing decree applied to nationality based differences was an obvious choice or 
that the above interpretation would have prevailed irrespective of the support of civil 
society organizations granted legal standing under its art. 5. This analysis is not meant 
to argue that without support by civil society organizations a different reading of the 
prohibition of discrimination would have prevailed. It is meant to explain how and why 
things happened the way they did.  
As McCann notes “legal relations, institutions, and norms tend to be double-edged, at 
once upholding the larger infrastructure of the status quo while providing limited 
opportunities for episodic challenges and transformations in that ruling order.”301 The 
blind exclusion of nationality and the differences of treatment targeting TCNs can be 
viewed as upholding the status quo, the very infrastructure the European Union is 
based on and deeply rooted on the distinctions between European national and TCNs. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of RED and the process of implementation and that 
followed appear to have provided also the opportunities to challenge the status quo. 
                                                            
299 Judgment of 22 June 1989, Fratelli Costanzo SpA C-103/88, EU:C:1989:256. 
300 C. E. Epp, The rights revolution, cit. p.18. 
301 M. McCann, Law and social movements cit. p.19. 
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Relying on such opportunities civil society organizations have promoted and helped to 
consolidate an interpretation of the domestic legislation implementing the RED such as 
to include within the reach of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race and 
ethnic origin nationality based differential treatment, forging new opportunities for 
fighting such differences of treatment in the national context302 
2. The access dimension. Legal standing. 
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, 145 out of 161 cases, which have been filed 
under the TUI and the Legislative Decree n. 215/03, concern nationality based on 
differential treatment. The case law provides also examples in which the prohibition of 
discrimination has been invoked in relation to differential treatment or harassment 
targeting Roma communities or otherwise unambiguously linked to the ethnic origin of 
the communities concerned, though such cases remain marginal in comparison. 
In order to get a general overview on the success of litigation, it should be considered 
that in 146 out of 161 cases courts have agreed with applicants as to the discriminatory 
nature of the criterion, practice or behaviour concerned.  
 
Outcome  2004-2015 (TUI&RED) 
It is discriminatory 146 
It is not discriminatory  10 
Referral to the Constitutional Court  4 
Other 1 
Table n.3 
                                                            
302 N. Pedriana, Help wanted NOW, cit. 
Chapter II showed scholars adopting the legal opportunity approach put particular 
emphasis over the importance of rules defining “access to courts” for explaining legal 
mobilisation. Indeed, judicial assessment on legal standing, regardless of whether the 
interest of the applicant is limited to the individual claim or pursues also objectives of 
social reform, is preliminary to considering the merits of the challenge. Applicants not 
enjoying legal standing have no chance to be heard, irrespective of the robustness of 
their legal arguments. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the extent to 
which the legal system grants “voice” also to actors different form individual victims, 
such as civil society organizations, will influence their choices with regard to the 
pursuing of litigation strategies, delineating available options and affecting besides 
other factors their expectation of success in court. 
Provided that acknowledging the relevance of the legal opportunity structure in this 
regard does not imply that legal actors will passively adapt their choices to the latter, 
the granting of legal standing to civil society organizations under the implementing 
decree of the RED appears to have influenced the emergence and success of legal 
strategies in a two fold way: providing the conditions for civil society organizations to 
challenge the exclusion of differences of treatment based on nationality from the scope 
of the implementing decree of the RED (and ultimately expanding the legal 
opportunities that provided the incentives for the turn to the courts in the first place), 
on the one hand, and to systematically enforce the prohibition of discrimination, on the 
other. 
The analysis of the case law shows civil society organizations have extensively relied 
on the legal opportunities resulting from the implementation of the RED, acting in their 
own name in more than half of the cases filed from 2004 to 2015 under art. 43 TUI and 
art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 (82 out of 161). As Table n. 4 shows, civil society 
organizations have acted in their own name as the only applicant in the proceedings in 
26 cases and together with an individual victim or trade union organization in other 56 
cases. In addition there is a number of cases where civil society organizations appear to 
have a secondary role being their intervention rather than in their own name, in support 
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of an individual applicant.   
Applicant  n. of cases filed 
Civil society organization (as the only applicant) 26 
Trade union organization (as the only applicant) 1 
Civil society organization and trade union organization 2 
Individual applicant (as the only applicant) 72 
Individual applicant and civil society organization 51 
Individual applicant and trade union organization 6 
Individual applicant, civil society organization and trade union 
organization  
3 
Ad adiuvandum/civil society organization  3 
Ad adiuvandum/trade union organization 1 
Ad adiuvandum/civil society organizations and trade union  2 
Table n. 4 
The evolution of case law over time provides further insight as to the background that 
prompted civil society organizations to “turn to courts”. Whereas data shows a general 
increasing trend in the number of cases concerning antidiscrimination law decided by 
courts in the years following the full implementation of the RED (Charter n. 1), it also 
shows that litigation levels during the years immediately following such 
implementation are in line with those characterizing the pre-implementation period, 
and still, with very limited exceptions, related to individual enforcement of the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
In this regard, it is probably helpful to remind that though the RED was implemented 
in the domestic order in 2003, as far as legal standing was concerned, the register 
allowing civil society organizations to claim standing in court was adopted only in 
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2006 and updated for the first time only in 2010. Whereas this consideration might 
explain to some extent the litigation trend, it does not explain the clear increase in the 
number of cases filed by civil society organization starting form 2009 (Charter n. 1). 
The described trend appears all the more puzzling if we consider that civil society 
organizations had already in 2005 claimed legal standing directly invoking art. 7 of the 
RED303 allowing to conclude that low levels of litigation from 2006 to 2009 are most 
likely not related to lack of awareness of the opportunities created by RED. 
 
Charter n.1 
An in depth analysis of the cases decided in 2009 clearly points to the exacerbation of 
the political debate around migration and the policy developments that followed the 
emergence of the centre-right as the clear winner of the 2008 general election and the 
local elections held between 2008 and 2009 in a number of northern Italy 
municipalities.  
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Following its victory, the centre-right majority, in line with its electoral campaign 
strongly focused on security and fight against illegal migration, adopted under the 
leadership of its Minister of Interior, a representative of the anti-immigrant Northern 
League Party, the so called “security package”304. The law, besides criminalizing 
unauthorized entry and permanence and introducing a number of other repressive 
measures, provided municipalities with extended powers concerning public safety and 
urban security. In particular urban security was intended to refer “to a public good that 
should be protected through initiatives promoting respect for rules governing civilian 
life with the aim of improving living conditions in urban areas, peaceful coexistence 
and social cohesion”305.   
Such extended powers translated into the adoption of a number of local ordinances, in 
particular in Northern Italian municipalities governed by the centre-right majority, that 
directly or indirectly targeted migrants. The most classical example in this regard is 
represented by ordinances on population registration providing additional conditions 
for the registration of migrants such as a certain income or a passport with an entry 
visa or limiting registration only to certain categories of migrants such as holders of a 
long term resident permit.306 
Such interventions were integrated by a number of welfare measures adopted at the 
local level aiming to selectively support the resident population including in most cases 
nationality clauses or limiting access to such measures only TCNs holding a long-term 
residence permit or requiring a particularly high number of years of residence in the 
                                                            
304 Law n. 94/2009 
305 N. Zorzella, I nuovi poteri dei sindaci nel pacchetto sicurezza e la loro ricaduta sugli 
stranieri, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 3/4, 2008, p. 57. 
306 A. Lorenzetti and S. Rossi (eds.), Le ordinanze sindacali in materia di incolumità pubblica e 
sicurezza urbana. Origini, contenuti, limiti, Jovene, 2009; A. Lorenzetti, Discriminazioni 
razziali ed etniche nelle ordinanze dei Sindaci e negli ordinamenti municipali, in D. Tega (ed.) 
Le Discriminazioni Razziali Ed Etniche. Profili Giuridici Di Tutela, Armando Editore, 2011 p. 
205; For a collection of such ordinances see, CITTALIA, Oltre le ordinanze: I sindaci e la 
sicurezza urbana, Anci, 2009. 
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country or in the city. In this regard local regulations excluding migrants from 
benefiting from baby bonuses or housing benefits or other forms of support for low-
income families became a sort of “best practice” among the above municipalities.      
This set of measures has contributed to establishing at the local level what has been 
termed as the “local policies of exclusion”. According to Ambrosini, that has coined 
the term and analysed and catalogued the local government interventions aimed 
(mainly) at immigrants, such policies are “aimed at marking the boundaries of the 
legitimate local community, reinforcing a duality between rightful members (the 
insiders, coinciding with the native population or those of Italian nationality) and 
outsiders, whose right to residence tends to be redefined in more limited and 
conditional forms.”307 In doing so, they reassure the indigenous citizens about the 
priority of their status compared to that of migrants, and communicate that they are 
actively defended by local governments, while at the same time encouraging the 
perception of the former group as to the fact that TCNs are a threat to “urban safety” 
and are responsible for draining the few resources available for welfare measures at the 
local level.308   
The increasing numbers of cases filed by civil society organizations starting from 2009 
should be therefore understood in the light of pressures upon civil society 
organizations to provide “adequate” responses to the policies of exclusion of migrants 
at the local level and challenge their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. 
Borrowing from Hilson,309 the increasing engagement of civil society organizations in 
litigation on the prohibition of discrimination might be more properly explained as a 
result of the interplay between the closure of political opportunities and the 
opportunities for action provided by RED. In the light of the above context, legal 
standing has contributed to including litigation among the available tactics to contain 
                                                            
307 M. Ambrosini, We are against a multi-ethnic society: policies of exclusion at the urban level 
in Italy, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36, 1, 2013, p.143 
308 Ibid., see also M. Ambrosini, and E. Caneva, Local policies of exclusion: the Italian case, 
Accept Pluralism Project, 7 th EU Framework Programme, European University Institute, 2012  
309 C. Hilson, New social movements, cit. 
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exclusion policies.  
Indeed, the first claim filed by civil society organizations in 2009 concerned the 
establishment of a “baby bonus” that was granted only to children with at least one 
parent holding Italian citizenship. ASGI together with a number of individual 
applicants claimed the nationality clause was discriminatory under the TUI and 
Legislative Decree n. 215/03. The Court of Brescia acknowledged civil society 
organizations enjoyed legal standing under the latter and declared the discriminatory 
nature of the nationality clause. In addition the Court ordered the Municipality to end 
its discriminatory behaviour, extend the benefit to all residents irrespective of their 
citizenship and postpone the original deadline for the submission of applications. 
Finally the judge ordered the publication of the decision in one of the three most 
circulated newspapers in the country.310  
Notwithstanding success in court, the case provided a view on how challenging 
effective enforcement can be. Indeed following the first instance decision, which was 
confirmed in second instance, the Municipality revoked the regulation establishing the 
benefit justifying such choice in view to the “supervening impossibility to enact the 
intervention in line with its original purpose”. The applicants filed a new claim relying 
on the prohibition of victimization under Legislative Decree n. 215/03. The Court of 
Brescia acknowledged the behaviour of the Municipality was retaliatory and ordered 
the latter to restore the baby bonus rejecting the idea that in the case in point equality 
could be respected either by extending the benefits to the categories unlawfully 
excluded or by eliminating the benefit completely.311  Ultimately, while showing 
                                                            
310 Court of Bresica, 26 January 2009, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 1, 2009, p. 277. 
The decision was confirmed in second instance by Court of Brescia, 20 February 2009, in 
Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 1, 2009, p. 278.   
311 Court of Brescia, 12 March 2009, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 1, 2009, p. 278. F. 
Rizzi, La vicenda del bonus bebè a Brescia: quando la parità "al ribasso" diventa ritorsione, in 
Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro,1, 2009, p. 289. The decision was confirmed in second 
instance by Court of Brescia, 27 May 2009, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 2, 2009, p. 
527; A. Lassandari, Agli italiani o a nessuno: i c.d. bonus bebè e la ritorsione discriminatoria, 
in Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro,1, 2010, p. 198. 
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effective enforcement might be time and resource intensive, the case provided support 
to the idea that the prohibition of discrimination was more than a “hollow shell”. 
During the same year civil society organizations successfully invoked the prohibition 
of discrimination against the Municipality of Brignano d’Adda for reserving to 
nationals access to local social services, income support for the unemployed and 
refunds for dental expenses for minors, in addition to limiting registration among the 
resident population to migrants holders of a long-term permit of stay312; against the 
Province of Sondrio for limiting to Italian citizens access to student housing313 and 
against the Municipality of  Ospitaletto for requiring for the purposes of registration in 
the residential roll of TCNs a certificate of the criminal record of the applicant.314    
While supporting the view of litigation as a promising strategy to counter “local 
exclusion policies”, early success in court has provided on the one hand valuable 
precedents, and on the other the incentives for extending the scope of litigation 
strategies to other exclusionary policies, such as those concerning access to 
employment in the public sector left mostly to individual enforcement 315 or access to 
social security until then almost exclusive domain of constitutional review.  
The process here described has ultimately resulted in the creation of a “support 
structure”. The analysis of the case law definitely allows identifying a well-established 
network of civil society organizations engaged in litigation on a systematic rather then 
occasional basis.   
ASGI has without doubt a prominent role in this regard. It should be noted that the 
association was founded by a group of lawyers and university professors in 1991 with 
very high expertise on migration law and has became over time a point of reference on 
                                                            
312 Court of Bergamo, 28 November 2009, in Giurisprudenza di merito, 10, 2010, p. 2445. 
313 Court of Milano, 1 August 2009 in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 108, confirmed 
in second instance by Court of Milano, 9 February 2010, see ft. 292. 
314 Court of Brescia, 25 July 2009, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 2040, confirmed 
by Court of Brescia, 7 December 2009, not published. 
315 Court of Milano, 17 June 2009 and Court of Milano, 20 July 2009, in Rivista critica di 
diritto del lavoro, 3, 2009, p. 669. 
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migration, asylum and citizenship and most recently in antidiscrimination law. 
Whereas one of the association’s first aims was to promote research and exchange of 
information and good practices within the community of migrant lawyers and 
contributing to drafting law proposals and promoting migrants rights, it has over time 
dedicated increasing resources to fighting discrimination, developing from 2010 a 
well-established structure of antidiscrimination focal points that provide legal advice, 
representation for victims, and training for lawyers interested in enforcing 
antidiscrimination law.  
Besides litigation, the association is particularly active in lobbying activities ranging 
from issuing reasoned opinions in cases of violation of the prohibition of 
discriminations, to lobbying national representatives and denouncing violations to the 
European Commission.  
Another association worth mentioning is APN, a pro-bono lawyers promoted by 
CARITAS, aiming to provide free legal assistance to socially disadvantaged 
individuals. The association operates mostly in the area of Milan and has devoted 
increasing attention to discrimination and participated, in most cases together with 
ASGI, to promoting litigation, besides offering legal advise to individual applicants 
and training for lawyers interested in enforcing the prohibition of discrimination.  
Case law shows the two above-mentioned organizations appear to have indirectly 
supported also individual enforcement. Indeed looking at individual enforcement 
cases, lawyers associated with both of them have assisted individual applicants in the 
vast majority of the cases concerned.  
Table n. 5 shows that also Fondazione Guido Piccini has promoted litigation in a 
significant number of cases. The Foundation, that is an institutional partner of CGIL, 
operates in the area of Brescia and is aimed at “promoting culture, solidarity and equal 
protection of human dignity” mainly through training initiatives, education and social 
assistance projects and human rights protection activities.  
 While setting the ground for further research as to the characteristics of the above 
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organizations, the foundation of their commitment towards migrant communities, how 
they interact which each other, how litigation strategies are put in place and what are 
the motivations behind the choice to do so, this first analysis of litigation around 
antidiscrimination law in Italy has provided an evidence based narrative of the 
increasing engagement of civil society organizations in litigation strategies 
highlighting in this regard the relevance of  rules concerning legal standing, both in 
terms of explaining the emergence of legal strategies and setting the conditions for 
systematic enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination in courts.  
Table n. 5 
3. Legal resources.  
Chapter II showed that the implementation of RED, besides providing legal standing 
for civil society organizations, has also liberalised the legal opportunity structure 
adopting new definitions of discriminatory behaviour and providing for an adaptation 
of the burden of proof in favour of the applicant. In addition, it pointed for the same 
purposes to the evolution of EU law as far as TCNs are concerned, in particular as 
regards the adoption at the EU level of a number of equal treatment clauses granting 
specific categories of TCNs equality of treatment in areas such as access to 
employment and welfare.  
This paragraph intends to trace the relevance of these legal resources in shaping 
equality for migrants. 
The analysis of the case law illustrates that the implementation of the RED and the 
Civil society organizations n. of claims 
Associazione Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) 75 
Associazione avvocati per niente (APN) 25 
Fondazione Guido Piccini Onlus 18 
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subsequent adoption of new definitions of discrimination has contributed to 
consolidate an understanding of the prohibition of discrimination that points to the 
prejudicial effect of the conduct concerned rather than to the intention to discriminate, 
and to the acknowledgment that such a prohibition entails an individual right not to be 
discriminated that protects victims with regard to any kind of conduct that can be 
qualified as discriminatory according to such definitions. 
Proof of intent is commonly considered among antidiscrimination scholars as a 
probatio diabolica likely to severely jeopardize the effectiveness of the prohibition of 
discrimination. Indeed, the embracing by courts of a theoretical elaboration of the 
concept of discrimination as an intentional act has been considered as one of the main 
reasons contributing to the ineffectiveness of the prohibition of discrimination under 
art. 15 of the Workers’ Statute316. Though the definition of discrimination adopted by 
the TUI explicitly refers to the “purpose or effect” of any behaviour that directly or 
indirectly involves a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on the 
protected grounds, the view that discrimination can be traced back to discriminatory 
intent appears to be particularly persistent. The analysis of the early enforcement cases 
of the prohibition of discrimination under art. 43 TUI, revealed, as a mater of fact, 
some reluctance as to ruling out any relevance of the intention to discriminate,317 
though in this regard the 2002 decisions of the Court of Milano318 and Court of 
Firenze319, the first concerning access to social housing and the second concerning 
access to employment in the public sector, distinctly opted for an objective 
understanding of discrimination.  
The introduction in the domestic legal system of new definitions of discrimination 
providing detailed descriptions as to when a specific conduct can be deemed to be 
discriminatory and manifestly pointing to prejudicial effect has contributed to 
anchoring such understanding to the explicit wording of the law. 
                                                            
316 See chapter II, p. 62. 
317 Ft. 187 and 189. 
318 Ft. 192.  
319 Ft. 199. 
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It suffices to mention two leading cases in this regard. The first is the already 
mentioned decision of the Court of Brescia on the discriminatory baby bonus320. The 
second is a decision of the Court of Milano concerning the inclusion of nationality 
clauses with regard to recruitment in the public sector.  
In assessing the discriminatory nature of the nationality clause, the Court of Brescia 
considers: 
“It should be immediately noted that it is difficult to discern in the choice of the 
Municipality of Brescia to reserve the baby bonus to Italian citizens any intention to 
discriminate, though this is not enough to rule out the “objective” discriminatory 
nature of the conduct of the municipality being contested before the court, given that 
the choice of the former determines in practice unequal treatment between Italian 
citizens and foreigners, disadvantaging the latter: what matters is the existence of a 
causal link between the conduct of the municipality and the disadvantage (…)” 
In the same line, after recalling the non-discrimination clause provided under art. 43 
TUI and the definition of indirect discrimination under the implementing decree of the 
RED, the Court of Milano observes321:  
“The consideration that discriminatory behaviour should be excluded since the 
defendant has acted in accordance with the law and therefore its behaviour is devoid 
of any intention to discriminate or to create any prejudice is irrelevant. The legislature 
in delineating also cases of indirect discrimination has referred to behaviour that 
although lacking intent to discriminate, still assumes a discriminatory connotation. 
Therefore the subjective element does not have any relevance (...) since what is 
important is the final outcome constituted by the objective condition of unequal 
treatment related to being or not a citizen.”  
The qualification of discriminatory behaviour in relation to the prejudice it creates to 
                                                            
320 Ft. 310.  
321 Court of Milano, 30 May 2008, in Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 3/4, 2008, p. 219. 
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the detriment of the protected groups is related to the second issue that was mentioned. 
What happens when the discriminatory conduct is attributable to the public 
administration? Provided that intent is irrelevant, can the latter claim it is not subject to 
the prohibition of discrimination since the act, practice or behaviour contested has been 
adopted within the domain of its discretionary powers or that its conduct was 
constrained by national law precluding in the understanding of the defendants the 
possibility for the public administration to act otherwise?  
As emerges from the passages reported above, the decisions of the Court of Brescia 
and the Court of Milano provide two clear examples of courts dealing with the 
“administrative discretion” and the “national law constraint” argument that represent, 
according to the analysis of the case law, the main defence arguments put forward by 
public administrations.  
In both cases, moving form the definitions of discrimination provided under art. 43 
TUI and art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03, courts have disregarded such arguments 
acknowledging that the prohibition of discrimination can be violated by any kind of 
conduct that entails prejudicial treatment in connection with a protected factor, 
including an act of the public administration.  
Indeed once the applicant has established a prima facie case, the only way to exclude 
discrimination is to prove there is no prejudicial treatment or that it is not related to one 
of the protected factors, and according to the form of discrimination, that a derogation 
clause applies with regard to direct discrimination, or that the criterion, practice or 
behaviour is justified in cases of indirect discrimination.   
The understanding of the prohibition of discrimination endorsed by the Court of 
Brescia and the Court of Milano has found support in two related decisions of the 
Court of Cassation322, which was asked by the defendant in both cases to assess 
                                                            
322 Court of Cassation n. 3670/2011, in Foro It. 4, I, 2011, p. 1101 and Court of Cassation n. 
7186/2011, in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, 4, II, 2011, p. 1095. A. Guariso, Sulla 
giurisdizione nei giudizi antidiscriminatori: un punto fermo e un punto interrogativo nella 
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whether the concerned proceedings were rightfully promoted before ordinary courts 
rather than administrative courts. Since the distribution of jurisdiction between 
ordinary and administrative court relies on the nature of the legal position of the 
applicant vis-à-vis the public administration, in establishing that the two cases were 
rightfully introduced before ordinary courts, the Court of Cassation affirms: 
“In presence of rules that, with the aim to ensuring equal treatment and prohibiting 
unjustified discrimination, provide particularly incisive and detailed prohibitions of 
discrimination, in relation to factors worthy of special consideration in the light of the 
constitutional and supranational law, (…), it must be considered that the legislature 
has established for the protection of victims an individual right that can be qualified as 
an absolute right since it is aimed to protect the individual’s freedom and potential 
from any kind of violation of the former.”323 
A thorough analysis of the following case law shows with evidence how the 
interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination provided by courts in these two 
milestone cases, and endorsed by the Court of Cassation, has strongly impacted the 
chances for legal actors to successfully enforce the prohibition of discrimination, in 
particular with regard to institutional forms of discrimination.  
As to the irrelevance of intention, it should be noted that the idea that the prohibition of 
discrimination under art. 43 and art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 leaves no room for 
investigating intention to discriminate has been unanimously shared by the following 
decisions. 
As to the scope of the prohibition of discrimination with regard to differential 
treatment that has been put in place by the public administration, the vast majority of 
cases has considered irrelevant the fact that such conduct might be related to the 
exercise of discretionary powers or otherwise “bounded” by national law provisions 
                                                                                                                                                              
pronuncia della Cassazione a Sezioni Unite n. 3670/2011, in Diritto, immigrazione e 
cittadinanza, 1, 2011, p. 112. 
323  Court of Cassation n. 7186/2011, in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, 4, II, 2011, p. 
1095. 
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that are in conflict with EU law or should be interpreted in the light of other 
supranational sources of law. It is important to mention nonetheless that in this regard 
there are some exceptions.324  
This is not, however, the only way in which the new definitions of discrimination have 
impacted success in court. As far as the prohibition of indirect discrimination is 
concerned, in focusing on differences between the definition of discriminatory 
behaviour under the TUI and the implementing decree of RED, chapter II pointed in 
particular to the fact that the prohibition of discrimination adopted by the latter is less 
reliant on statistical proof.  
Whereas the importance of the prohibition of indirect discrimination under Legislative 
Decree n. 215/03 has in part already been acknowledged in terms of supporting a 
reading of the implementing decree such as to cover also nationality related differences 
of treatment, it is important to notice that the above interpretation has relied on the idea 
that differences of treatment based on nationality entail “a particular disadvantage” for 
persons of a racial or ethnic origin suggesting the adoption of a definition of 
discrimination, which is less reliant on statistical evidence has most likely been crucial 
in this regard325. In addition the prohibition of discrimination has also been invoked in 
a number cases concerning the adoption of criteria applying to all beneficiaries 
irrespective of their nationality such as the case of the ten years residency requirement 
provided by the Friuli Venezia Giulia law for the allocation of baby bonuses or 
“housing benefits”. In this regard, reminding that long-term residents and beneficiaries 
of international protection enjoy equality of treatment as to access to social security 
under Directive 2003/109/EC e 2004/83/EC, the Court of Udine326 in examining the 
criterion under the prohibition of indirect discrimination states as follows:  
                                                            
324 Court of Brescia, 26 June 2010, not published; Court of Arezzo, 3 November 2011 in 
Redazione Giuffrè, 2011, Court of Rimini 27 September 2011, Foro It, I, 2012, p. 934. 
325 Ft. 292 and 297  
326 Ft. 293 
	 138	
 “The residency requirement imposed by regional law is evidently a criterion that 
generates an indirect discrimination that is not admissible with regard to this two 
categories of third country nationals (…) since it puts these protected categories at 
clear disadvantage compared to nationals or regionals”.  
This considered, it should be noted that most of the cases being analysed concern 
discriminatory conduct perpetrated by public administrations through ordinances, 
regulations or decisions explicitly referring to criteria such as Italian nationality or 
additional requirements provided only with regard to TCNs or limiting access to a 
certain benefit or to registration in the population roll only to TCNs holding a specific 
type of permit of stay. 
In terms of proving discriminatory behaviour this means that the causal link between 
the protected factor and the prejudice can be immediately inferred from the conduct of 
public administration itself.  
In addition, with few exceptions, applicants have invoked the violation of the 
prohibition of discrimination together with the violation of an equal treatment clause, 
significantly easing the assessment of the court as to the discriminatory nature of the 
criterion concerned.  
This is true in particular with regard to cases in which the difference of treatment is 
framed as an indirect discrimination. Provided that nationality based differences of 
treatment are considered indirectly discriminatory to the extent that they put people of 
a particular ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared to other people, unless 
the use of the criterion of nationality is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means for achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, the existence of an equal 
treatment clause granting equality of treatment to migrants (or certain categories of 
migrants) has been considered by courts in terms of limiting the scope of the 
justification defence. In other words the equal treatment clause allows the court to 
exclude that the criterion of nationality might be justified by a legitimate aim, given 
that with regard to the scope of the equality clause, the law excludes the possibility to 
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lawfully refer to such criterion.  
An example might be helpful to illustrate the point. Going back to the previously 
mentioned case of the Court of Milano327 concerning access to employment in the 
public sector, the Court after considering that TCNs enjoy equality of treatment with 
regard to access to employment in the public sector, with the exception of posts 
involving the exercise of public authority and the safeguard of general interest 
considers: 
“(…) the same article (the reference is to article 2 that establishes the prohibition of 
indirect discrimination) establishes that should not be considered as discriminatory 
differences of treatment that although apparently discriminatory are objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim pursued through appropriate and necessary means. It 
follows (…) that nationality can be required without assuming a discriminatory 
connotation only when justified by specific aims that are limited to activities involving 
the exercise of public authority and the safeguard of the national interest that in 
relation to their content should be performed only by those that have a particularly 
strong bond with the country.”  
These two aspects make the cases under analysis “easy cases” in consideration of the 
fact that prejudicial treatment is immediately linked to the protected factor through a 
“declaration” of the defendant and the violation of the prohibition of discrimination 
tends to coincide with the violation of the equality of treatment clause. 
Whereas the specificities of the case law do not allow a full assessment as to how the 
new definitions of discriminations and the new rules on the burden of proof have 
actually affected success in courts as far as proving discrimination is concerned, the 
same specificities contribute to highlight the role equal treatment clauses have played 
in this regard.  
The analysis of the case law provides a clear picture of what could be considered as a 
virtuous interplay between the prohibition of discrimination and such clauses, in which 
                                                            
327 Ft. 320. 
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the first, the prohibition of discrimination, assumes instrumental character as regards 
the enforcement of the second, the equal treatment clause. 
Thus, in cases involving nationality related differential treatment established by local 
authorities, the prohibition of discrimination has been enforced in connection with 
equality of treatment clauses provided under the TUI, and in particular: art. 2 that 
guarantees, in accordance with ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75, to all 
foreign workers regularly residing in Italy and their families equal treatment and full 
equality of rights compared to national workers; art. 40 that grants to third-country 
nationals holding at least a two-year residence permit and are employed or engaged in 
self-employment activity the right to equal treatment as regards access to public 
housing; art. 41 TUI stating with regard to access to social assistance that third-country 
nationals that are granted at least a one-year residence permit enjoy equality of 
treatment with nationals and finally art. 6 granting equality of treatment to third 
country nationals as regards registration in the population roll.  
In cases concerning differential treatment resulting from national law provisions, 
courts have systematically referred to equal treatment clauses established at the 
supranational level. The analysis of the case law shows such clauses have mattered in a 
twofold way. Firstly, they have provided the opportunity for courts, according to the 
mechanisms that govern their effect in the domestic system, to “set aside” the national 
provision that violates such clauses or provide an interpretation of the former that is 
consistent with the latter. Secondly, they have provided the standard of equality in the 
light of which courts have assessed whether the alleged discriminatory conduct 
violated the prohibition of discrimination.  
The case law provides in this regard multiple examples in which the discriminatory 
nature of the conduct of the public administration adopted in accordance with national 
legislation excluding migrants from a certain welfare benefit or from employment in 
public sector has been examined in connection with equality clauses provided under 
EU Directives or other sources of EU law and international conventions, and in 
particular the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75 and the ECHR as 
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interpreted by the Court of Strasbourg. In addition, it also allows identifying a clear 
preference of legal actors for EU equality clauses, especially when it comes to cases 
involving individual applicants benefiting from equality clauses established at both 
levels. 
Whereas the ECHR and ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75 are 
characterized by a universal approach not distinguishing between different categories 
of migrants in contrast with the fragmented web of equal treatment clauses resulting 
from EU law, such sources, unlike the latter are not backed with direct effect. Though 
both Conventions have been acknowledged to enjoy “sub-constitutional status” 
meaning their provisions should inform the interpretation of national law, in cases 
where conform interpretation is not legally acceptable, lower courts are left with no 
other choice but to refer to the Constitutional Court.328  
This “comparative advantage” of EU equality clauses appears to explain the extensive 
reliance of legal actors and courts on the equality clause provided under the Directive 
2003/109/EC. Indeed, despite having the Directive a more limited personal scope 
compared to the ECHR and the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers, Table n. 6 
shows the Directive has been widely invoked to disapply national provisions in 
contrast with its equality clause or otherwise provide a conform interpretation of 
national law (48 cases), either with regard to access to employment in the public sector 
or access to social security. In addition the case law show courts have been particularly 
receptive to the indications of the Court of Justice in the Kamberaj case 329 , 
notwithstanding the different outcome that the latter reached on the applicability of the 
RED to cases concerning nationality based differences of treatment.  
This does not mean that legal actors or courts are not willing to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the ECHR and the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers to go 
                                                            
328 According to the doctrine of the Constitutional Court (see ft.132), ordinary courts are bound 
by the provisions of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR, but they cannot disapply national 
provisions that are in conflict with the Convention. The assessment of the compatibility of 
domestic legislation with the ECHR is exclusively reserved to the Constitutional Court.  
329 Ft. 230. 
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beyond the standard of equality established by the national and the EU legislature and 
challenge the principle according which the assessment concerning the compatibility of 
national provisions with the such sources is reserved exclusively to the Constitutional 
Court. Indeed the analysis shows, besides cases in which courts have referred the issue 
to the Constitutional Court prospecting a violation of art. 14 ECHR,330 also a number 
of cases in which courts have provided a conform interpretation of the national 
provision ultimately reaching results equivalent to the mechanism of disapplication 
related to EU law331 or explicitly disapplied national legislation non consistent with the 
ECHR.332 
Table n.6 
  
                                                            
330 Court of Reggio Calabria, 30 March 2015, in GU, 1a Serie Speciale - Corte Costituzionale, 
41, 2015; Court of Bergamo, 30 November 2015, in GU, 1a Serie Speciale - Corte 
Costituzionale, 12, 2016 
331 Court of Ivrea, 24 July 2014, not published; Court of Appeal of Milano, 24 August 2012, not 
published. 
332 Court of Brescia, 9 October 2015, in Redazione Giuffrè, 2015 
 
Supranational sources  2014-2015 (TUI&RED) 
2003/109/EC  48 
2004/83/EC 5 
2004/38/EC 2 
2011/98/EU 2 
ECHR  8 
ILO C. n. 143/75 13 
2009/59/EC 2 
Association Agreement with Turkey 1 
EU-Morocco Agreement  4 
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4.  Resources for litigation. Fee shifting. 
Chapter II provided a general outline of legal rules concerning fee shifting and the cost 
of access to justice in the domestic system highlighting their relevance in terms of 
favouring or otherwise constraining legal mobilisation around antidiscrimination law.   
It also suggested that whereas legal aid might in general represent a key resource for 
legal actors in this regard, in the Italian case, its relevance is likely to be limited in 
consideration of the particularly low income threshold provided by DPR n. 115/02 and 
the mechanism according to which, under the same decree, lawyers’ fees in civil 
proceedings are reduced by half.  
The analysis of the case law shows fee shifting has generally played in favour of actors 
interested in enforcing the prohibition of discrimination.  
It might be helpful, in this regard to remind that art. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code 
provides that the “losing party should reimburse all his or her opponent’s expenses 
including court fees and lawyer’s fees” allowing the judge to derogate to the general 
rule only in case of “split outcome” and “serious and exceptional reasons”. 
With the aim of understanding the working of the rule in action, the analysis has 
distinguished between cases in which courts have ruled in favour of applicants and 
cases in which the discriminatory claim has been dismissed.   
Table n. 7 shows out of 146 cases in which applicants have resulted as the winning 
party, in 109 cases the court has condemned the defendant to fully refund the 
applicant’s lawyers and court fees, and in other 29 cases that each party should bear its 
own expenses.  
An in-depth analysis of these 29 cases shows the most common reasons lying behind 
the decision of the court to derogate the general rule are related to the “peculiarity of 
the issues under review”, to the “complexity of legal framework” or to the “novelty of 
the issues addressed by the court” denoting a certain level of unpredictability of the 
rule, provided that the above reasons are often used as generic formulas not grounded 
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on specific arguments and ultimately related to the nature of the legal framework rather 
than to the behaviour of applicants or to the outcome of the dispute. 
The issue is all but irrelevant. The risks related to a “loose” application art. 92 of the 
Civil Procedure Code are clearly highlighted by the Court of Appeal of Brescia333. In 
reversing a first instance decision providing each party should bear its own costs 
despite allowing that the conduct of the defendant violated the prohibition of 
discrimination with regard to access to social security, the Court observes: 
“Considered moreover the very small amount of the credit, the decision not to apply 
the fee shifting rule would ultimately make legal action completely superfluous, 
provided that the economic benefit granted to the applicant would barely cover his 
lawyers’ fees”. 
Table. n. 7 
The same motivations on the other hand appear to have to some extent protected 
applicants from the obligation to refund the defendant’s legal expenses in cases in 
which the court has dismissed the claim. Only in 3 out of 10 cases in which the 
discrimination claim is dismissed, the applicant has been condemned to pay the 
winning party’s costs.  
Finally the case law confirms the expectations as to the limited relevance of legal aid 
(there is only 1 case in which the applicant was actually admitted to legal aid). 
Chapter II also highlighted a gradual increase of costs related to access to justice 
                                                            
333 Court of Appeal of Brescia, 2 October 2014, not published. 
Decision on lawyer’s and court’s fees 2004-2014  (TUI&RED) 
Each party bears its own cost 29 
Full refund of the expenses of the applicant 109 
Does not rule in this regard. 7 
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starting from 2011. Whereas the rising cost of the “contributo unificato” appears not to 
have discouraged litigation, the exclusion of civil society organizations from benefiting 
from exemption from court fees, as far as proceedings concerning employment and 
access to welfare are concerned, appears to have pushed civil society organizations to 
adapt their strategies to acting in their own name only in cases entailing strategic 
relevance and limiting their involvement to supporting and proving expertise to 
individual claimants in follow up cases. (See in this regard Charter. n.1) 
5. Fighting institutional discrimination. 
This paragraph intends to provide a general overview on litigation highlighting in 
particular who are the perpetrators, what is the object of litigation and how litigation 
has contributed to narrowing the differences between nationals and non-nationals in 
specific areas.  
As to the first issue, it was already anticipated that most of the cases being analysed 
concern institutional discrimination. As Table n. 8 shows in 146 out of 161 claims filed 
form 2004 to 2015 under the TUI and Legislative Decree n. 215/03 the allegedly 
discriminatory conduct was put in place by the public administration. By contrast, 
private parties were involved only in 11 cases. Table n. 9 provides further detail as to 
the bodies of the public administration that have been held responsible for 
discrimination. It shows, in particular that INPS and Municipalities are the main 
subject being targeted by litigation.  
Defender 2004-2015(TUI&RED) 
Public administration  146 
Private 11 
Private and Public administration 4 
Table n. 8  
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Public administration bodies 2004-2015(TUI&RED) 
INPS 58 
Government 22 
Region 7 
Province 6 
Hospital 11 
Police 1 
Municipality 102 
University 1 
Other PA 3 
Table n. 9 
Before going into further detail in analysing the case law, it is important to reflect on 
the extent to which such findings mirror the reality of discrimination in Italy. In other 
words, does the considerably higher number of discriminatory claim towards the public 
administration signify private parties tend to discriminate less in comparison? 
There are at least two distinct reasons preventing such a reading of the data.  
Firstly, it is commonly accepted that prejudicial treatment resulting from the conduct 
of a public administration is far easier to detect, due to the transparency requirements 
the public administration is subject to compared to the level of informality generally 
characterizing the private sector. In order to illustrate such argument, be it sufficient to 
consider the difference between challenging in court a nationality clause included a 
public recruitment notice compared to the decision of a public employer not to hire 
based on the same ground. Indeed in the case law under analysis the overwhelming 
majority of cases concerns nationality related requirements provided by local 
regulations or the law. 
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Secondly, the significant difference in the number of claims involving the public 
administration compared to those involving private parties could be influenced also by 
the specific features of the support structure that has developed in the Italian context of 
fighting discrimination. Civil society organizations that have engaged in legal 
mobilisation on behalf of migrants can be characterized as “external allies” meaning 
that they lack significant numbers of migrants among their membership and their 
supporting activity is justified in the light of “a variety of material and or ideological 
commitments” towards the aggrieved population334. Lack of migrants among their 
membership and lack of organizational presence in “sensitive areas” for the purposes 
of fighting discrimination such as the workplace are very likely to have skewed 
litigation towards the public administration, leaving the private sector in the 
background.  
On this account, data on perpetrators should not be considered as marking a difference 
between the diffusion of discriminatory practices in the public sector and the private 
sector.  
This considered, distinguishing among cases filed against the public administration 
based on the object of the claim, it appears clear that litigation against discrimination 
of migrants has mainly focused on social security and benefits, employment and self-
employment, and services offered by the public administration.   
It should be acknowledged that the classification of case law in Table n.10 should not 
be considered in rigid terms. Whereas case law concerning registration in the 
population roll has been classified under access to services offered by the public 
administration according to a broad understanding of “access to goods and services” 
such as to include also services that are offered to the public by the public 
administration, litigation on the issue overlaps to some extent with access to social 
security and social benefits since the “registration on the population roll” represents a 
precondition for benefiting form any social protection intervention enacted at the 
                                                            
334 M. W. McCann, Rights at work, cit. p.108-109. 
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territorial level or established at the national level, in relation to which implementation 
is demanded to local authorities.   
The same is true for cases classified under “other”. The heading includes cases 
concerning “access to community service”, “sports federation membership” and a case 
challenging as discriminatory the failure of competent authorities to abide by the law 
with regard to an administrative regularization procedure for undeclared work; a case 
concerning a public declaration of a city councillor not to rent or sell houses to 
foreigners and cases concerning a municipality ban of burkini, burqa and street 
vendors. The first three categories are connected to access to employment and the other 
two to access to goods and services, though their peculiarities suggest it would be 
better to classify them separately.  
Object of the claim 2004-2015(PA) 
Social security and benefits 96 
Employment and self-employment 24 
Services offered by the PA 18 
Education 1 
Other  14 
Table n. 10 
Providing a complete overview of litigation is particularly challenging, if not 
impossible. Therefore the following will be limited to outline the main issues 
addressed by the case law with the purpose of highlighting the relevance of litigation in 
narrowing the differences between the status of TCNs and nationals.    
Looking at the political context that favoured increasing involvement of civil society 
organizations in litigation strategies paragraph n. 2 pointed to the so called “local 
policies of exclusion”. Litigation arising from pressures to contain the effects of such 
policies has dealt mainly with access to social benefits and registration of TCNs in the 
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resident population roll. 
As regards the first, the case law provides an extensive number of examples in which 
courts have firmly excluded the possibility for local authorities to refer for the 
purposes of access to social benefits to criteria such as Italian nationality or limit a 
certain benefit only to migrants with a specific type of permit of stay or otherwise 
provide particularly burdensome requirements of “length of residence” (10 years) such 
as to indirectly exclude the TCNs from the scope of potential beneficiaries.  
Such decisions have covered a wide range of benefits such as baby bonuses335, income 
support aimed at individuals that have lost their occupation,336 school fees subsidies,337 
refunds for vision and dental expenses for minors, access to the whole system of social 
protection at the local level,338 access to student housing339, housing subsides340 or 
other forms of support aiming to facilitate access to housing 341  and allocate 
municipality owned apartments.342 
Likewise, lower courts have clarified that local authorities are not allowed to put in 
place any limitation to the right of TCNs to enrolment in the population register under 
the same conditions provided for Italian citizens, therefore qualifying as discriminatory 
local regulations requiring for such purposes long-term status343, absence of criminal 
record344, or a minimum income and the presentation of the applicants passport with a 
                                                            
335 Court of Appeal of Brescia, 31 January 2013, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 1/2, 
2013, p. 264; ft. 310; ft.296; ft. 295; 
336 Ft. 312; Court of Bergamo, 8 July 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p.122. 
337 Ft. 292. 
338 Ft. 312. 
339 Ft. 293. 
340 Ft. 335. 
341Court of Bergamo, 15 July 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p.132. 
342 Court of Brescia, 13 June 2012, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 101; ft. 292. 
343 Ft. 312. 
344 Court of Brescia, 9 April 2010, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 246. 
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regular entry visa345.  
If local authorities are not allowed to refer to nationality related criteria to differentiate 
between nationals and migrants, courts have clarified the national legislature faces 
limitations as well.  
With regard to the so-called “large family allowance”, established under art. 65 Law n. 
448/1998 with the aim to financially support low-income families with at least three 
children and reserved only to Italian and EU nationals, courts have repeatedly 
considered the requirement of nationality to be in violation of the prohibition of 
discrimination.  Whereas with regard to beneficiaries of international protection, 
following the implementation of Directive 2004/83/EC, INPS, that is in charge of the 
payment of the benefit, issued an administrative circular clarifying beneficiaries of 
international protection qualified for the benefit, with regard to long-term residents the 
Institute has failed to provide municipalities, which are in charge of collecting and 
forwarding applications, with indications as to the inclusion of the latter among 
beneficiaries. 
The analysis of the case law shows most cases considering the nationality clause to be 
in violation of the prohibition of discrimination have done so in connection with the 
equal treatment clause provided under Directive 2003/109/EC, though there are also 
examples in which courts have reached the same conclusion with regard to other 
categories of third country nationals pointing to the need to provide an interpretation of 
national legislation that is consistent with art. 14 ECHR.346 As known the ECtHR has 
dealt specifically with the issue in the case Dhabbi v. Italy347 reiterating that “very 
weighty reasons” would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a 
difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible 
with art. 14 of the Convention. The ECtHR has also specified that although budgetary 
                                                            
345 Court of Brescia, 5 May 2011, not published; Court of Brescia ,15 March 2011 and Court of 
Brescia, 31 march 2011, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 255 -266. 
346 Ft. 331. 
347 ECtHR, Dhabhi v. Italy, 8 April 2014, Appl. n. 17120/09. 
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reasons advanced by the Italian Government were to be considered a legitimate aim in 
this regard, such reasons could not be considered sufficient to establish a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality in the instant case that would render the impugned 
distinction compatible with the requirements of art. 14 of the Convention.  
Case law concerning the so-called “basic maternity allowance” established under art. 
74 Legislative Decree n. 151/2001 has on the other hand repeatedly considered the 
requirement of long-term residence to be discriminatory just like the requirement of 
nationality. Providing further evidence on how the enforcement of the prohibition of 
discrimination has contributed to shifting the boundaries of equality for migrants, 
courts have extended the benefit to TCNs in connection with equality clauses under the 
Directive 2011/98/UE and the Euro Mediterranean agreement with Morocco348, the 
Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey349 and finally according to a reading of the national legislation that is 
consistent with art. 14 ECHR.350 In three other cases, based on the premise that the 
national provision does not allow a consistent interpretation, the issue has been 
referred to the Constitutional Court in relation to the compatibility of the requirement 
with art. 14 ECHR as interpreted by the Court of Strasbourg, art. 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution.351  
The case law provides additional examples in which nationality related differential 
treatment has been considered to violate the prohibition of discrimination with regard 
to other benefits established by the national legislature on a transitory basis, including 
a holiday bonus352, social card353, and baby bonuses354.  
                                                            
348 Court of Alessandria, 9 November 2014, not published and Court of Alessandria 25 May 
2015, not published. 
349 Court of Reggio Emilia, 16 July 2012, not published. 
350 Ft. 331. 
351 Ft. 330. 
352 Court of Milano, 17 August 2010, not published. 
353 Court of Trieste19 September 2012, in A. Guariso (ed.) Senza distinzioni, cit., p. 233,  Court 
of Trieste, 26 January 2012, not published. 
354 Court of Monza, 28 October 14, not published.  
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Ultimately a decision of the Court of Brescia has considered discriminatory the 
criterion of ten years of continuous residence in the country in connection with the 
equal treatment clauses provided under Directive 2003/109/EC and Directive 
2004/38/EC. The assessment of the discriminatory nature of the requirement of ten 
years of residence is in line with several decisions assessing the discriminatory nature 
of the same criterion with regard to access to “housing subsidies” and a regional 
“childbirth grant” established by the region of Friuli Venezia Giulia355. 
Access to employment and self-employment is another area that has been at the 
forefront of litigation, in particular as regards access to employment in the public 
sector.  
As already observed, the legislation concerning access to employment in the public 
sector has given rise to significant inconsistencies as to the requirement of nationality 
for the purposes of employment in the public sector resulting in a widespread practice 
of exclusion of TCNs from opportunities of employment in the public sector.  
Litigation in this regard has been strongly connected to the enforcement in the 
domestic system of the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers n. 143/75, which as 
already mentioned grants equality of treatment to all migrants with regular residency 
status as regards access to employment (included employment in the public sector), 
with the only exception of posts with regard to which restrictions can be considered 
justified in the interests of the State, though the case law includes also a number of 
rulings in which courts has specifically referred to Directive 2003/109/EC. 
Courts have repeatedly considered discriminatory for the purposes of art 43 TUI and 
art. 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03 the exclusion of TCNs form posts in the public 
sector that do not entail exercise of public authority, including posts as nurses and 
other healthcare professionals, 356  administrative staff and guardians, 357  software 
                                                            
355 Ft. 294 and Court of Udine, 7 March 2011, not published. 
356 Court of Lodi, 18 February 2011, not published; ft. 321; Court of Biella, 23 July 2010, not 
published; Court of Milano 21 April 2011, in Foro It, I, 2011, p. 2177; Court of Milano, 19 
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technicians358, receptionists359, census officers360, researchers361, teachers.362 
The requirement of nationality has been likewise considered discriminatory with 
regard to access to self–employment and in particular to the professional examination 
allowing exercising the profession of employment consultant363. 
Finally, an analysis of how litigation has contributed to narrow differences between 
Italian nationals and migrants cannot be conceived without referring to litigation on the 
issue of access to “community service”364. Whereas from a legal point of view, the 
arguments upholding the discriminatory nature of the requirement of Italian nationality 
with regard to “community service” are no different from those elaborated by courts 
with regard to access to employment in the public sector, such decisions hold particular 
relevance since they appear to make explicit an idea that flows throughout the case law 
under analysis, the idea that in addition to the traditional concept of community that is 
linked to citizenship, there is a community that goes beyond citizenship, that is based 
on the choice to move and reside in a certain country fulfilling the obligations and 
enjoining the rights it grants to its members. 
As the Court of Appeal of Milano observes: 
                                                                                                                                                              
November 2012, not published, Court of Perugia, 8 June 2012, not published, Court of Milano, 
5 October 2011, not published, Court of Trieste, 22 July 2011, not published. 
357 Court of Milano, 30 July 2010, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 3, 2010, p. 786.  
358 Court of Firenze, 23 January 2014, in Redazione Giuffrè, 2014. 
359 Court of Siena, 3 September 2012, not published.  
360 Court of Brescia, 29 December 2011, not published; Court of Genova, 16 August 2011, not 
published; Court of Milano, 12 August 2011, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 4, 2011, p. 
894  
361 Court of Roma, 20 December 2012, not published. 
362 Court of Roma, 14 December 2012, not published; Court of Milano, 4 March 2015, in Foro 
It, I, 2015, p. 2531. 
363 Court of Milano, 29 August 2013, not published. 
364 Court of Milano, 12 January 2012 in Foro It, 2, I, 2012, p. 594, confirmed by Court of 
Appeal of Milano, 22 March 2013, in Redazione Giuffrè, 2013; Court of Milano, 19 November 
2013. The Court of Cassation n. 7951/16 referred the issue to the Constitutional Court that 
ultimately declared the requirement of nationality unconstitutional in accordance with art. 3 of 
the Constitution (Constitutional Court n. 119/2015) 
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“The concept of ‘national community’ as defined by the Constitution and interpreted 
by the Constitutional Court does not refer to the concept of “national borders” rather 
than a to community of people living within such borders; it is clear that the concept of 
citizenship is linked to being part of this community that lives and interacts within a 
specific territory.” 
It is important to note that in narrowing differences between the status of nationals and 
non-nationals lower courts stand in a complementary relationship with the 
Constitutional Court, subjecting, through the enforcement of the prohibition of 
discrimination, national provisions entailing differences of treatment based on 
nationality to judicial review.    
Important as it is, the acknowledgement of equal rights in courts does not necessarily 
translate in significant social reform.  In order to assess the role of litigation and courts 
in this regard, is necessary to investigate the impact of litigation beyond courtrooms. 
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Chapter IV 
JUSTICE CONTAINED 
1. From court victories to policy response. 
The previous chapter highlighted how the legal opportunity structure has influenced 
legal mobilisation around the prohibition of discrimination affecting the strategies of 
legal actors and their chances of winning in court. It also provided an overview of 
litigation illustrating how lower courts have contributed to narrowing differences 
between the legal status of national and foreigners.  
This chapter intends to go further, moving from court decisions to policy response. In 
doing so it will focus on two specific areas of litigation, access to employment in the 
public sector and access to welfare, and in particular access to the “large family 
allowance” under art. 65 Law n. 448/1998.  
The choice of these specific issues is related to the fact that they have generated, 
compared to the other areas included in the analysis, exceptionally high levels of 
litigation, and in relation to both “European Law 2013” n. 97/2013 has amended 
national legislation allowing access to employment in public sector to long-term 
residents, beneficiaries of international protection and EU national family members 
and extending the area of the beneficiaries of the “large family allowance” to long-
term residents.  
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In discussing the evolution of the public interest law in the US, this research pointed to 
the criticism the “first wave” of public interest law was subject to and in particular to 
the liberal critique concerned with the limits of litigation as a strategy for social 
change. Indeed, both Handler and Scheingold have brilliantly illustrated the 
difficulties of translating court decisions into meaningful change and the risks 
associated with pursuing legal strategies as to “atomizing” collective claims and 
draining resources from more promising strategies such as political mobilisation365.  
Such legitimate concerns have been to a certain extent overcome by more recent 
research showing how law matters for social reform should be assessed in the light of 
the ability of actors to promote sustained litigation366 and to strategically use victories 
in court for obtaining responsive actions to policy demands and ensuring 
enforcement.367  
Focusing on the impact of European Court of Justice and national decisions on 
different areas of EU law, among which access to employment in the public sector and 
access to welfare for EU nationals, Conant elaborates a theoretical model which links 
policy response to patterns of legal and political mobilisation, arguing that the 
variations in the ability of actors interested in reform to initiate legal challenges and 
mobilise pressure to broaden the scope of legal victories will ultimately be crucial for 
judicial impact. Yet she notes the mobilisation of competing interest will also 
influence policy response compelling decision makers to contain justice by restricting 
the scope of such legal victories368. 
With these considerations in mind, the following paragraphs will trace the national 
authorities’ policy response to judicial decisions and weigh the impact of litigation on 
the process that brought to the 2013 reform.  
                                                            
365 J. F. Handler, Social Movements, cit. S. A. Scheingold, The politics of rights, cit. 
366  C. R. Epp, The rights revolution cit 
367 M. McCann, Law and Social Movements, cit,  
368 L. J. Conant, Justice contained: law and politics in the European Union, Cornell University 
Press, 2002.  
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2. Access to employment in the public sector. 
The analysis of the case law showed courts have assessed the discriminatory nature of 
the nationality clause as regards access to employment in the public sector taking into 
account the multilevel nature of regulation applying to the issue, and in particular the 
constraints arising from EU and international law as to the cases in which nationality 
can be lawfully required for such purposes.  
The previous chapters provided an account of how this different levels of regulation, 
national, international and European, have affected the strategies of legal actors and 
defined their chances of success in court.  
Indeed, the analysis highlighted the relevance of the ILO Convention on Migrant 
Workers n. 143/75 and of the EU Directives on long-term residents and beneficiaries 
of international protection in allowing legal actors to challenge discriminatory 
practices linked to an interpretation of the national legislation regulating access to 
employment in the public sector such as to include, except for European citizens, a 
general requirement of Italian nationality.  
It didn’t take long, following the adoption of the TUI, before such practices were 
challenged before courts for violating the prohibition of discrimination under art. 43.  
As already mentioned, the first ruling considering the nationality clause discriminatory 
for the purposes of art. 43 TUI was the 2002 decision of Court of Appeal of Firenze369 
which argued thoroughly on the effects of the ILO Convention in the domestic system, 
concluding that the only admissible restrictions applying to access to employment in 
the public sector were those mentioned by art. 14 of the Convention. 
The decision would start a vivid discussion between employment and administrative 
courts as to the correct interpretation of existing legislation, with the former 
                                                            
369 Ft. 199. 
	 158	
considering the requirement of citizenship discriminatory and the latter, except for the 
TAR Liguria370, endorsing the lawfulness of the same requirement for the purposes of 
recruitment in the public administration.371  
Apparently the legal uncertainty ultimately arising form these conflicting approaches 
prompted the issuing of an “opinion” on behalf of the governmental “Public Service 
Department”372. The “opinion” considered and disregarded the arguments supporting 
the possibility for TCNs to access public-sector employment.373  
The opinion would not as a matter of fact discourage further litigation. A year after it 
was issued, in 2005 the Court of Appeal of Firenze374 would confirm the arguments 
supporting the withdrawal of the requirement of Italian citizenship in national 
legislation.  
In 2007, Legislative Decree n. 3/2007 implemented Directive 203/109/EC specifically 
addressing the issue of access to employment. Art. 9 established holders of the EC 
long-term residence permit have access to any employment or self-employment 
activity that is not explicitly limited by law to nationals. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the only activities that are explicitly limited to the latter are those involving the 
exercise of public authority and the safeguard of the general interest, the provision was 
interpreted as confirming the exclusion of TCNs from employment in public sector.  
                                                            
370 Ft. 200. 
371 Court of Genova, 19 July, 2004, not published; Court of Genova 21 April 2004, in Diritto, 
Immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2, 2004, p. 172. Contra TAR Toscana n. 38/2003, not published; 
TAR Veneto, n. 782/2004, not published. 
372 The Public Service Department is in charge of the coordination and monitoring of the 
organization and functioning of public administrations, as well as for the coordination of the 
Public Administration with regard to admission and conditions applying to public sector 
employment.  
373 Parere dell’Ufficio per il personale delle pubbliche amministrazioni n. 196/2004, in Diritto, 
Immigrazione e cittadinanza, 3, 2004, 3, p. 239. 
374 Court of Appeal of Firenze, 21 December 2005, in Diritto, Immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2 
2006, p. 110. 
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Legislative Decree n. 251/2007 implementing Directive 2004/83/EC and Legislative 
Decree n. 30/2007 implementing Directive 2004/38/EC had the merit of being less 
ambiguous in this regard both extending, respectively, to beneficiaries of refugee 
status (the law fails to mention beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) and EU 
national’s family members access to employment in the public sector under the same 
conditions applying to EU nationals. In addition the national legislature would extend 
access to employment in the public sector also to family members of Italian nationals 
in order to avoid “reverse discrimination”. 
Though one could reasonably expect the implementation of the EU directives granting 
equality of treatment to the above categories of TCNs to lower the number of 
grievances and therefore limit litigation as far as these categories are concerned, the 
analysis of the case law shows the new provisions did only change the law in the 
books. Though their impact in opening public-sector employment to TCNs was 
limited, the above Directives provided essential arguments for legal actors and courts 
to rely on in arguing on the unlawfulness of nationality clause. 
Looking at the overall litigation generated on the issue (Table n. 10), the data shows 
the 2002 decision of the Court of Appeal of Firenze was followed by 46 lower courts 
decisions assessing the discriminatory nature of the nationality clause, with courts 
agreeing with the applicant in 45 out of 46 cases decided and one referral to the 
Constitutional Court.   
Table n. 10 
Outcome of the proceeding n. of decisions  
Referral to the Constitutional Court  
 
1 
It is not discriminatory  1 
It is discriminatory  45 
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Consensus among lower courts on the discriminatory nature of the nationality 
requirement has proved so strong that it was able to overcome the setback of the Court 
of Cassation in 2006 considering the requirement to be in line with national and 
international law375 and attain in 2011 the indirect support of the Constitutional 
Court.376 The latter indeed seemed willing to align with lower courts in declaring the 
referral of the Court of Rimini377 not admissible provided that the referring judge 
appeared to have already identified a reading of the relevant regulations that was 
conform with the Constitution. According to such reading the referring judge had 
concluded the applicant, a third country national, had the right to access employment 
in the public sector under the same conditions applying to EU nationals.  
The consolidation among lower courts of an inclusive reading of domestic legislation 
would also affect the official position of UNAR on the issue. In 2010 asked to provide 
an opinion on the discriminatory nature on the nationality clause, UNAR would 
simply acknowledge the existence of conflicting case law and refer to the official 
position of the government before concluding on the “impossibility, de jure condito, to 
open the doors of employment in the public sector to individuals not holding Italian or 
European citizenship”, though the Office wished for an evolution of the legal 
framework in that direction.378 Less than a year later, making explicit reference to 
lower courts decisions, the Office will maintain that in light of the existing regulatory 
framework and related case law, nationality could be lawfully required only with 
regard to posts involving the exercise of public authority and the safeguard of the 
general interest. Apart from these cases, it is concluded, the requirement assumes a 
discriminatory connotation, implying a differential and disadvantageous treatment for 
                                                            
375 Court of Cassation n. 24170/2006, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2, II, 2007, p. 
302 
376 Constitutional Court, n. 139/2011  
377 Court of Rimini, 22 June 2010, in GU 1a Serie Speciale - Corte Costituzionale, 45, 2010. 
378 UNAR, Opinion n.15, Rep. n. 219/2010 
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migrants that cannot be justified in the light of the objective differences between the 
status of national and non-nationals379. 
Litigation will be particularly intense between 2010 and 2013. During this three years 
period will be filed 31 out of 47 cases.  
 
Charter n. 2 
Notwithstanding considerable success in court, reform amending Legislative Decree n. 
165/2001 extending the exemption provided for EU citizens to TCNs with EU long-
term resident status, beneficiaries of refugee and subsidiary protection and EU 
nationals’ family members is more likely to be related to the intervention of the 
European Commission on the issue. Therefore, multilevel protection of migrants as to 
the issue of access to employment in the public sector, besides strongly affecting 
enforcement, allows also to explain the process that brought to the 2013 reform.  
The influence in this regard of the European Commission institutional support is 
confirmed by the legislative instrument chosen by the Italian government to this end. 
The so-called “European law” is specifically used for the purposes of adapting the 
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domestic legislation to obligations arising from EU law. This is confirmed by an 
explicit reference in Law n. 97/2013 to the EU Pilot pre-infringement proceedings 
1769/11/JUST and 2368/11/HOME, the first concerning the correct implementation of 
Directive 2004/38/EC and the second the implementation of Directives 2003/109/EC 
and 2004/83/EC.  
The failure of the legislature to take into account and extend equality of treatment to 
categories of migrant workers different from those covered by EU legislation 
confirms, beyond formal arguments, the importance of the pressure coming form the 
European Commission in the process that brought to the adoption of Law n. 97/2013.  
During the parliamentary proceedings, civil society organizations would draw the 
attention of the legislature on the need to modify national legislation in accordance 
with the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers and the related national case law 
granting migrant workers, other than those protected under EU law, equality of 
treatment as regards access to employment in the public sector380. Though the issue 
was raised before both chambers of the Parliament in line with civil society 
organizations’ appeals381, eventually the law remained silent in this regard.  
While the legislative amendment has dissolved any doubt with regard to the categories 
of TCNs it specifically refers to, the minimalist approach of the legislature seems to 
have re-opened the discussion with reference to the categories of TCNs not mentioned 
by Law n. 97/2013. 
Indeed the fact that Legislative decree n. 165/2001 was amended allowing access to 
public sector employment only to the categories of TCNs migrants covered by EU law 
was considered by the Court of Cassation as an indication of the persistence in 
national legislation of a general principle according to which Italian nationality 
represents a necessary condition for the purposes of access to public sector 
                                                            
380  ASGI, Migrants and access to employment in the public sector: appeal for a new 
discrimination, 17/07/2003; S. Briguglio, Notes on access to employment in the public sector 
by migrants, 22/07/2013. 
381ODG Camera dei deputati 9/1327/7; ODG Senato G7.100. 
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employment, except for cases where the national legislature expressively provides an 
exception in this regard. 382 
The sequence of the events here described echoes Conant’s findings on the policy 
responses following the ECJ case law granting EU nationals access to most fields of 
employment in the public sector. She argues that Member States were initially 
reluctant to honour the policy implications of the ECJ restrictive interpretation of the 
“public service exception” responding to legal challenges on a case-by-case basis 
rather than through general reform383. 
In her account, whereas limited enforcement before national courts and the ECJ failed 
to generate such policy change, the European Commission engagement provided a 
critical source of pressure towards the enactment in the early ’90 of legislative reforms 
abolishing nationality clauses, at least in relation to some areas of public-sector 
employment.  
Nonetheless the case of access of TCNs to public sector employment in Italy appears 
to be different, at least with regard to two different aspects.  
In explaining the above pattern of policy response, Conant points in particular to two 
factors. The first refers to the lack of organizational capacity of EU migrants and 
associations supporting them to pursue legal opportunities effectively and migrants’ 
lack of national franchise, ultimately insulating host Member States from their 
demands. The second is related to limited interest of Member States either to reform 
their policies or to resist change. Indeed the latter were able to retain full exemption 
for “sensitive” posts, had no cost in allowing EU nationals to access public sector 
employment and could rely on the limited number of EU migrants not to generate 
political opposition from their constituencies.  
                                                            
382 Court of Cassation n. 18523/2014, in Foro It, 10, I, 2014, p. 2732. Contra, Court of Firenze 
23.1.2014, ft. 358.  
383 L. J. Conant, Justice contained, cit., p. 151-176. 
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The analysis of the national case law shows migrants and civil society organizations 
have been able to successfully exploit legal opportunities and build significantly broad 
consensus among lower courts.  
Whereas it could be argued that the failure to reform existing legislation in accordance 
with the EU Directives and national court decisions could also be explained in the 
light of the non-compliance record of Italy as just another example of lack of 
administrative capacity, there are several reasons for considering an alternative 
explanation. 
First, notwithstanding the decision to amend national legislation in line with the 
indications of the European Commission, the document accompanying the draft law 
specifies, as regards long-term residents and beneficiaries of refugee status and 
subsidiary protection that the government does not share the position of the European 
Commission as to the incompatibility of national legislation precluding access to such 
categories with the EU Directives and justifies reform in view to avoiding the opening 
of an infringement procedure.384 
Second, the evolution of the political discourse on TCNs and immigration policies 
targeting TCNs both marked by emphasis on repression of illegal migration, 
restrictions on access to national labour market and retraction of equal rights to those 
already admitted in the national territory provide a strong argument on the interest of 
national authorities in resisting reform.385  
Whereas the analysis of the case law shows trade union organizations might share to a 
certain extent the objective of opening public sector jobs to TCNs (they have actually 
acted together individual claimants or even filed collective claims, sometimes together 
with civil society organizations), the opinion of the general public appears to live no 
room for speculation. Indeed according to ISTAT, though 71,7% of Italians consider 
“absolutely not justifiable” the decision of an employer not to hire a migrant, though 
                                                            
384 Document accompanying European Law 2013, A.C. 1327 
385 L. Calafà, Migrazione economica cit.; W. Chiaromonte, William, Lavoro e cit. F. Biondi Dal 
Monte, Dai diritti sociali cit. 
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she has all required qualifications, 48,7% agree that in times of scarcity of 
occupational opportunities, employers should give priority to hiring Italians over 
migrants, while 24,6% neither agree nor disagree with the same statement.386 
It appears that in the case under examination, higher levels of enforcement have been 
counterbalanced by stronger interest of public authorities to resist general reform. 
Notwithstanding sustained litigation and related costs, national authorities’ 
preferences appear to have been shaped by concern of exposure on a particularly 
sensitive issue for political opponents and the general public. 
3. Access to the “large family allowance”. 
As for the case of access to employment in the public sector, the interaction between 
different levels of regulations has played an essential role, both in relation to the 
successful enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination in court and the 2013 
reform extending the benefit to long-term residents.  
The large family allowance, as previously mentioned, was established under art. 65 
Law n. 448/1998 and granted exclusively to Italian or European nationals according to 
the following mechanisms: the benefit is granted by municipalities following the 
application of those qualifying as recipients and is paid by INPS based on data 
provided by municipalities. 
Following the implementation of Directive 2004/83/EC, INPS issued an 
administrative circular clarifying that beneficiaries of international protection were 
entitled to the benefit387. By contrast, the Institute did not provide any guideline in 
relation to the inclusion of long-term residents among the beneficiaries of the “large 
family allowance”.  
Such failure could be explained, at least in relation to the immediate aftermath of the 
implementation of Directive 2003/109/EC, in the light of the ambiguous wording of 
                                                            
386 ISTAT (Istituto nazionale di statistica), I migranti visti dai cittadini, 2012. 
387 INPS, Circular n. 9/2010.  
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the implementing decree as to the rights granted to long-term residents with regard to 
access to social security and social assistance.  
Indeed the latter established that long-term residents are “entitled to social assistance 
and social security benefits and to those relating to subsidies for health, education and 
social matters (…) unless otherwise provided and on the condition that it is shown that 
the foreign national actually resides in national territory (emphasis added).” 
Questioning the above provision could qualify under art. 11 of Directive 2009/109/EC 
as an expression of the intention of the national legislature to limit equality of 
treatment as regards social assistance and social protection to “core benefits”, while 
arguing at the same time that the “large family allowance” clearly falls within the 
scope of “core benefits”, ASGI together with an individual claimant challenged for the 
first time the discriminatory nature of the nationality clause before the Court of 
Gorizia388.   
Arguing that it was not apparent that the legislature had intended to rely on the 
derogation from the equal treatment clause established under art. 11 of the Directive, 
the Court found the exclusion of long-term residents from the benefit was in violation 
of Directive 2003/109/EC, and held that the denial of the application of the claimant 
was discriminatory for the purposes of art. 43 TUI and 2 Legislative Decree n. 215/03. 
The Court ordered both INPS and the defendant municipality to grant to benefit. 
Relying on the decision of the Court of Gorizia, ASGI publicly urged INPS to adapt 
its policies in line with the judgment of the Court389. While acknowledging the issue 
was worthy of consideration in relation to its social implications, INPS insisted that 
according to the current state of legislation only Italian and European nationals 
qualified for the benefit, also pointing to the fact that the national legislature had 
specified long-term residents are granted equal treatment “unless otherwise provided” 
                                                            
388 Court of Gorizia, 1 October 2010, in Rivista critica di diritto del lavoro, 3, 2010, p. 875, 
confirmed in second instance by Court of Gorizia, 7 December 2010, not published. 
389 ASGI/INPS and ANCI, letter dated 20/10/2010. 
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and to its limited competences on the issue, being the granting of the benefit, 
according to INPS a matter for municipalities390.   
The decision of the Court of Gorizia paved the way for further litigation on the issue.  
By April 2012, legal actors and national courts could count on the support of the 
highest court in EU law confirming their arguments on the scope of the derogation 
clause and urging national courts to disapply domestic law provisions in contrast with 
the Directive. Indeed, in the Kamberaj case the Court of Justice held that since the 
integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member 
States and the right of those nationals to equal treatment in the sectors listed in art. 
11(1) of Directive 2003/109 is the general rule, the derogation provided for in art. 
11(4) must be interpreted strictly. In addition, the Court specified that the derogation 
provided for in article 11(4) of Directive 2003/109/EC requires Member States to state 
clearly that they intend to depart from the general rule391. 
Despite the European Court of Justice left no room to insist on an alternative 
understanding of the Directive, such as to exclude the entitlement of long-term 
residents to the “large family allowance”, by May 2012 INPS issued a “message” 
confirming that on the basis of the “existing regulatory framework”, long-term 
residents could claim no right in this regard. The message referred to a reasoned 
opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance pointing to the fact that a regulatory intervention would imply an “increasing 
financial burden” on national authorities and concluded that in absence of a regulatory 
intervention on the issue, INPS had no other choice but to apply “the law”.392  
Between 2010 and August 2013 were filed 31 (out of a total number of 51 cases) 
claims concerning the discriminatory nature of the nationality requirement for the 
purposes of the “large family allowance”, with litigation reaching its peak in 2013 
(Charter n. 3). Courts agreed on the discriminatory nature of the nationality 
                                                            
390 INPS/ASGI, letter dated 22/10/2010. 
391 Ft. 230, paragraph n. 86-88. 
392 INPS, Message n. 8468/2012. 
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requirement in 30 cases, with only one exception represented by the Court of Monza 
deciding to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court393. 
 
Charter n. 3 
Despite the insistence of INPS on the “existing regulatory framework”, it is interesting 
to notice that its main “defence strategy” has consisted in “blaming municipalities.” 
Prior to the 2013 reform the Institute has been condemned in 29 out of 30 cases to 
grant the benefit to the individual applicant and refund together with the municipality 
involved the legal expenses of applicants. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the 
case law on the issue, the Institute has failed to adjust its policy in accordance with 
national courts rulings containing compliance with EU law to distinct court orders, 
and thereby containing justice in the process.  
Once again the European Commission would make a difference, forcing national 
authorities to amend art. 65 Law n. 488/1998.  Art. 13 of European Law 2013 
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specifically refers the infringement procedure n. 2013/4009 initiated by the European 
Commission on the “non-conformity of Italian law with the equal treatment principle 
of Directive 2003/109/EC”.  
Having traced the process that brought to the amendment of national legislation, it 
should be acknowledged that the same factors that shaped policy response with regard 
to access to employment apply also to the case of “large family allowance”. On the 
one hand, TCNs complete political disenfranchisement has insulated the national 
government form the claims of migrants for equal rights. On the other hand, pressure 
on national authorities exercised by political counterparts and the general public, in 
addition to the substantial financial burden connected to policy change, have limited 
the impact of litigation and provided strong incentives to limit compliance to 
individual decisions avoiding reform. In times of economic stagnation and austerity 
policies, welfare is a very sensitive topic, especially if associated with migration.  
Such pressures have been very much in place even with regard to the definition of the 
scope of the newly established rights, providing further confirmation to the above 
considerations.  
While finally acknowledging the long-term resident’s entitlement to the “large family 
allowance”, the legislature indirectly restricted scope of the entitlement by limiting the 
allocation of financial resources for such purposes to the period starting from July 
2013, therefore excluding the benefit could be awarded in relation to the first semester 
of 2013, though according to the provision regulating the submission of applications 
recipients could still apply in this regard. 
The issue also affected those that had taken the initiative to submit their applications 
for the previous years despite persistence of competent authorities in claiming they 
had not right. These cases include for the most long-term residents that had already 
started a case or were willing to do so.  
	 170	
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs394 and INPS395 aligned along a narrow 
interpretation of the right of long-term migrants to benefit from the “large family 
allowance” such as to take effect from July 2013.  
The restriction triggered a new wave of litigation with legal actors claiming in courts 
that long-term residents were entitled to the benefit also with regard to the past. Such 
claims mainly referred to the fact that “European law 2013” while explicitly 
acknowledging that long-term residents were qualified for the benefit, did not as a 
matter of fact establish a new right, since their entitlement preceded legislative reform, 
having its roots in art. 11 Directive 109/2003/EC, which as the ECJ confirmed in 
Kamberaj has direct effects. 
In 16 out of 16 cases filed on the issue courts agreed with applicants and therefore 
declared discriminatory the refusal of the competent authorities to award the benefits 
in relation to periods prior to July 2013.  
It is particularly significant in this regard the decision of the Court of Milano396 
specifically addressing the discriminatory nature of the administrative circular issued 
by INPS aiming to limit the effects of the equal treatment principle, in the light of the 
2013 reform (circular 4/2014). In assessing the discriminatory nature of the circular, 
the Court held that indeed the right of long-term residents to the large family 
allowance was not dependant on the choice of the legislature as to the allocation of 
resources and ordered INPS to terminate its conduct and to publish the decision on its 
website. 
Remarkably, INPS has issued a new administrative circular397 giving account of the 
decision of the Court of Milano and expressing the intention to proceed to payments 
with reference to the first semester of 2013. 
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395 INPS, Circular n. 4/2014. 
396 Court of Milano, 20 May 2014, not published, confirmed in second instance by Court of 
Appeal of Milano, 22 May 2015, not published. 
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Whereas caution is advised in assessing whether the policy reaction of INPS can be 
considered to break the pattern of limited compliance, it cannot be ignored that it 
indeed opens to the possibility of a more transparent dialogue with the institution. 
Prior to the 2013 reform, equality existed only for those that had access to courts. 
Outside of courtrooms differential treatment based on nationality prevailed in the 
everyday practices of institutions that were under the obligation to give effect to equal 
rights. Legal actors successfully exploited the legal resources at their disposal building 
broad consensus among lower courts as to the right of long-term residents to access 
the “large family allowance”, though the financial burden associated to reform and 
concerns of political opposition skewed policy response to “contained justice.” 
4. Litigation as part of a broader strategy 
The above analysis highlights the limits of litigation as a strategy for achieving social 
reform when political opposition is strong and affected constituencies lack the 
possibility to influence decision makers to adapt their policies in line with judicial 
decisions.  
Notwithstanding significant success in court, the case of access to employment in the 
public sector and the case of access to the “large family allowance” showed the impact 
of litigation beyond the courtroom was contained. While migrants lack political rights 
and are not therefore in the condition to exercise any pressure on national or local 
authorities, the policy preferences of the latter appear to have been shaped by concerns 
of exposure on issues considered to be particularly sensitive for political opponents 
and the electorate.   
 Should therefore those interested in fighting for migrant rights better focus on more 
promising strategies, such as lobbying of institutions like the European Commission or 
elected representatives instead of spending scarce resources on litigation? 
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The question is misleading for two different reasons. Firstly, it should be noted that 
what drove civil society organizations towards legal strategies is indeed related to the 
constraints migrants suffer in advancing their interests through political channels. 
Secondly, it assumes that litigation as a strategy for social reform is pursued in 
alternative to political mobilisation and tends to ignore the interaction between legal 
and political mobilisation.  
Indeed if we go back to the cases under review, if litigation did not end practices of 
exclusion, it clearly contributed to highlight the scope of EU law and document the 
diffuse practice of exclusion of TCNs from public-sector employment and access to 
social assistance, while at the same identifying legal solutions for overcoming such 
practices pointing to the inconsistencies of national regulation on access to 
employment in the public sector and access to social assistance. By doing so it brought 
into the agenda claims that would otherwise remain unexpressed. 
But most importantly, both cases allow highlighting the importance of litigation as 
part of a broader strategy, including lobbying for institutional support.  
Indeed, exploring the process that brought the European Commission to start the EU 
Pilot cases 1769/11/JUST and 2368/11/HOME (concerning the implementation of 
Directives 2004/38/EC, 2003/109/EC and 2004/83/EC as regards access to 
employment in the public sector) and the infringement procedure n. 2013/4009 
(concerning the implementation of Directive 2003/109/EC as regards the equal 
treatment principle under the Directive), it is possible to link the initiative of the EU 
Commission to two separate complaints filed by ASGI in 2009398 and a 2011.399 
The first complaint documented to the European Commission the state of domestic 
legislation on access to employment in the public sector while referring to national 
case law on the issue, as a source of support of the accuracy of the complaint from a 
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legal point of view and as a means for documenting the diffuse practice of exclusion 
from public sector employment of the categories of TCNs covered by EU law.  
The second complaint specifically addressed the issue of the incompatibility with EU 
law of the exclusion of long term residents from the “large family allowance” 
illustrating in detail the national regulatory framework, the generalized practice of 
exclusion of long term residents while pointing to the interpretation of the equal 
treatment clause endorsed by national courts and to their position as to the 
incompatibility of art. 65 Law 448/1998 with the former. 
Scholars warning about the limits of litigation as a strategy for social change correctly 
point to the fact that courts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate policies and 
implement decisions ordering significant social reform.400 What is perplexing about 
this critique is the underlying assumption that general policy reform enacted by 
legislature alone can generate social change.  
The above analysis showed the adoption at the EU level of legislation aiming to 
extend to specific categories of TCNs equal treatment as regards access to 
employment or social protection and their implementation by national law did not 
prevent national authorities from narrowing the scope of the principle of equality or 
contain practices blatantly departing from the latter. 
The analysis of the aftermath of the 2013 law reform unfortunately confirms this view. 
As far as access to social protection is concerned, the case law showed the amendment 
of art. 65 Law n. 448/1998, while finally acknowledging the right of long-term 
residents to receive the “large family allowance", triggered a new line of case law 
addressing the narrow interpretation of INPS as to the coming into effect of such right. 
As to access to employment in the public sector, based on its monitoring activities of 
public recruitment notices ASGI has already denounced the existence of diffused 
practices in the public administration having the effect, if not the aim, to limit the 
opening of public sector employment to TCNs and consisting in the publication of 
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notices of recruitment mentioning exclusively Italian and European nationality, while 
making obscure references to the applicable law or to “nationals that enjoy equal 
treatment with European nationals”. In doing so ASGI has asked the governmental 
“Public Service Department” to issue a new “Opinion” clarifying for the public 
administration the obligations they are subject to under the law.401  
In addition, it appears that civil society organizations have already turned to the courts, 
proving the expectations that the 2013 reform would put end to discriminatory 
practices were over-optimistic. APN, ASGI together with Confederazione Unitaria di 
Base (CUB) have challenged before the Court of Milano a Ministerial Decree issued 
by the Ministry of Education requiring Italian or European nationality for the purposes 
of hiring substitute teachers, while establishing that TCNs candidates could apply only 
with regard to positions concerning “foreign languages that are official languages 
exclusively in non-EU countries.” In addition the Decree specifies that potential 
candidates that meet the requirement of EU nationality will be conferred priority in 
this regard. Interestingly the Ministry failed to enter an appearance. The Court of 
Milano agreed with the applicants, issuing yet another decision on discrimination and 
access to employment in the public sector.402 
In conclusion, this analysis allows to highlight how legal and political mobilisation 
interact, and their complementarity for pursuing social reform. Initial litigation 
targeting the nationality clause contributed to highlight the scope of protection under 
art. 11 of the EU Directive 2003/109/EC and document patterns of practices of 
exclusion of long-term residents, while allowing civil society organizations to lobby 
for the support of the European Commission to put pressure on national authorities to 
enact legislative reform. Following the adoption of European Law n. 97/2013, 
litigation appears to be still very much needed to ensure that the national authorities 
will fulfil their obligations towards their “silent constituency.”  
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